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Abstract
A history of modem architecture can follow two distinct paths. First is the path
of the object: an analysis of the historical origins of the things and events themselves.
Second is the path of the subject: an analysis of the more intangible and shifting
historicity of the concepts and categories by which we attempt to understand objects
and events. This study analyzes the reciprocity of subject/object relations in modern
architecture. Subjectivity constitutes the categories of possible experience, objectivity
is what is experienced; and architecture resides in the both domains.
The particular dialectic of subject and object treated here is that which emerges
in the buildings, projects, and writings of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer,
each of whom, in different ways, brings himself face-to-face with the threatening
problems posed by modernity to bourgeois humanism and the sovereignty of its modes
of artistic production and reception. My thesis is that a perceptual shift, which I call
posthumanism, can be detected within the work of these figures. Posthumanism is the
consciousness and conscious response, whether with applause, resignation, or regret.
to the threatened norm of psychological autonomomy and individualism. Each of these
architects produced a body of work that delineates precise social agendas as well as
aesthetic preferences and offers architectures that would be adequate to the
posthumanist social orders envisioned.
The study draws on established and emergent analyses in critical theory, in
particular those of the Frankfurt School and of certain poststructuralist thinkers. It
attempts to demonstrate that many of the experiments by these architects previously
relegated by the critical-historical establishment to reductive versions of functionalism
or Sachlichkeit can be more fruitfully explained within a framework of positions
indicative of the changed status of the subject and the ways the subject is variously
constituted by the different architectures.
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Introduction
The separation of subject and object is both
real and illusory. True, because in the
cognitive realm it serves to express the real
separation, the dichotomy of the human
condition, a coercive development. False,
because the resulting separation must not be
hypostasized, not magically transformed into
an invariant. This contradiction in the
separation of subject and object is imparted
to epistemology. Though they cannot be
thought away, as separated, the pseudos of
the separation is manifested in their being
mutually mediated - the object by the
subject, and even more, in different ways,
the subject by the object. The separation is
no sooner established directly, without
mediation, than it becomes ideology, which
is indeed its normalform. The mind will
then usurp the place of something absolutely
independent - which it is not; its claim of
independence heralds the claim of
dominance. Once radically parted from the
object, the subject reduces it to its own
measure; the subject swallows the object,
forgetting how much it is an object itself.
Theodor Adorno, "Subject and Object" (1969), in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew
Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1982), 498-99
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Introduction
Modernism, whatever else we may mean by the term, has something to do with the
emergence of new kinds of objects and structures in everyday social, technological, and
economic life and, at the same time, the emergence of new conceptualizations of
everyday experience, of the changed relationships between objects, their producers,
and their audiences and consumers. A history of modern architecture, then, can follow
two distinct paths. First is the path of the object: an analysis of the historical origins of
the things and events themselves - the buildings, drawings, and writings, as well as
the social, technological, and economic transformations with which they can be related.
Second is the path of the subject: an analysis of the more intangible and shifting
historicity of the concepts and categories by which we attempt to understand objects
and events. It is the second path that I propose to follow in this thesis, recognizing that
ultimately the paths would converge, that in historiography, too, "the separation of
subject and object is both real and illusory." I shall analyze the transformations within
modern architecture of certain subjective attitudes and perceptual categories which are at
once formations by specific social and historical forces and at the same time
productions of new forms of objective structures and operations. Architecture will be
understood as a mediating practice between social phenomena and private experience.
Subjectivity constitutes the categories of possible experience, objectivity is what is
experienced; and architecture resides in both domains. Subjective categories are formed
through the very object world they organize and explain. This is the inescapable
dialectic of architectural production.
This study accordingly turns on the difficulties of the act of interpretation itself
and presupposes that we can never really approach a building, a drawing, or a text
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immediately, as a thing-in-itself, but rather as something always already interpreted.
To confront the buildings, drawings, and texts at issue here is also to confront the
sedimented readings and reading habits through which they and other modem projects
have been understood and situated. But more, the study recognizes that an architectural
object is placed by interpretation only, but also places itself in the world, so to speak -
in culture and history, in theories of culture and history, in theories of interpretation -
and its manner of doing this constrains what can be done in critical exegesis. An
architectural object is one whose interpretation has already commenced but is never
complete. Historical contingency and circumstantiality, subjective categories of thought
and object perception, as well as the artifact's persisting sensuous, material particularity
must all be considered as incorporated into the structure of the object; they saturate the
immanent properties of the work. All of which is to reject the view that meanings and
subjectivities are already constituted and existent somewhere outside the work and that
the critic's and historian's business is to locate them, and to recognize that modem
architectural practice aims to bring into being new meanings and new subjectivies,
seeking to figure not only what is but what could be.
The particular dialectic of subject and object that will be the topic of this study is
that which emerges in the buildings, projects, and writings of Hannes Meyer and
Ludwig Hilberseimer, each of whom, in different ways, brings himself face-to-face
with the threatening problems posed by modernity to bourgeois humanism, and to the
sovereignty of its modes of artistic production and reception. The rationalization that
was attendant to modernity is inseparable from a problematization of the subject defined
as conscience and will, that is to say, of humanism. This threat has already been
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articulated by Sigfried Giedion who framed his own problematic in terms of subjective
perceptual categories. But as we shall see, Giedion attempts to accomodate the threat to
humanism to a protracted humanist model of creation and perception and continues to
claim an independence of subject over the determinants of matter. So while this study
begins with an analysis of Giedion's account as a paradigm of the received view of
modernism and reinterprets some of its insights, it should also be seen as a critique of
the received view's fundamental ideologies, recognizing with Adomo that the mind's
"claim of independence heralds the claim of dominance."
In philosophy, modern humanism has usually been subjected to a twofold
critique: first, a critique of humanism as bourgeois ideology - the doctrine that
valorizes "man" as such and masks differences such as class and historicity - and
second, a critique of instrumental or technical reason which is affiliated with bourgeois
ideology and culture. 1 Thus humanism has often been associated with the rise of
capitalism and the ongoing bourgeois revolution. In architecture, however, this
conception of humanism overlaps another which extends from Renaissance theory and
the concommitant epistemologies of the human body, perspective and harmony, and
visual homologies, and has its corollaries even in present day architecture. It is an
expanded model of humanism which includes both conceptions that will be employed
here.
In humanist thought the role of the subject vis-a-vis the object has been that of
an originating agent of meaning. The subject enters the dialectic with the world as its
1It is, of course, within a Marxist tradition that this critique in its most familiar form has been made.
But a deconstruction of metaphysics of subjectivity from a Freudian, Nietzschean, or even Heideggerian
tradition finds common ground with Marxism on the themes of abstract "man" and idealist rationality.
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source, as the intending manipulator of the object and the conscious originator of
meanings and actions. Modem humanist architecture - Charles Gamier's Opera, say,
or Otto Wagner's Postal Savings Bank or Louis Sullivan's commercial buildings -
encodes the values and norms of a bourgeoisie still emergent in a market economy,
providing a system of representation that exactly suffices the sense of self, the aesthetic
preferences, social habits, and forms of entertainment of that class. But within
modernism, and within disparate disciplines, there developed another attitude that
shifted away from a dominant humanism. This changed cultural attitude is evident, for
example, in the writings of Samuel Beckett, the atonal and serial musical compositions
of Arnold Sch6nberg, the non-narrative films of Hans Richter and Victor Eggeling, the
productivist and constructivist work of the Russian avant-garde, the spatialized history
of Rimbaud's poetry, and perhaps even in Kurt Gidel's "incompleteness" paper in
mathematical logic. These are stylistic and technical manifestations. What is important
is that atonality, the renunciation of narrative time, the disprivileging of the purely
visual, and the thematization of incompleteness and uncertainty are aesthetic corollaries
of the disenfranchisement of autonomous individualism. The subject is no longer
viewed as an originating agent of meaning, but as a variable and dispersed entity whose
very identity and place is constituted in social practice. Objects and processes are seen
as having a material existence independent of, and at times threatening to, the unity of
the individual self. In this context, man is what Michel Foucault has called a
"discursive function" among complex and already formed systems of thought which he
witnesses but does not constitute. Siegfried Kracauer, a contemporary of the architects
to be considered here, put the situation of the subject in modernity this way:
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The world is split into the diversity of what exists and the diversity of the
human subject confronting it. This human subject, who was previously
incorporated into the dance of forms filled by the world, is now left solitarily
confronting the chaos as the sole agent of the mind, confronting the
immeasurable realm of reality. [The subject is] thrown into the cold infinity of
empty space and empty time.2
My thesis is that an analogous perceptual shift, which I shall call
posthumanism, can be detected within modem architecture - in particular the
architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer. 3 Posthumanism is the
consciousness and conscious response, whether with applause or regret, to the
threatened norm of psychological autonomomy and individualism. I shall attempt to
demonstrate that many of the experiments of these architects previously relegated by the
critical-historical establishment to reductive versions of functionalism or Sachlichkeit
can be more fruitfully explained within a framework of positions indicative of how
subjects relate to objects in the present world and how they might relate to them in a
possible future one as anticipated in the experiential categories delimited by architecture.
We are concerned, then, with analyzing the status of the subject and the ways the
subject is variously "constituted," "constructed," or "inscribed" by the different
architectures. 4
2Siegfried Kracauer, Schriften 1, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 13
3The work of Adolf Loos and Mies van der Rohe, though secondary for the present study, will also be
treated in comparison with the work of the main figures.
40f course, it must be recognized that actual individuals, by virtue of their complex and multiple
historical and cultural affiliations, always exceed the subjectivities constructed by architecture. Indeed,
another sort of study could perhaps argue that it is percisely in that excess that concrete critical
resistance to dominant ideologies is located. My claim here will be, however, that precise potentials of
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The term "subject," meaning both particular individual consciousness and
material-ideologically constituted consciousness in general, is inherently multiple and
equivocal. Any reference to an individual self and its relation to ideological
institutional and disciplinary apparatuses entails a concept of the subject that has
overarching connotations which take it beyond the particular person. But any
completely collective concept of the subject which suppresses individual differences
fails to be adequate to its object in the real world where those differences have not been
entirely eradicated.5 The term's polysemic indecisiveness is strengthened still further if
we introduce the contradictory meanings of subject as active agent - the source of
one's control of one's own destiny - and as passive object of domination - the
instrument of an other to whose will one is subjected - and as willing subjects who
"work by themselves." 6 Similarly the term "object" comprises a constellation of
meanings including the brute facticity of the world, the artifacts of culture, their
meaningful critical resistance and action are produced and made available, albeit only in a symbolic
mode and at the level of cultural representation, in the architectural objects and their subject-productive
force.
5
"'Subject'... may refer to the particular individual as well as to general attributes, to 'consciousness in
general'.... The equivocation is not removable simply by terminological clarification, for the two
meanings have reciprocal need of each other; one is scarcely to be grasped without the other. The
element of individual humanity... cannot be thought apart from any concept of the subject; without any
remembrance of it, 'subject' would lose all meaning. Conversely, as soon as we reflect upon the
human individual as an individual at all, in the form of a general concept - as soon as we cease to
mean only the present existence of some particular person - we have already turned it into a universal
similar to that which came to be explicit in the idealist concept of the subject." Adorno, "Subject and
Object," 497-98
6
" [T]he individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the
commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that
he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself.' There are no subjects except
by andfor their subjection. This is why they 'work all by themselves.'" Louis Althusser, "Ideology
and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left
Books, 1971), 182; emphasis in original.
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immanent formal organization, and the forces by which those artifacts are produced,
forces that are, in turn, manipulated by subjects.
A dialectical understanding of the subject/object framework is thus demanded if
our epistemology is to be adequate to our interpretive task. A simple positivism fails to
recognize the active, constitutive agency of subjectivity in creating the world - or at
least that part of the world we call history, culture, and society - and thus is
complicitous with a passive, contemplative politics which accepts the world as an
already finished reality. On the other hand, idealism develops and preserves the active,
practical side of subjectivity, but does so only on the abstract level of an absolute,
unchanging, transcendental Subject. And humanist epistemology incorporates both
passive contemplation and transcendental ideals. A genuine materialist epistemology
should call into question not only the passive subject of the positivists but also the
overly active, transindividual, constituting Subject of the idealists; it should anticipate
ways of mapping possible new structures and new subjectivities beyond the horizon of
the humanist tradition. This thesis, then, further intends to be a step foward, albeit a
modest one, in the development of such an epistemology within architectural critical
discourse.
In the attempt to deal with some of the vicissitudes of architectural practice
between the wars, the epistemological basis for this thesis is constructed from a range
of disciplines and positions. Perhaps the most significant, sustained attempt to
thematize the changed conceptualization of objects and the changed relations of subjects
in a systematic aesthetic and critical theory is found in the body of work generated by
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Georg Lukics, Ernst Bloch, and Siegfried
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Kracauer, which is also related to the earlier writings of Georg Simmel. (Specific
works will be cited in the respective sections of the thesis.) Theirs is a vivid diagnosis
of the reification7 of the subject under industrial capitalism. By dialectically
juxtaposing antithetical concepts and exposing the irreconcilability of subjective
concepts with the objective reality they were supposed to describe, these authors direct
their work to the double task of peircing through the mere appearances of modernity
and demonstrating the inadequacy of received (humanist or idealist) concepts used to
define it.
For example, Adorno affirms neither the concepts of reality nor the reality itself.
Rather, for him each is affirmed only in its "nonidentity" to the other. Even so, what
gives knowledge its consistency was not the universality of the human subject, but the
uniform, commodity structure of the material object. The object, not the subject, is
preeminent. For Adorno and Benjamin, the subject got out of the box of bourgeois
humanism by giving itself over to the object, entering into it. This "immersion in
particularity" (Adorno) does not lead to the subject's discovery of its individuality, but
to a discovery of the social structure in a particular historical configuration.
7A note on terminology: Alienation derives from the division of labor, the splitting of life into
separate activities in which the individual worker's experience of a unified and self-contained process is
destroyed. Commodification is the organized process whereby the work of art, like all objects, is
alienated from its primary and traditional status as an object of use-value and of aesthetic experience,
and becomes an object of exchange-value, one whose character is determined first and foremost by its
relation to the market. Rei~fcation (Verdinglichung) names the penetration of commodificaton into the
very core of personal experience, a condition in which the relations between persons is reduced to that
of an illusory, impersonal relationship between things (i.e., "thingified," verdinglicht). Unlike the
concept of alienation - a process that pertains to activity, and in particular to the dissociation of
workers from their labor, their products, their fellow workers, and ultimately from their entire
experience - reification is a process that affects our cognitive relationship with the social totality.
Reification thus becomes a conceptual category by which we can explain certain transformations of the
art object.
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To some extent, this aspect of the works of Adorno and Benjamin can be
understood as a critical elaboration of the prior work of Lukics in terms of the
categories of subject and object. Lukics sees the split between subject and object as the
thread uniting modernist aesthetic experimentation. For Lukaics, however, the
"destruction of the individual" should be resisted by art, since it is this same destruction
that was at the heart of capitalist alienation. In contrast to techniques of montage,
distancing, and negation, which came to be advocated by Benjamin and Bertold Brecht,
for Lukaics the ability of art to interrelate individuals and social development lies in the
artist's capacity to uncover the construction of economic and social life through realist
narrative. The antinomies of subject and object are therefore also at the heart of the
ensuing debate between Lukics, Brecht, and Bloch over the adequacy of various
modes of art.8 The interest of the exhanges here is not only for their internal logical
dynamics, but also for the range of issues brought in their wake - problems of
popular art, realism, avant-gardism, media, and finally, political and nonpolitical
modernism. What is more, the concept of art as articulated in the debates lays a claim
to cognitive as well as aesthetic status and presupposes forms of aesthetic experience
that have a binding relationship to the real itself, that is to say, to those realms that have
traditionally been differentiated from the realm of the aesthetic.
Later, Louis Althusser reorganized the category of the subject, defining its
constitution in terms of ideology.
8See especially the essays collected in Aesthetics and Politics, Perry Anderson, et al., eds. (London:
New Left Books, 1977)
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[I]deology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among
the individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects
(it transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I have called
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most
commonplace everyday polic (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!"9
The question Althusser poses for critical theory is, What is the relation between
aesthetic practice and ideological practice? Althusser claims that if works of art do not
simply replicate the ideological material of a given epoch, they nevertheless do take the
ideologies as their material of construction. How they do so, and how their
presentation of ideological materials is then reappropriated as an instrument in the
project of a particular class is just the question that a materialist conception of art must
answer.
Althusser's analysis of the subject was made via the psychoanalytic theory of
Jacques Lacan as well as Marx. Lacan's so-called "mirror stage" of development
serves as an exemplary situation of how the subject is structured with respect to the
body. 10 The mirror-stage denotes that moment when the child acquires a sense of his
own body's unity through a process of identification with an external object, the image
in the mirror. The apprehension of bodily unity is the support of the division between a
coherent self and that "other" against which the self is perceived. For the very
exteriority of the mirror image anticipates what will become in Lacan's account the
fundamental characteristic of the ego: a mirage of coherence and centrality through
9Aithusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 174
10Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London -nd New York: W. W. Norton,
1977)
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which the subject is seduced into misrecognizing its actual alienation and fragmentation.
The ultimate resolution of this situation comes not by insistence on self-identity and
autonomy, but only by the acceptance of the individual's implication in the domain of
intersubjectivity, that is, in language.11 Thus Lacan can assert that the unconscious is
structured like a language since it comes into being as a result of the stuctures that
transform the subject as it enters into language's symbolic code. With Althusser, then,
one can rewrite Lacan's slogan, "the unconscious is structured like a language," in
materialist terms as "the subject is structured like a mode of production."12 The
Althusserian subject is not the centered subject of humanist epistemology and
aesthetics, but is precisely decentered to the degree that it is the bearer of different,
often contradictory structures.
More recent work in critcal theory has continued the project begun by the above
authors. Whereas Althusser displaces the subject into the structure of ideological
practices, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Derrida displace the subject into
language and textuality, and Michel Foucault displaces the subject into history and the
geneologies of power. While the very real differences between this later,
poststructuralist project of undermining, dismantling, and deconstructing objects and
subjects through the endless differring and deferring of signification in textuality, and a
materialist project whose economy is articulated on the basis of concepts such as the
production of signs and the struggle of specific historical systems of signification are
11The literature on Lacan is vast, but in the present context see especially Peter Dews, Logics of
Disintegration. Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987).
12Michael Sprinkler, Imaginary Relations. Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical
Materialism (London: Verso, 1987), 199
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enough to cast doubt on the possibility or fruitfulness of a rapprochement, there are
nevertheless significant convergences and mutual challenges between poststructuralist
thought and the interpretations of modernism within the strains of Marxism mentioned.
The common criticisms of idealism, metaphysics, logocentrism (taken as the discourse
of a ruling ideology), and the humanist subject suggest that a sharp and serious
confrontation between these two systems of thought is precisely what is needed in
architectural theory at this moment. With this suggestion one wishes to avoid the worst
pitfalls both of vulgar marxism - in particular the difficulties involved in claiming that
the base of any social formation is some brute facticity made of stuff more solid than
signs - and the equally inadequate critical perspective of a domesticated and
formalized deconstructionism that talks only about the signs themselves. Certain
themes from poststructuralist thought will find their way into the present study. While
the ideas of a number of poststructuralist writers may be glimpsed between the lines of
this thesis, it is the transformations and extensions of the concepts of reification and
mediation made by Fredric Jameson - who of all recent critics has perhaps most
fruitfully merged poststructuralist and Marxist analyses - that especially inform my
project. 13
It should be underscored that this study is not an exposition of these various
positions. Neither is it a philology of the concepts of functionalism, Sachlichkeit, or
other trajectories of modernism. (Indeed such an exposition or philology could be the
material of several more dissertations.) It is rather an elaboration and extension of
131n particular, see Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1981). The work of Terry Eagleton could be added to such a program.
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certain concepts derived from these intellectual traditions to the work of the architects
under study. If there are important parallels and models for such an extension in the
fields of literary criticism and in the art critical circle of the journal October, the
architectural material under study here requires significant modifications of the theories
with which it is read, even as the theories enable the construction of new reading
practices for architecture.
Selected architectural projects, buildings, and writings of Hannes Meyer and
Ludwig Hilberseimer will provide examples of what I understand by a posthumanist
modem architecture in terms of a dialectic of subject and object. Each of these
architects produced a body of work that delineates precise social agendas as well as
aesthetic preferences and offered architectures that would be adequate to the social
orders envisioned. In order to explicate the claimed posthumanist shift, and to go
beyond received historical interpretive methods that maintain rigid partitions between
intrinsic and extrinsic criteria, accounts must be given of the affiliations14 that exist
between the world of ideas and forms, on the one hand, and the world of politics,
power, artistic traditions and institutions, intellectual communities, and ideology, on the
other. Nor can such relationships in the cases of our examples be construed as very
straightforward. While most interpreters would agree that any artwork is burdened to
14The concept of affiliation is from Edward Said. Said sees the relationship of affiliation as
replacing the continuity, community, and legitimacy provided by biological relations or filiations.
"Thus if a filial relationship was held together by natural bonds and natural forms of authority -
involving obedience, fear, love, respect, and instinctual conflict - the new affiliative relationship
changes these bonds into what seem to be transpersonal forms - such as guild consciouness,
consensus, collegiality, professional respect, class, and the hegemony of a dominant culture. The
filiative scheme belongs to the realms of nature and 'life,' whereas affiliation belongs exclusively
to culture and society." The World. the Text. and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), 19-20
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some extent with its occasion, with the contextual circumstances from which it
emerged, architecture is not easily reduced to an unselfconscious product of the
circumstances of its making. The formal organizations and perceptual conventions of
architecture have an inexorable degree of autonomy. And yet, the works to be
considered are not wholly inward, self-referential, or self-sufficient; they explicitly
refuse exemption from art's socio-political vocation. The works, as has been said,
situate themselves in the world, taking on disciplinary and social ideologies as their raw
material. Thus, in order to explicate the different kinds of affiliations of interest here, it
will not be enough to speak of disinfected formal objects and how their parts have been
equilibrated and integrated into a system that can be understood without external
references; nor can we mistake for parts and pieces of the external socio-political world
those irreducibly artistic categories and concepts. What I wish to suggest instead is that
it should be possible to recognize affiliations within theforms themselves. Whatever
methods one calls upon to explicate those affiliations will always involve an interpretive
leap between two unlike and uequal realms: the one formal, defined by certain
conventions of artistic practice, the other some different (and larger) form of social and
material reality. Nevertheless, artistic form carries within its own construction a
capacity for quite palpable interaction with the world; indeed, this capacity is an
infrangible precondition for art's functionality as a mode of knowledge and a producer
of subjectivities. It is in the different exercises of this capacity that the various
positions of our protagonists will be seen, according to the various possible
relationships between subject and object.
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Significance of the study within current historiography
The motivation for much current scholarship in modem architectural history is
the desire to fill a gap in the record or rehabilitate an underestimated event or aspect of
an architect's work. Surely such remedial work is crucial to a more adequate
understanding of modernism. Recent and ongoing studies of such "precursors" as
Adolf Loos or such "followers" as Giuseppi Terragni, to mention only two, as well as
reevaluations of "masters" like Peter Behrens, Heinrich Tessenow, Le Corbusier, Mies
van der Rohe, and Alvar Aalto, have indeed challenged the received view of a
monolithic modernism through archival discoveries and historical explanations. Often,
however, in dealing with the particular sort of material under consideration in this study
- that is, the work of architects neither minor nor major - something else happens.
Rather than becoming a revisionary or interventionary movement across established
lines of demarcation (I am thinking of various stylistic definitions or theoretical
categories such as "functionalism," "utopianism," "traditionalism," "abstraction,"
"representation," etc.), architectural historiography simpy revalidates the canonic view
of modernism by adding new but self-confirming information. Or alternatively,
historiography reacts against the canon - as is the case with many "postmodem"
revisions - but simply by reversing its values, not by challenging its definition.
Within the still spotty expositions of Hilberseimer's work emerging from a group
headed by Marco De Michelis and published in a special issue of Rassegna, 15 as well
as those published by The Art Institute of Chicago as In the Shadow of Mies, 16 with
15Rassegna 27 (September 1986)
161n the Shadow of Mies. Ludwig Hilberseimer, Architect, Educator, and Urban Planner (New
York: The Art Institute of Chicago and Rizzoli 1988)
Introduction
the single exception, perhaps, of Richard Pommer's essay, Hilberseimer is related to
the canon for better or worse, with few questions asked about the doctrines and
dogmas in whose light Mies and other "masters" stand. Francesco Dal Co's "Hannes
Meyer e la venerabile scuola di Dessau," 17 on the other hand, is a provocative
revisionist essay on Meyer's position in the context of the European avant-gardes and
the Bauhaus. This and Claude Schnaidt's Hannes Meyer, 18 now twenty-five years
old, are still the only treatments of Meyer's writings and projects other than brief and
usually derogatory mentions of Meyer as the "other" director of the Bauhaus. 19
Within the received historiography of modem architecture, two concepts have
been maintained as definitive. First is functionalism, the intersection of brute facts of
utility with objective design methodologies and standardized means of production. The
versions of neue Sachlichkeit of Meyer and Hilberseimer have been taken to be
paradigmatic of functionalism. Second is the avant-garde, characterizations of which
have usually depended on some notion of a self-referential and self-critical formal
practice as well as the incorporation of advanced technology. Again, and not without a
certain contradiction, the projects and writings of Meyer and Hilberseimer have been
seen to participate in avant-garde practice and to stand in sharp contrast to the more
"traditional," "representational" Sachlichkeit of Werkbund members like Hermann
17Francesco Dal Co, "Hannes Meyer e la venerabile scuola di Dessau'," introduction to Hannes
Meyer, Architettura o rivoluzione (Padua: Marsilio, 1973)18Claude Schnaidt, Hannes Meyr. Buildings. rJects and writings (Teufen: Verlag Arthur
Niggli, 1965)
19This dissertation was substantially complete just before the publication of Hannes Meyer 1889-1954
architekt urbanist lehrer (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1989) and will not address the essays presented there.
I am aware that two students in Zurich and Frankfurt are working on the Hannes Meyer material, but I
know nothing more than that they are researching the archives. No doubt the centennial of his birth,1989, will prompt more studies.
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Muthesius or Heinrich Tessenow and the Heimatsschutz. These two concepts,
functionalism and the avant-garde, have been supposed to describe fundamental
demarcations within modem architecture upon which corollaries of utopianism and
historical determinism have been based. The analyses of this thesis will lead us to
suggest that the interpretive concepts of functionalism and autotelic formalism as
definitive factors of modernism are both called into question by a thematization of the
posthumanist subject. The study undertakes to challenge the received view through a
historical explanation and ideological criticism of this thematization. It seeks to reveal
the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in posthumanist architecture in its various
forms, and to explicate the internal resistances to its self-declared forward movement.
In an alternative theorization of the avant-garde, more recent commentaries have
often been based on some version of the concept of integrating art and life or art and
industry.20 But this thesis will attempt to make the theorization of that integration at
once more specific and more complicated, finding the concept more or less explicitly
elaborated in the writings and projects of the architects studied. Indeed, what links the
architects chosen for study here is the practice of Aufhebung or sublation- the
reintegration of art with social practice through either the negation (Meyer) or radical
reformulation (Hilberseimer) of traditional concepts of architecture. What distinquishes
the two architects are their different positions on the status of the subject in a collective,
mass-cultural, and mass-industrial world.
20 Above all, see Peter BUrger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984).
Introduction
Sources of primary material
The Hannes Meyer archives are divided between the Institut fUr Geschichte und
Theorie der Architektur at the Eidgen6ssiche Technische Hochschule in Zurich -
which holds most of the drawings for the architectural projects - and the Deutsches
Architekturmuseum in Frankfurt am Main - which holds much of Meyer's
correspondence. Meyer's most important writings were published in journals of the
period and have already been collected as Hannes Meyer. Bauen und Gesellschaft.
Schriften, Briefe. Projekte. 21 The Ludwig Karl Hilberseimer Archives - including
Hilberseimer's theoretical and art critical writings as well as his early architectural
projects - are held at the Ryerson and Burnham Libraries, The Art Institute of
Chicago. His important writings and projects were published in his books and in
journals of the period. These journals, books, and archives constitute the primary
sources of material for this thesis.
Perhaps it should be noted finally that this thesis is neither a monographic
comparison nor an exhaustive study of the protagonists. It is not concerned primarily
with archival "discoveries," chronologies, or attributions. I would call it an excercise
in interpretive scholarship. As such, to the sources of primary material could correctly
be added that body of work designated as critical theory.
21Hannes Meyer. Bauen und Gesellschaft. Schriften. Briefe. Proiekte (Dresden: VEB Verlag der
Kunst, 1980)
Giedion versus Modernity:
the Protraction of the
Centered Subject
The fiction of the individual subject -so-
called bourgeois individualism - had of
course, always been a key functional
element in the bourgeois cultural revolution,
the reprogramming of individuals to the
'freedom" and equality of sheer market
equivalence. As this fiction becomes ever
more difficult to sustain (or, to use the
somewhat mythic terminology of the
Frankfurt School, as the old "autonomy" of
the bourgeois subject is increasingly lost
under the effects of disintegration and
fetishization), more desperate myths of the
self are generated, many of which are still
with us today. [Such a myth of the self],
which comes into being as a protest and
defense against reification, ends up
furnishing a powerful ideological instrument
in the perpetuation of an increasingly
subjectivized and psychologized world....
Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 221

Giedion versus Modernity: the Protraction of the Centered Subject
Understood as a practice and a mode of knowledge rather than a stylistic category or
formal canon, modem architecture can be explicated as the invention and elaboration of
new strategies by which objects are formed, which is at the same time the production of
new concepts, categories, and modes of perception and experience of visual and spatial
phenomena. Modern architecture is a specific but interminable set of conceptual
procedures and formal operations that has as its raw material the very structural
conditions of modernity - the alienation, fragmentation, and reification consequent of
the advance of industrial capitalism - and as its historical function the systematic
unraveling, demystification, and secular decoding of those inherited traditional
paradigms that constitute the disciplinary terrain of architecture. In a subjective sense,
then, modern architecture plays a significant role in an ongoing cognitive revolution -
that extended process of intellectual transformation whereby a society whose life habits
and perceptual apparatus were formed by other, now anachronistic, modes of
production are effectively reprogrammed for life in the new industrialized world. This
subjective, analytical, and critical vocation is the complement of the objective mission to
produce the very referent - the newly equilibrated spatial and temporal organizations,
the newly secularized and disenchanted objects of mass reproduction, the daily life of
mechanization, rationalization, and abstraction - in short, that very life world of which
this new representational system will then claim to be the realistic and inevitable
reflection. The problem of the subject is as crucial for an analysis of modernism as is
the problem of the object, particularly if one holds that the forms of human
consciousness and the mechanisms of constructing and representing our relation with
the world are not timeless and everywhere the same, but rather situation specific and
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historically produced. 1
That the writings of Sigfried Giedion confront both aspects of modern
architecture, the subjective and the objective, has already been recognized. Ignasi de
Sola-Morales, for one, has written,
[T]o understand the work of art it was necessary to reverse the criteria that
derived from the conditions of the object and to emphasize those that related to
the productive subject, and especially to the viewing subject.... References to
technical conditions or to the content of works of art are thus relegated to a
secondary level in comparison to a history of vision which emerges as the
protagonist in the evolution in art. And such a history of vision is obviously a
history of the subject, and of its capacity for the production of meaning.... At
the moment of cultural crisis in which this shift occurred, the subject alone
seemed to constitute a secure point of reference for the reconstruction, in some
way, of the order of reality.... Perhaps it is necessary to remember why Space.
Time and Architecture and Mechanization Takes Command are in fact two
complementary works that explain the changes comprising the modern
condition of industrialized society from the point of view of changes in
sensibility - i.e., from visual categories.2
We will return later to the importance of vision and sight for an understanding of
Giedion's construction of the subject. More generally, Giedion himself specified the
subjective character of modernism as a special kind of protracted humanism: an
unremitting belief in the individual consciousness as a monadic and autonomous center
lJameson, The Political Unconscious, 151 ff.
2Ignasi de SoIA-Morales, "Toward a Modem Museum: From Riegl to Giedion," Oppositions 25 (Fall
1982): 69-77
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of activity able to maintain its stability against the plurality of divisive and corrosive
effects of modernity which threatened its constitution.
What is of interest in the present context is not the denunciation of Giedion's
construction of the centered subject and its significations, 3 so much as an
understanding of the historical emergence of that construction within the discourse of
modern architecture (a discourse, I will argue in the later sections of this thesis, that
was concerned variously with the projection, compensation, or elaboration of a quite
different subjectivity designated as posthumanism). That Giedion's centered subject is
a conceptual mirage will be my suggestion here, but more: that the insertion of that
centered subject performs a precise ideological function and is itself susceptible to
historical causation. We will come to see that alternative, posthumanist subject
positions can be detected within the very formal logic of modern space-time
simultaneity and mechanization extolled by Giedion, but which provide concrete
challenges to his conception of the self as a homogeneous and consistent whole.
Nevertheless, the reckoning on Giedion's construction of the subject comes due, I shall
argue, not in his epistemology, but rather in his aesthetics. And, therefore, my analysis
in this section will be advanced in two parts: first, an argument that Giedion's
epistemology is relatively sound 4; and second, a suggestion that his aesthetic
preferences are part of a more general strategy of containment of twentieth-century
3The centered subject has of late been the target of criticisms from leftist, feminist, and
poststructuralists alike. The centered subject is denounced as a bourgeois ideological phenomenon, and
the signs of the "end of man" (Foucault) are welcomed as the herald of some new postindividualistic
state of things. The investigation here learns from such criticisms but emphasizes the historicity of
the concept of the centered subject within architectural criticism.
4Relative, that is, to certain other histories of modem architecture with which I shall briefly compare
Giedion's.
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individualism suffering from the aftershocks of reification, a strategy which, as I say,
was already being exploded from within modem architectural design practice itself.5
Manfredo Tafuri has used the term "operative criticism" to name certain aspects
of the work of eighteenth-century writers like the Abb6 Laugier and Francesco Milizia,
as well as twentieth-century modem critics and historians like Nikolaus Pevsner, Bruno
Zevi, Reyner Banham, and Sigfried Giedion, all of whom seem compelled to make of
history a guide to actual design practice.
What is normally meant by operative criticism is an analysis of architecture (or
of the arts in general) that, instead of an abstract survey, has as its objective the
planning of a precise poetical tendency, anticipated in its structures and derived
from historical analyses programmatically distorted and finalized. 6
But we can make a first distinction, finer than Tafuri's, between the Enlightenment's
critical instrumentalization of invented origins, like Laugier's prescriptive primitive hut,
and what I shall call a normative history of modem architecture. 7 The distinction lies, I
think, in the fact that modem criticism extends the instrumentalization or operativity of
5A criticism of Sigfried Giedion's history of modem architecture runs the risk of becoming something
like the flogging of a dead horse. Giedion's modem movement is the modern movement which has
been pronounced dead again and again recently by historians and architects aike. Yet such
proclamations are too often run through contemporary discussions without adequate knowledge of
exactly what is being rejected or what that rejection entails. I believe that returning to Giedion's
historiography, and in particular his Space. Time and Architecture, should help focus our attention on a
few issues in our now problematic relationship to modernism.
6 Manfredo Tafuri, Theories and History of Architecture (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1980), 1417There are, of course, numerous models for a normative history within various intellectual traditions,but among the most rigorous is that of Imre Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational
Reconstruction," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1971); and Lakatos, Thi
Methodology of Scientific Research Progrmmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
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criticism to history per se rather than from invented origins. The distinction can be seen
in Giedion's Space, Time and Architecture. 8
In his dissertation with Heinrich W61fflin, SpItbarocker und romantischer
Klassizismus, 9 Giedion had already devoted an extended study to the late baroque and
romantic classical periods, thus entering into the realm of late eighteenth-century and
early nineteenth-century artistic production which was then, in 1922, considered
marginal. Despite this first-hand knowledge of the period immediately preceding mid-
nineteenth-century developments, and notwithstanding that various baroque
experiments are subsumed into the discussion of Space, Time and Architecture,
romantic classicism plays a very small part in Giedion's study of modernism.
Moreover, while Giedion seeks to treat modern architecture in the broadest possible
terms - as encompassing construction, planning, social problems, scientific thought,
other arts, and objects and routines of daily life - his historical progression from the
formal exuberance of the baroque, to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century technical
innovations, to the new architecture of the 1920s and 30s seems suspiciously selective.
Giedion's own explanation of his historiographical method as emulating that of Jakob
Burkhardt is crucial:
In Civilization of the Renaissance, Burkhardt emphasized sources and records
rather than his own opinions. He treated only fragments of the life of the period
but treated them so skillfully that a picture of the whole forms in the readers'
minds. Jakob Burckhardt had no love for his own time: he saw during the
8Sigfried Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941-). The
references that follow are to the fifth edition, 1974.
9Sigfried Giedion, Spatbarocker und romantishcer Klassizismus (Minchen, 1922)
Giedion versus Modernity: the Protraction of the Centered Subject
forties an artificially constituted Europe which was on the verge of being
overwhelmed by a flood of brutal forces.... But Burkhardt was a man of great
vitality, and a man of vitality cannot entirely desert his own time.... His
Civilization of the Renaissance aimed at an objective ordering of factual
material, but in it his greatest efforts are devoted to uncovering the origins of the
man of today.10
This last desideratum is of the sort Tafuri finds suspect. But Giedion here
makes explicit an inevitable condition typical of any history: the recovery of the codes
for the interpretation of the past can only be achieved by starting from present codes,
and of course, present contextual factors tend to distort our statements about the past.
Indeed, Giedion continues,
But I owe as large a debt to the artists of today as to these guides of my youth.
It is they who have taught me to observe seriously objects which seemed
unworthy of interest, or of interest only to specialists. Modern artists have
shown that mere fragments lifted from the life of a period can reveal its habits
and feelings; that one must have the courage to take small things and raise them
to large dimensions.... The historian, the historian of architecture especially,
must be in close contact with contemporary conceptions. Only when he is
permeated by the spirit of his own time is he prepared to detect those tracts of
the past which previous generations have overlooked. 11
The conventions and values of the architectural disciplinary apparatus as received by
Giedion enabled him to cut his way through the overwhelming mass of data and
experience in which he was personally involved, to choose the new architecture of Le
10Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 3-4; my emphasis
11Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 4-5
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Corbusier, Gropius, and Mies as a donnie or limiting case, and then to refit it with an
ancestry and a geneology. In his normative history, the new architecture is justified not
by inventing a past, as a Laugier might have done, but by a coherent and critical
selection and deformation - launched from a specific historical present - of a real,
discovered past. The "confusion" of the nineteenth century is left behind - only the
"potentialities in construction" and the "changed organization of society" are carried
through - and the architecture of Giedion's present is connected with the momuments
of the past. Thus, the spiral lantern and weaving together of interior and exterior space
of Francesco Borromini's church of Sant' Ivo in Rome becomes the prior impulse
behind Vladimir Tatlin's project for a Monument to the Third International (fig. 101);
Giuseppe Valadier's scheme for the Piazzo del Popolo harbors a similar relation of
horizontal and vertical planes as Theo van Doesburg's countercompositions (fig. 102);
the undulating walls and their relation to their sites of Borromini's San Carlo alle
Quattro Fontane and of Lansdowne Crescent in Bath are of the same "essence" as Le
Corbusier's Algiers project (figs. 103, 104); and the neolithic "Tomb of the Giants" in
Sardinia becomes the "mythic connotation" of Le Corbusier's chapel at Ronchamp (fig.
106).12 These various "constituent facts" of architectural form travel through space and
time and, through the pressures of different contexts, reemerge into new prominence.
Before returning to Giedion's foundational notion of constituent facts, we must
further distinquish normative history from what I shall call substantive or prophetic
12Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 115-19, 152-55, 156-59, 577-78, respectively
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history. 13 This latter is not satisfied with a simple complicity or shared logic of a
disciplinary apparatus between historiography and contemporaneous theories of design.
Rather, it reorganizes past history and, at the same time, forcesfuture history by
offering solutions for design problems not yet known. We could say, roughly, that in
contrast to the most ambitious piece of normative history, which would produce an
account of the present as a kind of unification of the whole past, substantive
historiography seeks to give an account of the whole of history - past, present, and
future.
To take just one example, the summation of Nikolaus Pevsner's An Outline of
European Architecture 14 and Pioneers of Modem Design15 is a substantive history, and
exhibits two characteristic features of such. The first is a description of a structural
pattern among the events that make up the whole past and a projection of this pattern
towards the future, which implicitly makes the claim that events in the future will either
repeat or complete this pattern. The second is an explanatory theory which accounts for
this pattern in causal terms. 16 Pevsner's pattern is a sine curve of Western civilization,
born out of pre-history, surviving its Merovingian infancy, and reaching the virile
maturity of Gothic times. But after the "summit of the High Renaissance" came the
13This distinction and the discussion that follows are based on Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of
History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965). Danto analyzes the differences between
"substantive" and "analytic philosophies" of history.
14Nikolaus Pevsner, An Outline of European Architecture (Pelican Books, 1943-)
15Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneers of Modem Design (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1936)
16Danto insists that "an explanatory theory qualifies as a philosophy of history only insofar as it is
connected with a descriptive theory. There are any number of causal theories which seek to account for
historical events in the most general terms - explainable by reference to racial or climatic or economic
factors. But these theories are at best contributions to the social sciences, and are not, as such,
philosophies of history." Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 2
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"first symptoms of the aging of the West." With Mannerism, the West was becoming
distinctly perverse. By the nineteenth century, Western civilization had fallen into a
diseased state. 17 Given this pattern, present and future architectural production must
discover and develop what Pevsner asserts is the style for the twentieth century, the
next apogee in the trajectory. This pattern, which is the descriptive theory, will
presumably continue as the spirit of each new age finds its true expression. And the
attempt to link up these expressions with some sort of Hegelian Zeitgeist as the causal
factor constitutes the explanatory theory of Pevsner. 18
One could similarly construct the pattern of Reyner Banham's description of
architectural progress through the first machine age of hand-scaled machines and the
second of electronic machines, with technological determinism as the explanatory
theory and the driving force of architecture. 19 But the general point is this: from
examinations such as these, we can say that the attitude of this sort of history is
prophetic towards the future. It differs from normative history in that it makes
projections into the historical future, and this is an important qualification. As Arthur
Danto writes,
To ask for the significance of an event, in the historical sense of the term, is to
ask a question which can be answered only in the context of a story. The
17I owe this scheme to various courses given at MIT by Stanford Anderson, and to his unpublished
lecture delivered to the Architectural Association, London, spring 1964, circulated in MS. See also
Anderson's review of Pevsner's The Sources of Modem Architecture and Design (New York: Fredrick
A. Praeger, 1968) in The Art Bulletin, vol. 53 (September 1971): 274-75
180n Pevsner's Hegelianism, see David Watkin, Morality and Architecture (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), part III.
19See Stanford Anderson, "Architecture and Tradition that isn't 'Trad, Dad'," in The History. Theory
and Criticism of Architecture, ed. Marcus Whiffen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).
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identical event will have a different significance in accordance with what
different sets of later events it may be connected. Stories constitute the natural
context in which events acquire historical significance.... But obviously, to tell
a story is to exclude some happenings.... Equally obviously, we can only tell
the story in which [an event] E figures relevantly if we are aware of what later
events E is related to, so there is a certain sense in which we can tell only true
stories about the past. It is this sense which is somehow violated by
substantive philosophies of history. Using just the same sense of significance
as historians do, which presupposes that the events are set in a story,
philosophers of history seek for the significance of events before the later
events, in connection with which the former acquire significance, have
happened. The pattern they project into the future is a narrative structure. They
seek, in short, to tell the story before the story can properly be told. And the
story they are interested in is, of course, the whole story, the story of history as
a whole.20
Substantive histories of architecture introduce serious mythicizations into the discipline,
which are reinforced by the mutual epistemological dependency between history and
design and the process of ever reinforcing their own stabilizing ties. Moreover, the
interdependence of history and design coupled with historical prophecies make it
impossible to identify any robust system of expectations by which to measure the
trajectories of contemporary design practice and clarify its immanent processes; rather
interpretive analysis of the present can only reaffirm the values already predicted by
design practice.
What all this suggests, then, is that substantive or prophetic historiography can
be shown to be problematic, or even illegitimate, on an epistemological level. But the
20Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 11-12
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same sort of epistemological refutation cannot be made, I think, against Giedion's
normative historiography. For Giedion, unlike Pervsner, the work of architecture is
not part of some genetic process wherein it is understood as emerging from this or that
prior moment of style and directed toward some subsequent one; nor is it guided by
some metaphysical ground given as something extrinsic and beyond it. Rather the
work is interrogated in terms of the formal and semantic conditions of a present.
Giedion's model entails the epistemological insight that we, the interpreters, are the
conveyors of the past into the present, that historical understanding is essentially a
mediation or translation of past meanings into the present. It entails the architectural-
critical insight that the disciplinary apparatus defines the terms of that mediation,
placing restraints upon interpretation not because history or causation is hidden behind
the architectural object, but rather because contingent historical circumstances exist at
the same level of surface particularity as the object itself. Critical interpretive inquiry
operates in the irreducibly architectural realm between those received disciplinary
conventions, which seem to generate or enable the architect's intention to make
architecture, and those present forms in which the intention is transcribed. Giedion
thus rejects, even as he learns from, those interpretive models that see architecture
either as the efficient representation of a preexisting historical ground or as a wholly
detached and autonomous formal system.
Giedion's notion of "constituent facts" specifies his selection and deformation
of past codes.
Constituent facts are those tendencies which, when they are suppressed,
inevitably reappear. Their recurrence makes us aware that these are elements
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which, all together, are producing a new tradition. Constituent facts in
architecture, for example, are the undulating of the wall, the juxtaposition of
nature and the human dwelling, the open ground plan. Constituent facts in the
nineteenth century are the new potentialities in construction, the use of mass
production in industry, the changed organization of society.21
What is proposed here, it seems, is an interpretive system in which the particular forms
of the period in question are rewritten according to the paradigm of another,
overarching history of forms which is taken as the former's master text or Ur-form and
proposed as its essential hidden or unconscious meaning. The risk of such a rewriting
according to some preordained master code is, of course, a radical impoverishment of
the material in question. And if we only go this far, Giedion would surely remain open
to accusations of a formalism that sees only visual homomorphisms. But Giedion
further insists on a periodization of the modern forms according to a distinctive spatial
conception of simultaneity and space-time, his third space conception,22 which
2 1Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 1822
"To summarize briefly: There are three stages of architectural development. During the first stage
- the first space conception - space was brought into being by the interplay between volumes. This
stage encompassed the architecture of Egypt, Sumer, and Greece. Interior space was disregarded. The
second space conception began in the midst of the Roman period when interior space and with it the
vaulting problem started to become the highest aim of architecture.... Despite several profound
differentiations, this second space conception persisted throughout the period from the Roman Pantheon
to the end of the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century forms an intermediary link. A spatial
analysis of its buildings indicates that elements of all the different phases of the second stage are
simultaneously intermingled.... The third space conception set in at the beginning of this century with
the optical revolution that abolished the single viewpoint of perspective. This had fundamental
consequences for man's conception of architecture and the urban scene. The space-emanating qualities
of free-standing buildings could again be appreciated. We recognize an affinity with the first space
conception. Just as at its beginning, architecture is again approaching sculpture and sculpture is
approaching architecture. At the same time the supreme preoccupation of the second space conception
- the hollowing out of interior space - is continued, although there is a profoundly different
approach to the vaulting problem. New elements have been introduced: a hitherto unknown
interpenetration of inner and outer space and an interpenetration of different levels (largely an effect of
the automobile), which has forced the incorporation of movement as an inseparable element of
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envelopes spheres of cultural production as diverse as Cubist painting, Apollinaire's
poetry (c. 1911), Einstein's Elektrodynamik bewegter Kbrper (1905), and later
verifications of the conception such as Edgerton's stroboscopic photography, as well as
the architectural production that Giedion canonized (figs. 105, 107, 108).23 And so,
on the opposite side from formalism, Giedion's periodizing practice is covered - and
not entirely contradictorily - by that well-known conceptual target designated as
historicism. 24 And it must be admitted that any fruitful use of the notion of a coherent
structurality of a historical or cultural period, imposed upon what is inexorably a
heterogeneous and open field of activities, tends to give the impression of a facile
parallelism or homologization - a seamless tissue of entities and events, each of which
expresses some world-view, period style, or unified inner truth which is isolated and
privileged as a master code or inner essence capable of explicating all elements or
features of the material in question.
architecture. All these have contributed to the space conception of the present day and underlie its
evolving tradition." Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, lv-lvi
23Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 434-36
24To be more specific, I am thinking of Althusser's "expressive causality." "This is the model that
dominates all Hegel's thought. But it presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible
to an inner essence, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than the phenomenal forms
of expression, the inner principle of the essence being present at each point in the whole, such that at
each moment it is possible to write the immediately adequate equation: such and such an element
(economic, political, legal, literary, religious, etc., in Hegel) = the inner essence of the whole. Here
was a model which made it possible to think the effectivity of the whole on each if its elements, but if
this category - inner essence/outer phenomenon - was to be applicable everywhere and at every
moment to each of the phenomena arising in the totality in question, it presupposed that the whole had
a certain nature, precisely the nature of a 'spiritual' whole in which each element was expressive of the
entire totality as a 'pars totalis."' Louis Althusser, Reading Capital (London: Verso, 1979 [orig.
French, 1968]),186-87; emphasis in original. For discussions of the distinctions among historicism,
totalization, and mediation, see Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 23 ff. and passim.; Martin Jay,
Marxism and Totality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); and Michael
Sprinkler, Imaginary Relations. Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism
(London: Verso, 1987), 153 ff. and passim.
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Yet a construal of Giedion's thesis as either naively historicist or rigidly
formalist, I believe, is reductive. I would want to grant Giedion's interpretive practice
at least a local validity on two points. First, by assuming that, as a result of specific
historical circumstances, Giedion's theory pertaining to those circumstances arises from
a particular and already constituted disciplinary apparatus. And second, by
understanding it to have confronted - explicitly, thematically, and in the form of an
epistemological and historiographical problem - a difficulty that is, in fact, inherent in
all materialist criticism: that of providing mediations between social phenomena, the
formal properties of the architectural work, and the psychic economy organized by the
latter, or, in different terminology, the problem of the insertion of the subject. Indeed,
it is this mediating practice which will be retained in the present thesis. What will differ
is the result. In Giedion's history, the standard oppositions between the interpreter and
the interpreted, private experience and public conventions, the unconscious and the
conscious, the personal or unknowable and the universal and comprehensible, are all
displaced and reanchored in a new conception of the historical context and psychic
situation wherein the individual subject can be recentered in its social present by the
sheer lucidity of visual form. The importance of Giedion's conception of visuality, his
"optical revolution," can now be considered.
Giedion's notion of the "Eternal Present" is the subjective corollary of the
objective vocation of constituent facts. His main thesis is this: 1) that the modem
movement in architecture was trying to heal a rift in culture and the human psyche
which had opened up in the nineteenth century; 2) that that rift involved a split in
subjective or psychological terms between thought and feeling, and in objective,
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architectural terms between form and structure, expression and construction, art and
industrial production; and 3) that the reconciliation of this rift involved an elaboration of
a few constituent facts. Such an elaboration would be a means for correlating human
experience, space, and knowledge; a means for achieving the necessary oneness of
knowledge and feeling.
Giedion's characterization of the conditions of modernity, which the terms
rationalization and reification can be taken to designate, is not so different from that of
philosophers and sociologists such as Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and Georg Lukdcs,
who saw traditional cultural institutions - once unified, genuine, and concrete forms
of social relationships - as having long since been dissolved by the corrosive effects
of market relations, blasted into their component fragments, and reorganized by the
processes of capitalism with its characteristic tendency toward greater efficiency
according to the instrumental dialectic of means and ends. When this process finally
completes its structural separation of subject from object and recolonizes each
separately, new hierarchies of functions are produced according to their instrumental
use, and the quantifying, rational modes of thought are overdeveloped while the more
archaic functions, such as Giedion's "feeling," are bracketed off in a kind of psychic
marginality.25 But at the same time, it seems that for Giedion these now isolated,
fragmented bits and pieces of the older unities acquire a certain coherence and
autonomy of their own which in some measure serve to compensate for the
dehumanization of experience that rationalization and reification bring, and to rectify the
251 borrow this general formulation from Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 220 ff.
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otherwise intolerable effects of the new process. 26 So, to return to Giedion's primary
example, as vision becomes an independent mode of reception, and as sight becomes a
separate activity in its own right, they generate new objects of their own which, though
still the products of the processes of fragmentation, abstraction, and rationalization that
operate to interdict the experience of the world according to a more holistic, auratic
depth model of "feeling" - of religious iconography, say, or the experience of
"natural" environments - can, at the same time, be reconfigured and projected as
possible solutions, on an aesthetic level, to that genuinely contradictory situation in the
concrete world of everyday life from which they first emerged. The artistic
manipulations of Picasso, Le Corbusier, et al. - which employ "abstractions" such as
monochromy or pure color, flattened and layered space, and "fragmented," non-
perspectival points of view - are individual productions and cultural manifestations
grasped as responses to a determinate situation and having the intelligibility of genuine
historical gestures, provided the context is reconstructed with sufficient complexity.
So, in Giedion's words, the Cubist "presentation of objects from several points of
view," the "breaking up the surfaces of the natural forms into angular facets," the
"extreme scarcity of colors," the "advancing and retreating planes..., interpenetrating,
hovering, often transparent, without anything to fix them in realistic position," "the
flattening out so that interior and exterior could be seen simultaneously," (one could go
on) are "equivalent to psychic responses." 27 Taking on the properly utopian vocation
of the newly reified sense of sight, the mission of this heightened and autonomous
26Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 63 ff.
27Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture 437-8
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visual language of space-time can be construed as restorative, at least symbolically, of
the experience of psychic gratification and integration to a world drained of it.
The moment around which Giedion's interpretive system turns is, thus, a kind
of visual wish-fulfillment, posited as the very dynamic of our being as individual
subjects. What is necessary to underscore is the dependence of Giedion's "discovery"
of the the visual logic of space-time on the increasing fragmentation, simultaneity, and
abstraction of actual experience in modern everyday life. In such a situation, it is clear
that his reassertion of the centered subject, the homologue of the Eternal Present at the
level of the individual, is a genuinely historical act. The subject having been split from
its object by the logic of social and technical development, the object must now be
reconstructed by Giedion in such a way as to bear the place of the subject within itself:
"lo spettatore nel centro del quadro" was how Giedion put it.28 And here, once again,
is the conjunction of criticism and design too easily dismissed by Tafuri as "operative."
The viewing, interpreting subject must be placed within the frame of the object, "not at
some isolated point outside. Modern art, like modern science, recognizes the fact that
observation and what is observed form one complex situation - to observe something
is to act upon and alter it."29 The process of critical interpretation is transformed by
Giedion into one of a hypothetical or imaginary restoration of the historical situation
itself, whose reconstitution is at one with visual comprehension. The artwork is an
object whose interpretation has already commenced but is never complete. As Giedion
put it, "There is no static equilibrium between man and his environment, between inner
28The quotation left in Italian by Giedion is from the first manifesto of futurism.
29Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture, 5-6
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and outer reality. We cannot prove in a direct way how action and reaction operate
here. We can no more lay tangible hold on these processes than we can grasp the
nucleus of an atom."30
Giedion's effort was to chart the commerce between inner and outer reality -
especially the impact of mechanization on what he conceives as our unchanging
humanity, on the stability of the individual psyche - and to project new means of
reconciliation. As such, his interpretive method can precisely and properly be
reasserted as mediation. Fredric Jameson has defined this concept.
[The concept of mediation [is] the relationship between the levels or instances
[of social practice], and the possibility of adapting analyses and findings from
one level to another. Mediation is the classical dialectical term for the
establishment of relationships between, say, the formal analysis of a work of art
and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and
its economic base.... The concept of mediation has traditionally been the way
in which dialectical philosophy and Marxism itself have formulated their
vocation to break out of the specialized compartments of the (bourgeois)
disciplines and to make connections among the seemingly disparate phenomena
of social life generally. If a more modern characterization of mediation is
wanted, we will say that this operation is understood as a process of
transcoding: as the invention of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a
particular code or language, such that the same terminology can be used to
analyze and articulate two quite distinct types of objects or "texts," or two very
different structural levels of reality. Mediations are thus a device of the analyst,
whereby the fragmentation and autonomization of social life... is at least locally
overcome, on the occasion of a particular analysis. 31
30Ibid.31Jameson, The Political Unconscious 39-40
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But it is in the intangible realm between inner and outer reality, between
perceptual categories and modes of production, between subject and object, that there
remains something disturbing about Giedion's specific theory of modern architecture.
For precisely at a time when reification was penetrating into the very core of personal
experience, leaving no vestiges of a non-alienated reality as its reciprocal or opposing
notion, Giedion's theory - which, as we have seen, comes into being as a protest and
a defense against reification - emerges as the perpetuation of a conception of a
historical moment, wholly present, in which the individual subject would somehow be
fully conscious of his or her determination by such extrinsic structural conditions of
modernity as I have already mentioned, and would somehow be able to reintegrate and
resolve these determinations in the visual experience of architectural form. Recent
poststructuralist theory has shown us again and again that such a resolution, such an
immanence, is a myth, an ideological mirage. 32 But the impossibility of immanence
means more than that Giedion was not able at his point in time to become, as it were, a
poststructuralist. For in the end, Giedion's aesthetic ideology and social vision is
contrary to, and must be evaluated against, the postindividual and posthumanist
reversal of much of modern architecture - the side of modern architecture not
considered by Giedion. In practice this architecture aimed beyond the autonomous
individualism of the bourgeoisie in its heyday, took on the task of a radical and painful
decentering of the consciousness of the individual subject which it confronted with a
32I am thinking of the work of Michel Foucault, Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques
Derrida, but the impossibility of such a resolution is already explicityly analyzed in Marx and Freud.
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determination necessarily felt as beyond the humanist horizon, and, conscisouly or not,
anticipated an emergent collective process of enunciating a new status of the subject
after the decay of bourgeois centrism.
In the sections of this dissertation that follow I will analyze different
constructions of the subject which employ the very forms of the space-time synthesis
and mechanization that Giedion extols, but which enact a critical reversal of his
humanism. Against Giedion's notion that modem architectural objects provide visual
symbols for the integral psychological self, I wish to point to certain modem
architectural objects that put into crisis the cognitive status of autonomous vision and
the centered self for which that vision is a metaphor, and redirect our attention to those
extrinsic processes that lie beyond individual aesthetic mastery. We will see how, in
order to displace the unified subject of bourgeois humanism, certain modernist practices
draw upon the effects of reification in the actual experience of such subjects,
incorporating into the structure of their works the very effects of social and technical
transformations that determine aesthetic representations and pitting what was
increasingly felt to be the semantic reality of industrial capitalism against the formal
ideologies of humanism. Such work begins from the position that critical intervention
into the very mechanisms of representation and sign construction can be a motivating
force of aesthetic production, but then moves in different directions: toward the critical
instrumentalization of aesthetic practice (Meyer) or toward the reluctant affirmation of
posthumanist anomie and distraction within aesthetic practice (Hilberseimer) - all in
the name of Sachlichkeit. Modern architecture thus dramatizes in its very internal
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structures the crucial contradiction in the ideology of the subject latent in the writings of
Giedion.
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Time and Architecture showing comparison
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International, Moscow
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end ertical plane. . 1920.
80. Piaza del Popol, Rome. View frm the Pinrcio erraei. showing the di
onial lemel ineoled and their relatios to the ertica plae In the Pi . V
touches upon a fundamental eenception of our tite: the relation beimen hr
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aladier herehontat and
view might lead out upon a wide green area as it does
in the Place de Ia Concorde and in the Royal Crescent at
Bath. Today this area is occupied by broad avenues and tall
houses and defaced by advertising signs.
The Piazza del Popolo has remained to this day one of the most
"modern " in appearance of all the great squares. To a certain
extent this is due to the thoroughgoing fusion of buildings and
park. Its air of modernity is owing much more, however, to
the way in which different levels are brought within the same
r composition. The series of places built at Nancy in the middle
of the eighteenth century had exploited the relations that can
be made to hold among the vertical surfaces of buildings of
different heights. In the Piazza del Popolo. Valadier embodies
a hovering sensation in the total effect produced by his design
by bringing into relation with each other two horizontal areas
of different levels: the terrace on the Pincio, and the pia::a
proper. A proportion in three dimensions - not merely in
two, as at Nancy - is developed.
We have seen how Borromini, in striving to lead the movement
of a design through the space of the interior into outer space,
anticipated a concern of modern architecture. Valadiers
pia::a touches upon another fundamental conception of our
time: the relation between horizontal and vertical surfaces as
a basis for aesthetic responses of a special sort. That this is
one of the constituent facts in modern architecture. one of the
tendencies determining its character, cannot be doubted. A
drawing made about 1922 by the Dutch painter, poet, and
architect, Theo van Doesburg, founder of the "Stijl" group,
shows a conscious recognition of this conception (fig. 81). It
depicts the interacting relations of hovering and transparent
vertical and horizontal plane surfaces of a house.
To avoid misunderstanding, it may be worth repeating that
neither Borromini nor Valadier worked with space con-
102. Comparison of the Valadier's Piazza
del Popolo, Rome, with Van Doesburg's
"interacting relations of hovering and
transparent vertical and horizontal plane
surfaces"
Interrelated
horizontal and
vertical surfaces
A
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265. EDGERTON. Speed photograph ofa tennis player. 1939.
266. PICASSO. "Guernica," 1937. Deail.
344s. Stele at the neolithic monumental "Tomb of the 344h. LE CORBUSIER. Pilgrimage Chapel
Giants" in Sardinia. of Notre Dame du flout, Ronchamps. 1955.
View fromw the usl. A Meziean archileel, R. Bar-
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Sardinia-
105. Comparison of Edgerton's
stroboscopic photography with Picasso's
Guernica
106. Comparison of the "secret affinity"
between the Tomb of the Giants, Sardinia,
and Le Corbusier's Notre Dame du Haut,
Ronchamps
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single view. There is no uncertainty in the observer concern-
ing their relation to each other. On the other hand, a view
restricted to its central axis reveals none of the essential
character of an organism like Rockefeller Center. It possesses
symmetries which are senseless in reference to the aesthetic
significance of the whole. The complex must be comprehended
in terms of space and time analogous to what has been achieved
in modern scientific research as well as in modern painting.
In Edgerton's stroboscopic studies, in which motion can be
fixed and analyzed in arrested fractions of 1/100,000 of a sec-
ond, a complete movement is shown separated into its succes-
sive components (fig. 523). At Rockefeller Center the human
eye must function similarly (fig. 522); it has to pick up each in-
dividual view singly and relate it to all others. combining them
into a time sequence. Only thus are we able to understand its
grand play of volumes and surfaces and perceive its many-
sided significance.
522. Rockefeller Center. Pholomontage. Expressions of the new urban cale like Rocke-
feller Center areforcefully conceived in space-time and cannot be embraced in a single view.
To obtain a feeling for their interrelations the eye must function as in the high-speed photo-
graphs of Edgerton.
our own age. The difference can be indicated by comparing it
with such thirteenth-century structures as the leaning towers
of the two noble families of Asinelli and Garisenda in Bologna
(fig. 521). These private patrician fortresses rise magnificently
into the sky, but they can be embraced at a single glance, in a
ussii-- L r ms. -r, -- rjm .
s23. EDGERTON. Speed photrapho lfstroke. In Edgerton's stroboseopic stud es
in which molions can befred and analyzed in arresledfrations of 1/100.000 ofa second, a
whale moeent is separated it its successie comtponens, nmaking possible compreheneon
in both space and time.
852 853
107. Comparison of Giedion's own
photomontage of Rockefeller Center with
Edgerton's stroboscopic photography in
which "a whole movement is separated into
its successive components, making possible
comprehension in both space and time"
emisseerais e
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108. Comparison of Picasso's L'Arl6sienne
with Gropius's Bauhaus, Dessau in which
"the extensive transparent areas, by
dematerializing the corners, permit the
hovering relations of planes and the kind of
'overlapping' which appears in
contemporary painting"

ll. Hannes Meyer and the
Radicalization of Perception
The form of the new means of production,
which at first is still dominated by the old
(Marx), corresponds to images in the
collective consciousness in which the new is
intermingled with the old. These images are
wish-images, and in them the collective
seeks both to sublate and transfigure the
incompleteness of the social product and the
inadequacies in the social system of
production. In addition, these wish-images
manifest an emphatic striving for
dissociation with the outmoded - which
means, however, with the most recent past.
These tendencies direct the visual
imagination, which has been activated by the
new, back to the primeval past. In the
dream in which, before the eyes of each
epoch, that which is to follow appears in
images, the latter appears wedded to
elements from prehistory, that is, of a
classless society. Intimations of this,
deposited in the unconscious of the
collective and intermingling with the new,
produce the utopia that has left its traces in
thousands of configurations of life, from
permanent buildings to ephemeralfashions.
Walter Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century," in Reflections (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 148. I have modified the translation slightly to restructure certain phrases
and to render Wunschbilder as "wish-images," and aufzuheben as "sublate." The original 1935 essay,
"Paris: Die Haupstadt des XIX Jahrhunderts," is in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, ed. Rolf
Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhauser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972-); the
passage cited is on p. 408.
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Hannes Meyer and the Radicalization of Perception
Around 1926 Hannes Meyer developed a body of work designated by the the name
"cooperative" or "Co-op" (eg: figs. 201-205), a locution which Oskar Schlemmer
would call Meyer's favorite. 1 Meyer's Co-op work marks a fault line in the
development of modern architecture, a cleft in cultural space across which henceforth
will be played the dialectic of formal paradigms already defined by the avant-garde and
the altogether different perceptual conventions of mass technological society.2 The
disparity between these two modes is most apparently registered by what critics of
Meyer's work consistently have seen as a tension between an avant-garde
"constructivist aesthetic" - a visual approach to his work - and a purely
"functionalist," utilitarian, and anti-aesthetic organization of building components
dedicated to a social program.3 It is a disparity not of form only, but between two
distinct spaces of culture - that of "high" culture with its autonomously developed
formal strategies, and that of popular or mass culture and the apparatuses of its
production.
1In a letter to Tut Schlemmer, 1 December 1927, in The Letters and Diaries of Oskar Schlemmer, ed.
Tut Schlemmer (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), 2162Such a condition is not unique to Meyer, of course, and can be detected perhaps most emphatically in
the work of the Russian avant-garde. But in the West Meyer's work stands as perhaps the key example
of the dialectic of modernism and mass culture.
3See especially Francesco Dal Co, "Hannes Meyer e la 'venerabile scuola di Dessau'," introduction to
Hannes Meyer, Architettura o rivoluzione (Padua: Marsilio, 1973); and Jacques Gubler, Nationalisme
et internationalisme dans l'architecture moderne de la Suisse (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1975).
Some critics also perceive a definite shift in Meyer's design strategy around the time of his
appointment as director of the architecture department at the Bauhaus. For example, Manfredo Tafuri
writes, "In the works of Meyer designed between 1926 and 1930... the categorical imperative of
'construction as thoroughly thought out organization of the vital processes' [Meyer] was expressed in a
contradictory manner. On the one hand, in the Petersschule and the Geneva building, we have
Constructivist mechanistic metaphors not unmindful of what was being done by the Soviets at that
time; on the other, in the Bernau school and even more in the five blocks Meyer added to the T6rten-
Dessau Siedlung begun by Gropius, form was reduced to a tendentially scientific process approaching
pure technique and function...." In Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture (New
York: Abrams, 1979), 173
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An adequate account of Meyer's modernism must treat this disparity, which is
one symptom of the general difficulty of knowing and signifying in modern society, of
the difference-yet-consonance between the values of progressive modernization and
those of epistemic and historical continuity within the discipline of architecture. In this
section of the thesis I shall attempt an exposition of Meyer's Co-op research which will
show that the consistency of his position is entirely comprehensible, but only within a
framework of changed relationships between design practice, architectural form, and
the forces of social production and consumption at large. A discussion of these
changed relationships will be progressed along several lines. First, we will see that
Meyer's conception of the design process is one that has been redefined in order to
collapse the distinction between the aesthetic and the practical-cognitive function of
artistic signs. Design for Meyer is a signifying practice4 which employs appropriations
of the physical materials, visual images, and formative principles of the industrialization
and massification of everyday life, and seeks to negate the qualitative differences
between artistic practice and the production of objects of everyday use. Second, the
aesthetic response Meyer's work elicits is itself an interpretive event, a productive
performance which shows the world as emergent through processes that are arbitrarily
imposed and changeable rather than natural or universal. Finally, however, Meyer's
design practice is an activity that can completely enunciate the desired change of
4"I shall call signifying practice the establishment and the countervailing of a sign system.
Establishing a sign system calls for the identity of a speaking subject within a social framework,
which he recognizes as a basis for that identity. Countervailing the sign system is done by having the
subject undergo an unsettling, questionable [sic] process; this indirectly challenges the social
framework with which he had previously identified, and it thus coincides with times of abrupt changes,
renewal, or revolution in society." Julia Kristeva, La Travers6e des signes trans. in Kristeva, Desire in
Language, Leon S. Roudiez, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 18
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relationships between art and the world only through a radical negation of the discipline
of architecture itself as defined within the paradigm of modernism.
What I mean to suggest by the performativity of Meyer's work is an enabling
condition for architecture in contrast to both historical or functional determinism and
authorial intentionality. When, for example, Meyer expands Marx's dictum that life
determines consciousness with the statement that "the revolution in our attitude of mind
to the reorganization of our world calls for a change in our media of expression," 5 he is
asserting that the transformations of social structures necessitate the transformation of
aesthetic hierarchies and require radically different forms of perception, and further
implying that some social structuring force outside individual consciousness activates,
conditions, and sets that consciousness in motion. In Meyer's view of artistic
production, human agency is not relinguished altogether. Indeed, a crucial point in
Meyer's conception of the productivity of architecture is the moment of negativity and
resistance registered by the designing agent: "in every creative design appropriate to
living, we reorganize an organized form of existence." 6 Yet, while still allowing and
accounting for the agency of the designing subject, Meyer gives a productive power to
the object and the complex interplay between subject and object: "We could call the
process of building a conscious patterning of the socio-economic, the techno-
constructive, and the psycho-physiological elements in the social living process." 7
5Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt," Das Werk 7 (Bern, 1926): 205-24; trans. in Claude Schnaidt,
Hannes Meyer. Buildings, projects and writings (Teufen: Verlag Arthur Niggli, 1965)
6Meyer, "bauhaus und gesellschaft," in bauhaus 1, 1929; trans. in Schnaidt. Original is in lower case
letters; my emphasis.
7Meyer, "Education of the Architect," a lecture to the San Carlos Academy, Mexico, 30 September
1938; partial transcript in Schnaidt, 53.
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Recognizing the designing subject's partial determination by external social forces and
the object's productive engagement with the viewing subject avoids the exclusive
appeal to individual artistic agency by affirming the reciprocity between modes of
production and modes of reception. It is this reciprocity that I am calling the
performativity of perception - understood as the critical, interpretive engagement of
designer, viewer, and object all plunged into the social dynamic that activiates and
conditions them. Thus Meyer's radicalization of the performativity of perception as a
collective engagement can be distinquished from Giedion's conservative protraction of
individual visual gratification, and Meyer's conception of antihumanist subjectivity can
be launched.
Co-op Vitrine and the Representation
of Mass Reproduction and Consumption,
or the Performativity of Perception
It is because modem society does not recognize itself as an ideological construction that
it must be represented as such; this is the vocation of any politically engaged art. With
Hannes Meyer's Co-op Vitrine project of 1925 (figs. 206-209) we confront not only
the practical, formal problem of the representation of industrialized society and the
distantiation of its ideological materials, but also and more fundamentally, the question
of the ideological nature and function of that representation itself.8 The Vitrine was
designed for the exhibition of Co-op products in Ghent and Basel in 1925. What
qualifies the Co-op Vitrine as exemplary of such questions - for it may not be
immediately obvious that the display case qualifies as a work of "art" let alone a
representation - is the particular perceptual interaction with the viewing subject it
generates, as well as the systematic formal procedures by which the perceptual
phenomenon is constituted.
8 Althusser states in his "A Letter on Art in Reply to Andr6 Daspre," in Lenin and Philsophy and Other
Essays trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) that he does "not rank real art
among the ideologies." (emphasis in original) His attempt here is to discriminate, following a
traditional form/matter relation, between two different modes of apprehending the world: aesthetic
practice and ideology. For Althusser, art gives form to the materials of ideology. But neither is
ideology wholly external to art. Works of art may become the raw materials for ideological practice.
Then, their aesthetic modality is subordinated to their ideological function, but the irreducibly artistic
structure will enable its utilization as an ideological instrument. This formulation will be helpful in
our analysis of Meyer.
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At first gloss, the Vitrine, with its foregrounding of the object language of
commodity production in a visual display, seems to be stigmatized precisely and easily
by theories of commodity reification and alienation of subject from object, which
describe the way products and productive activities under capitalism are ruthlessly
rationalized and reorganized in the purely instrumental terms of means/ends efficiency:
in a world where every product and form of labor has become a commodity, activities
of making are stripped of their unique qualitative differentiation and become abstractly
comparable through the indifferent medium of capital; and the objects made also shed
their intrinsic qualities and use values and come to be arranged under the common
denominator of exchange value. In the Co-op Vitrine, articles of everyday use,
packaged in various shapes and sizes of cartons, cans, bottles, tubes, bags, and boxes,
appear as depleted images of commodity production, distanced even further from their
producers and users by the conditions of their display, which bracket off the products
from the physical space of the consumer, rendering them, exactly and merely it seems,
distantiated and fragmented images. Arranged as the repetitive components of so many
different series of mechanical processes of stacking, extruding, and aligning, they bear
no traces of human manufacture, no evidence of an individual producer's control, but
rather seem to emanate auto-mechanically from an unseen assembly line.
Consequently, upon attending to the Co-op Vitrine, our own sense of self unity
as individuals is threatened. In a section titled "The division of labor as the cause of the
divergence of subjective and objective culture" of The Philosophy of Money, Georg
Simmel seems to capture our initial sense of Meyer's presentation exactly:
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The unity of an object is realized for us only by projecting our self into the
object in order to shape it according to our image so that the diversity of
determinations grows into the unity of the "ego." In the same manner, the unity
or lack of unity of the object that we create affects, in a psychological-practical
sense, the corresponding formation of our personality. Whenever our energies
do not produce something whole as a reflection of the total personality, then the
proper relationship between subject and object is missing.... Because of its
fragmentary character, the product lacks the spiritual determinacy that can be
easily perceived in a product of labor that is wholly the work of a single person.
The significance of the product is thus to be sought neither in the reflection of a
subjectivity nor in the reflex of a creative spirit, but is to be found only in the
objective achievement that leads away from the subject.... The broadening of
consumption... is dependent upon the growth of objective culture, since the
more objective and impersonal an object is the better it is suited to more people.
Such consumable material... cannot be designed for subjective differentiation of
taste, while on the other hand only the most extreme differentiation of
production is able to produce the objects cheaply and abundantly enough in
order to satisfy the demand for them.... [T]he product of labor in the capitalist
era is an object with a decidedly autuonoumous character, with its own laws of
motion and a character alien to the producing subject, [and] is most forcefully
illustrated where the worker is compelled to buy his own product.9
The subjective aura of the Co-op product has disappeared in relation to the individual
consumer because the commodity is now produced independently of individuals, and
even its arrangement as so many fragments in its glass case indicates this
disenfranchisement of individual manufacture. The aesthetic structure of the Vitrine is
9Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig: Duncken und Humbolt, 1900); references are to the
English translation The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 454-56; some emphasis added
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determined rather by the repetitive and serially structured formation that is the very
nature of mass reproduced commodities and their display.
As a straightforward and unreflective display of articles of daily use, Meyer's
work may be seen to go no further than this, and thus to stand implicated in a purely
technocratic, administered, and instrumental logic. As an apparatus of visual sign
production involving preestablished conventions of object perception, however, the
Co-op Vitrine can be understood in its specific mode of signification only by
constructing the alternative conditions of perceptual interaction that it proposes relative
to the received modernist paradigm. This would clarify its immanent (formal)
meanings as well as allow us to account for the production of that quite different thing
called ideology, which Althusser defines as "the imaginary representation of the
subject's relationship to his or her real conditions of existence." 10 We have just
broached the issue of the subject as it is constructed in its general perceptual interaction
with the object. When we now introduce the more specific question of representation
into our analysis, the ideological coordinates of our problem will come into focus. 11
A powerful instrument given by recent literary theory for the analysis of
representation in terms of subjectivity is the distinction between the subject of the
enunciation and the subject of the utterance (sujet d'inonciation / sujet d'bnonc). 12
1OLouis Althusser, Lenin and Philsophy and Other Essays, 162
11The term "representation" has been charged in many, and often contradictory ways in much of recent
poststructuralist and postmarxist theory, but has usually been taken to name the mirage of organic
realist unification, with all of the bad ideological consequences that follow. Here I understand
representation to be synonymous with "figuration" or "imaginary construction of a world" and will
assume, therefore, that what follows in any form of aesthetic production is some sort of representation.12
"In order to describe the dialogism inherent in the denotative or historical world, we would have to
turn to the psychic aspect of writing as trace of dialogue with oneself (with another), as a writer's
distance from himself, as a splitting of the writer into subject of enunciation and subject of utterance.
Co-op Vitrine and the Representation of Mass Production and Consumption
This distinction can be summarized as follows: The self-creating and self-representing
ego is a function or effect of a subject that, in actuality, is never identical with itself,
always dispersed, and strung out along the chains of the discourses that constitute it.
There is a radical gap between the subject split into several incommensurable faculties
by the various cultural apparatuses that place contradictory ideological demands on it,
and the representation of that subject through the work of art or through ordinary
discourse unified in that desired state consisting in a harmony between those faculties.
This gap is exemplified by the simple act of referring to myself in a sentence. When I
write "Today I will purchase that product," the "I" which I name is an immediately
intelligible, fairly stable point of reference which belies the more complex depths of the
I that actually produces the utterance as well as the ideological mechanisms which
enable and constrain that production.13 The former I is known to linguistic theory as
the subject of the utterance - the topic designated by my sentence, the subject as it is
designated in discourse; the latter I, roughly the writer of the sentence, is the subject of
the enunciation - the subject of the actual act of representing, the subject of the
By the very act of narrating, the subject of narration addresses an other; narration is structured in
relation to this other.... Consequently, a dialogue between the subject of narration (S) and the addressee(A) - the other. This addressee, quite simply the reading subject, represents a doubly oriented entity:
signifier in his relation to the text and signified in the relation between the subject of narration and
himself. This entity is thus a dyad (Al and A2) whose two terms, communicating with each other,
constitute a code system. The subject of narration (S) is drawn in, and therefore reduced to a code, to a
nonperson, to an anonymity (as writer, subject of enunciation) mediated by a third person, the he/she
character, the subject of utterance.... The subject of utterance, in relation to the subject of enunciation,
plays the role of addressee with respect to the subject; it inserts the subject of enunciation within the
writing system by making the latter pass through emptiness.... The subject of utterance is both
representative of the subject of enunciation and represented as object of the subject of enunciation....
The subject of utterance is "dialogical," both S and A are disquised within it." Julia Kristeva, Desire in
Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 74-76. One should note the issue of
performativity is already embedded in this dialogical relationship.
13Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory. An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1983), 164-65
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ideological structures that position and control speech, and also, in an expanded sense,
the subject of the forces of production and consumption which make the product
referred to available for purchase. The subject of the enunciation is the subject that is
alienated and lost the moment it is articulated in language. In a linguistics of the
dnoncd, these two subjects seem to achieve a rough sort of representational unity, but
this unity is of an imaginary kind: the convenient, conventionally unified, and self-
identical pronoun "I" stands in for the ever-dispersed subject. Whereas in a linguistics
of the gnonciation, stress is placed on the relational and process-like character of
language, 14 which tends to undermine the conventionalized unities, identities, and
fixities of representational categories, and thereby to pose the question of possible
alternative conventions and signifying practices.
We can extend this linguistic distinction to the problem of representation at issue
here. Understood in the terms of an act of inonciation, rather than as a presentation of
already fixed and commodified signs, the Co-op Vitrine transforms both the immanent
aesthetic structure of the work and the structured perceptual interaction of the pictorial
construct with the viewer in important ways. First, rather than the familiar arrangement
of isolated individual products in a shop window, the Co-op articles are presented as an
image or facsimile of the industrialized manufacturing process itself, each series of
products configured as if having issued from the various conveyor belts of an assembly
line. Second, the very picture of the commodity producing factory, as it were, is itself
framed as the overall scene of collective reception and consumption; the final, finished
14
"A subject of enunciation takes shape within the gap opened up between signfier and signified that
admits both structure and interplay within." Kristeva, 127-28
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product to which the consumer has the most direct access is, simultaneously, the
constituent element of the overall pictorial device which the "pictorial consumer" must
apprehend. The work thereby stresses the process of commodity sign production and
reception as well as the reification which that sign must undergo in its transfiguration
into a pictorial construct, by making the mechanisms of the work's representation and
mode of address part of its actual content, all of which is bound to result in a
contradictory aesthetic. The Co-op Vitrine attempts to turn this contradiction to fruitful
use, displacing the spectator from his accustomed imaginary possession of the work as
a unity, but providing alternative spaces from which the viewer might appropriate the
work's main fiction of mass industrialized production and consumption.
One of the registers through which the fiction of the Co-op Vitrine is projected
is the familiar formal and autotelic production of modernism, but this is quickly
interrupted by questions of the reception of form. On the one hand, the Co-op Vitrine
incorporates the compositional strategies of seriality, repetition, diagonal and frontal
layering, and circumnavigable space, all constituents of a modernist practice already
evolved to its most advanced stages in postcubist and elementarist pictorial and
sculptural practices such as suprematism and constructivism. At the same time, without
sacrificing the formal rigor and self-referentiality of a thoroughly modern artform,
Meyer introduces into this work an iconic potential which seeks to engage a wholly
different audience in wholly different terms than those routinely associated with
modernism, terms closer to the instrumentalized factographic and cinematographic
researches of productivism and even dadaism than to the valorization of autonomy,
abstraction, and hermetic withdrawal of high modernism.
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For example, when in 1921, Raoul Hausmann declares, "Our art is already
today film! At once event, sculpture, and image!" 15 he defines a collective, mass-
technologically structured form of object perception as well as a strategy of formal
articulation. And when, in the same year, A. V. Babichev declares, "Art is an informed
analysis of the concrete tasks which social life poses.... If art becomes public property
it will organize the consciousness and psyche of the masses by organizing objects and
ideas," 16 he invokes themes of organized production, consumption, and subjective
engagement that are continuous with Meyer's concerns in the Co-op Vitrine. Such
statements and the sorts of work to which they are attached belie a more general crisis
of representational systems within the modernist paradigm than has been acknowledged
in the standard architecture historical literature, 17 a crisis involving nothing less than a
changed psychic and cognitve relationship to objects.
In the mid-1920s there was a general recognition among the most politically
committed artists that those artistic forms, procedures, and conditions of reception
received from bourgeois society and its aesthetic institutions would have to be
systematically dismantled and redefined in an effort to establish new conditions of
simultaneous collective reception, and that those latter conditions would involve
changed perceptual conventions for objects of everyday use. The productivist
programs of of the Soviet avant-garde provide a standard against which to measure
15Raoul Hausmann, "PREsentismus gegen den Puffkeismus der Teutschen Seele," in De Stijl 4, no. 9
(September 1921), reprinted Hausmann, Am Anfang war Dada ed. Karl Riha and Gunter Kampf
(Giessen: Anabas-Verlag, 1980), 31
16A. V. Babichev, cited in Hubertus Gassner, "Analytical Sequences, " in Alexander Rodchenko, ed.
David Elliot (Oxford: Museum of Modern Art, 1979), 110
17Benjamin Buchloh discusses this crisis in the context of the historiographic reception of the Russian
avant-garde in his "From Faktura to Factography," October 30 (Fall 1984): 82-119.
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many of these changes. But another illuminating comparison with Meyer's Co-op
Vitrine comes in a remarkable essay by the painter Johannes Molzahn, "Economics of
the Advertising Mechanism," published in Die Form in 1925-26. (Compare fig. 210.)
In order to understand what I have called the psychic and cognitive nature of the
perceived interrelations of systems of production, commodity products, and their
reception, it is worth quoting the article at some length.
[J]ust as the natural forces of water, wind and fire can only be harnessed to
industrial use by interposing some form of reistance to them (turbines,
windmills and so on), to convert the forces into mechanical energy, in the same
way the productive forces that we find in industrial production become
expressive only when similar conditions are fulfilled and the production-psyche
is successfully converted into acceptance by the consumer. The comparisons of
the functions can be illustrated in parallel tables:
Industry Advertising
Natural forces: water, fire etc. = production, materials
Converter: turbine, windmill = propaganda machinery
Effective power mechanical energy = consumption, sales
As we have now set out the production-psyche of the natural forces, that which
drives the production-machinery through a process of conversion and keeps it
going, and appears in the Table as effective power, similarly we have found the
converter in the propaganda-machinery, which drives the consumption
mechanism and keeps that moving. We now have to find out the means
employed in the propaganda-machinery, to find a converter serving the same
purpose in our field as the turbine does in the field of industrial production.
Our first problem will be to recognize the psyche of consumption, or
acceptance, with its organs and functions, and to deduce from that the means of
Hannes Meyer and the Radicalization of Perception
affecting them. It is not difficult to perceive this acceptance-mechanism in the
spirit of the people or its expression in the spirit of the age, which takes material
form through an optical-acoustic appeal to the senses ... The propaganda of
production must therefore rely primarily on optical functions. But propaganda
is in essence information in graphic presentation; the question is, then, to
determine which elements of graphic presentation to have the greatest optical
capacity to make a lasting impression on the psyche.... We can demonstrate the
conversion effect of the symbol presentation in yet another example. Let us
take a magnifying glass and hold it between the sun and a piece of paper so that
the paper is at the focal point of the lens, and catches fire. In thus creating fire
we have converted the sun's energy into active energy. The conception of a
symbol-effect is convincing if we show this same experiment to a primitive
tribe; the impact would be absolutely shattering and express itself in wild flight
from this "magic," which has so taken and impressed the whole psyche of the
primitive man. The lens has become a symbol of the sun, the unknown
function of the lens has engraved itself on the subconscious, a mystery. In this
example we have established the principle that the industrial symbol has to
construct if it is to produce its effect. The trade-mark has the function of the
lens, it stands for the lens as the lens stood for the sun to the primitive people.
At the focal point, which corresponds to the concentration-point of the industrial
symbol, the same process of conversion has taken: the production-force
becomes effective in the psyche of the consumer, perhaps in the manner
indicated schematically [in the 'Fire-Psyche' diagram accompanying the text].
Thus the trade-mark is always the most elementary means, the link between
production and consumption.18
18Johannes Molzahn, "Economics of the Advertising Mechanism," Die Form 1 (new series) (Berlin,
1925-26), 141-44; translation in Form and Function: A Source Book for the History of Architecture
and Design 1890-1939, ed. Tim and Charlotte Benton (London: The Open University Press, 1975),
224-26
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The emblematic product as the lens through which to see production: it is a suitable
metaphor within which to read the Co-op Vitrine, and its appropriateness is confirmed
in the reproduction of the Vitrine by Meyer as an illustration (along with "Kinoplat" and
"Zeitungsprospekt") to his essay, "Die neue Welt," in a section significantly entitled
"Die Propaganda" (fig. 211). Meyer writes,
The modem poster presents lettering and product or trademark conspicuously
arranged. It is not a poster work of art but a piece of visual sensationalism. In
the display window of today psychological capital is made of the tensions
between modem materials with the aid of lighting. It is display window
organization rather than window dressing. It appeals to the finely
distinguishing sense of materials found in modem man and covers the gamut of
its expressive power: fortissimo = tennis shoes to Havana cigarettes to
scouring soap to nut chocolate! Mezzoforte = glass (as a bottle) to wood (as a
packing case) to pasteboard (as a packing) to tin (as a can)! Pianissimo = silk
pyjamas to cambric shirts to Valenciennes lace to "L'Origan de Coty"! 19
Thus situated, the project not only operates to repudiate that more traditional and
conventional view of representation - which is able to see such a work as the Co-op
Vitrine only as sheer communication of a fixed external social condition or idea, as a
crystallizatized isomorph of a world already finished - and to install an alternative
signifying practice that foregrounds the procedures of interpretive framing and modes
of address, but also vehiculates a new conception of subject/object relations which we
will come to see as a neutralization or obversion of Simmel's conception introduced
earlier, and which it must now be my task to articulate more fully.
19Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt," in Das Werk 7 (Bern, 1926): 205-24; trans. in Schnaidt
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As I have already indicated, implicit in Simmel's conception of modernity is the
absence of concrete and integrated experience (Efahrung) and its displacement by a
kind of psychologism - the absorption of the contradictory fragments of the world
into the monadic armature of our individual inner experience (Erlebnis). "The unity or
lack of unity of the object that we create affects, in a psychological-practical sense, the
corresponding formation of our personality."20 The persuasiveness of Meyer's Co-op
work will best be felt not so much as a reversal of this theme as the identification of an
alternative condition in which interiority is defeated, and our subjectivity as consumers
is now dispersed outward across the exteriority of the fields of signs or aesthetic
surfaces, what Walter Benjamin in the citation above called wish-images, which are the
immediate result of collective modes of production, of which the individual subject, like
the individual article of consumption, is a decentered effect, and to which bourgeois
individualism, illusionism, and interiority cannot lay claim. Meyer provides his own
summary of the tranformatory potential of mass industrial and cultural techniques and
channels of communication:
The standardization of our requirements is shown by: the bowler hat, bobbed
hair, the tango, jazz, the Co-op productthe DIN standard size and Liebig's
meat extract. The standardization of mental fare is illustrated by the crowds
going to see Harold Lloyd, Douglas Fairbanks and Jackie Coogan. Grock and
the three Fratellini weld the masses - irrespective of class and racial
differences - into a community with a common fate. Trade union, co-
operative, Ltd., Inc., cartel, trust and the League of Nations are the forms in
which today's social conglomerations find expression, and the radio and the
20 Loc. cit., note 9
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rotary press are their media of communication. Co-operation rules the world.
The community rules the individual. 21
The Co-op Vitrine adheres to the formal strategies of the modernist avant-garde,
as we have seen, even as it folds into itself those enunciative formations of
industrialized production and mass consumption on which its representation is born, all
of which produces a doubled circuit of signs. The doubling, I will argue, is an
aesthetic resolution and imaginary projection of an as-yet-unattained, underlying
condition of collective modes of production and reception, and should be seen as part
of a general attempt by Meyer in his Co-op work to devise such aesthetic apparatuses as
quasi-material transmission systems which operate to help produce a new,
corresponding collective subjectivity. As Benjamin writes, "These images are wish-
images, and in them the collective seeks both to sublate and transfigure the
incompleteness of the social product and the inadequacies in the social system of
production."
And so now, to the compass of significations in the Vitrine developed so far
must be added another register: the sign system organized by the Co-op Vitrine is class
directed; or better, the advantages or limits upon the capacity to apprehend its
signification are conferred by the class affiliations with a workers' collective
consciousness, as opposed to bourgeois individualism. I hasten to add that this
interpretation is not a matter of simply finding class signals added to the work, but
rather of understanding how its structuration - its processes and context of formation
21Meyer, "Die neue Welt"
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- inevitably delimits a domain of ideological effectivity, and gives specific visual form
to certain cognitive and emotive materials of everyday life in much the same way as do
propagandist forms of rhetoric.
Consider, as an example of the latter, the brief play "Der Traum" (fig. 213), by
Hannes Meyer and Jean Bard, staged simply with a phonograph recording, life-sized
puppets, and actors, in Ghent, Belgium, 1924, as part of the Internationale Ausstellung
des Genossenschaftswesens und der sozialen Wohlfahrtspflege under the direction of
Bernhard Jaggi. In the play a poor family appears in a "dreamlike apparition of the
actual community." A scene of misery is described, with a mother and two children
sleeping as a black spider descends, horrifying the mother and upsetting the children.
Enter the father who pulls a sandwich from its wrapper. "Stillness and anticipation."
The wrapper is a Co-op poster, which the father then places on the wall to the excitment
of the family. The family returns to their sleep and the dream commences: Co-op
packages descend, containing food and products of daily use. "The picture of the
future advances, gigantic [riesengross]." An apparition of a hand with refund and
reimbursement (Riickvergiitung), laden with money advances then dissolves. The
dream ends.22
Behind this example of class-specific theatrical propaganda, and behind all of
Meyer's Co-op work, lies the sedimented experiences of Siedlung Freidorf, the
community facility built by Meyer between 1919 and 1924 for the Swiss Co-operative
Union, under the direction of Bernhard Jiggi and Henry Faucherre, professor of
political economy at the University of Zurich, along with Karl Mundig, who coined the
22Hannes Meyer, "Das Theater Co-op," Das Werk 11 (Bern, 1924): 329-332
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name "Freidorf', and Rudolf Kiindig.23 The promoters of Freidorf situated their
patronage, in turn, relative to two figures directly related to the international and
Helvetic cooperative movements, Heinrich Pestalozzi and Heinrich Zschokke.
Faucherre cited the eighteenth-century educational reformer Pestalozzi as the veritable
source of the Freidorf "adventure." 24 In his novel Leonard and Gertrude (1781),
Pestalozzi pays particular attention to collective self-help and self-determination, as well
as to family education and the key role of the mother, whose common sense, sound
judgment, and liberating suppleness contrast to patriarchal, authoritarian strength, and
influence first her family, then her village, and finally the state. For Faucherre,
Pestalozzi was the initiator of the modern cooperative movements, and the principle
influence on later planners like Robert Owen, who had visited Pestalozzi in
Switzerland. On the other hand, Zschokke's The Goldminer's Village (1817) - which
narrated the systematic transformation of a village toward collectivity and described in
detail the benefits for all, emphasizing that different forms of behavior are reflections of
2 3 And behind Freidorf lay his work on housing projects in Essen in Krupp's welfare office, his study
of town planning in Berlin, and of the English cooperative, syndicalist, and garden city movements.
For a brief biography of Meyer, see Schnaidt, Hannes Meyer. The best commentary on the Siedlung
Freidorf is Jacques Gubler, Nationalisme et internationalisme dans l'architecture moderne de la Suisse
(Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1975). The original documentation and commentaries on the project are
in Johann Friedrich Schar, Henri Faucherre, and Hannes Meyer, Die Siedlung Freidorf (Basel:
Buchhandlung VSK, 1921); a second enlarged edition, which appeared in 1943 as 25 Jahre
Siedlungsgenossenschaft Freidorf; and also Hannes Meyer, "Die Siedlung Freidorf," in Das Werk 12,
no. 2 (1925): 40-51.
2 4Henri Faucherre, "Vom inneren Aufbau der Siedlungsgenossenschaft Freidorf," in 25 Jahre
Siedlungsgenossenschaft Freidorf. Pestalozzi's pedagogy involved a rejection of catechesis and teaching
based on religious aims and memorization, in favor of studies based on observation, discovery, and
experimentation designed to enhance and guide the development of the natural instincts and capacities of
the growing child.
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tensions between a humanizing possibility and specific social situations - was, for its
founders, nothing less than a prototype of Meyer's Siedlung.25
In the socio-political context around the year 1919, the Freidorf experiment was
understood to have a certain revolutionary and transformatory dimension which was
not lost on Meyer.26 Meyer himself was a member of the cooperative and a resident of
Freidorf from 1921 to 1926, as well as the chief of its building commission. In the
latter capacity he designed not only the buildings (about which more later), but also the
logo for the cooperative - which appears, for example, on the coupons used in place
of Swiss Marks for exchange of everyday goods - as well as the packages and
window displays of the standard products of the magasin d'alimentation, at which all
members of the cooperative were obliged to shop. It is from these early experiences in
the specific economic situation and way of life in the workers' cooperative that the Co-
op Vitrine derives.
His Co-op theater and Freidorf experience point to Meyer's concern for
worker's lives, perhaps, but how can we theorize the claim that the Co-op Vitrine is
informed by class considerations? In History and Class Consciousness, 27 Georg
Lukdcs develops a theory of reification as a negative and critical concept structurally
related to class, which subtends the earlier studies of Simmel and the analyses of
Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and others that followed, and provides a potential
25Faucherre, "Siedlungsgenossenschaft Freidorf"26Jacques Gubler, Nationalisme et internationalisme dans l'architecture moderne de la Suisse, 87.
Gubler points out that part of the reason for the promotional efforts of the founders was, indeed, to
make the idea of Freidorf palatable to the larger public, and, thereby, to make the Siedlung possible.
27Georg Lukscs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 [orig. German
1968])
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framework for an understanding of Meyer's project. Unlike the concept of alienation
- which pertains to activity, and in particular to the progressive dissociation of the
activity of workers from their labor, their products, their fellow workers, and ultimately
from their entire life experience - reification is, for Lukaics, a process that affects our
cognitive relationship with the social totality by structuring our fundamental relationship
to objects in the world and categories through which we conceive all other things.28
The distortions of reified bourgeois society consist of the separations and "antinomies"
of subjective experience and objective history, private self and public life, isolated
empirical details and overarching abstract principles, and so forth; and its cognitive
limits are signaled by its incapacity to come to terms with the category of totality, with
the unity of subject and object. Consequently, the tendency of the middle-class is to
understand external objects in a static and contemplative mode - not in terms of
production or use, origin or purpose, but rather through a myopic and motionless gaze
in a suspended moment of time. For the bourgeois, an object is above all a commodity
- a fixed, given, immediate thing whose cause is wholly secondary to its consumption
- and this static relationship to objects is, of course, but a "reflection" of the life
experience of the bourgeois in the the socio-economic realm. For though he may gaze
at the apparent elements of his environment and social relations within capitalism, the
bourgeois is not aware of this reality as a product of historical forces, and as therefore
open to change. Bourgeois ideology, then, is a kind of inertness, a set of stragegic
lapses and omissions of parts of the raw material which preclude the possibility that
certain questions can even arise.
28Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 160 ff.
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Though the proleteriat life world is also structured by reification, the worker's
perception of that reality is significantly different from that of the bourgeois. For the
worker knows the finished product as a moment in the process of production itself - a
process involving the interrelationship of tools and procedures, situation and purpose,
acts and consequences - and it is this knowledge which produces in proleterian
thought the capacity for dissolving the antinomies and inertness inherent in bourgeois
epistemology. For inasmuch as reality is thought as a construction and a process, it is
thought historically and as containing within its present moment the possibility of
radical transformation. It is thus proletarian thought that, for Lukdcs, penetrates the
fetishized immediacy of bourgeois reality to establish itself as the privileged mode of
knowledge whereby the world is comprehensible as a "totality," as a process open to
change through that union of consciousness and activity which is praxis.29
What is important for us here is the notion that it is precisely the self-
consciousness of an intolerable position within a certain mode of production - which
is a consciousness of one's self as a member of a class in a society that is a historical
construction - which produces in proleterian thought the capability of rethinking
subject/object relations from a vantagepoint of concrete totality. Fredric Jameson has
put the point succintly:
[T]he outside world, as the result of human labor, considered now not as nature
but as history, is of the same substance as the subjectivity of the worker
himself: the subjectivity of men can now be seen as the product of the same
29Lukdcs's analysis, in the context of architecture, would thus privilege the workers' life experience and
craft labor, in contrast to Meyer's empirico-critical praise of technology.
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social forces that create commodities and ultimately the entire reality of the
world in which men live.30
What is more, Lukics finds in the artistic production of realism - or more specifically
the realist novel, where the characters and their interactions emerge as concrete
particulars within the articulated context of a changing social whole - a narration of the
social totality which modernist art, in its abstraction, cannot achieve. Realism makes
the connections between the actual workings of a society and its appearances. And so,
even though the category of totality remains absent from modern life, it can
nevertheless be reasserted on the representational plane of artistic form.
I invoke Lukdcs's theory of class, reification, and realism so specifically here
not because I believe that it is entirely adequate or unproblematic - indeed, Lukdcs's
endorsement of realism is explicitly at odds with the sort of description I have been
making of Meyer's work - but rather because it yields a general way to relate artistic
form to the structure of the psychic subject as the latter is differently constructed
according to its position in specific modes of production. It is this interactive relation
of form, subjectivity, and mode of production, in an openly political art, that is
operative in the Co-op Vitrine. And I would suggest that Co-op form has as much
content, albeit more rudimentary and limited in its articulation, as the older realisms
with which Lukdcs is concerned. In its investigations of commodity sign production
and reception, its stress on the analogous process-like character of artistic signifying
practice, both as production and reception, and its positing of a continuum in the life of
30Jameson, 188
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the commodity product from the factory to the shop window, Meyer's Co-op form
attempts to articulate mechanisms by which to transcend the most fundamental
antinomies of modem existence: those between public and private, work and thought,
the political and the artistic, the sociological and the psychological, the collective and
the individual, between my being-for-myself and my being-for-others, in short,
between object and subject. And if Meyer's is now an aesthetic that avails itself of the
formative principles of mechanized reproduction as a privileged, if fragmentary, form
of modem reality rather than of the strategies of realist narrative, as in Lukdcs, and if it
is repetition, seriality, banality, and the like which become the valid conceptualization
of the totality of our experience of modem society, it is not because Co-op form betrays
a legitimation of the existing order, but rather because it identifies the transformatory
potential of that order out of which an authentic collective life and a single international
culture of the future might be developed. We are reminded again of Benjamin's
citation: "In the dream in which, before the eyes of each epoch, that which is to follow
appears in images, the latter appears wedded to elements from prehistory, that is, of a
classless society."
A curious reversal thus takes place: it is heneceforth precisely the
mechanization, massification, and planification of everyday life - the very forces of
reification recognized by Simmel and Lukics - and their subjective consequences, that
are recommended as the raw material of a critical aesthetic practice. While Simmel and
Lukdcs correctly identify reification as the precondition for the emergence of
modernism, they overlook the possibility of the different resolution achieved by Meyer:
the utopian vocation of the reified material, ideologically reconfigured or re-presented,
Co-op Vitrine and the Representation of Mass Production and Consumption
to promote at least a symbolic experience of collective life. Reification and modernism
are structurally related, but their conjunction must now be thought not in terms of
representing the redeemed humanist subject or its threatened psychological precincts,
but by means of the very different representational categories of progaganda,
dispersion, and reproduction, organized around the collective subject of the
posthumanist future.
We have concentrated thus far on the Co-op Vitrine and the representation of
mass production and collective reception. Yet, Co-op form sends critical analysis out
in so many different directions that it is impossible to focus on a primary work or
message. We must now consider other instances of Meyer's attempt to provide
transmission systems with which to articulate the experience of cooperative life.
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204. Abstract architecture II, 1925-26
205. CO-OP Construction 1926/4, 1926
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206. Co-op Lino, linocut related to the Co-
op Vitrine, 1925-26
207. Hannes Meyer, Co-op Vitrine with
Co-op products, exhibited in Gent and
Basel, 1925
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DIE PROPAGANDA
KINOPLAKAT
211. Spread entitled "Die Propaganda" from
"Die neue Welt" showing the Co-op Vitrine,
Zeitungsprospekt, and Kinoplat
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213. Scene from the play "Der Traum" from
Hannes Meyer, "Die Siedlung Freidorf,"
Das Werk 12, no. 2 (1925)
214. Scene from the play "Die Co-op
Arbeit"
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Contra the Bourgeois Interior:
Co-op Zimmer
In his essays "Fashion" and "The Problem of Style," as well as The Philosophy of
Money, 31 Georg Simmel analyzes the phenomena of fashion and style as the manifest
effects of a never resolved tension between attempts at individual differentiation and the
overwhelming absorption of individuals into a homogenizing social structure. On the
one hand, the adherence to the homogeneity of a dominant fashion bestows upon the
individual a certain stability and supraindividuality that counters the fragmentation and
abstraction of commodity fetishism. On the other hand, fashion is a means of
expressing and preserving some semblance of inner freedom, of reasserting one's
absent individuality in the face of "the superiority, autonomy, and indifference of the
cosmos. "32
The consecutive shifts of fashion over time and the plurality of styles at the
present are related respectively as diachronic and synchronic structures of
differentiation. The rate of changes in fashion are indications of the languishing of
cultural energies:
3 1Georg Simmel, "Die Mode," in Simmel, Philosphische Kultur (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911), 31-
64; translated as "Fashion," in American Journal of Sociology 62 (May 1957) and reprinted in Georg
Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971), 294-323; page references are to original. "Das Problem des Stiles," Dekorative Kunst
11, no. 7 (1908): 307-16. Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig: Duncker und Humbolt, 1900); translated
as The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1978); page references are to the English translation.
32Simmel, "Die Mode," 57
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Changes in fashion indicate the amount of deadening of nervous excitement; the
more nervous an epoch is, the more rapidly will its fashions change, because
the need for the attraction of differentiation, one of the essential agents of
fashion, goes hand in hand with the languishing of nervous energies.33
Similarly, the proliferation of styles, the "disloyalty" to any one style, is a consequence
of the individual's overstimulation, indifference, and restlessness:
The lack of something definite at the center of the soul impels us to search for
momentary satisfaction in ever-new stimulations, sensations and external
activities. Thus it is that we become entangled in the instability and
helplessness that manifests itself as the tumult of the metropolis, as the mania
for travelling, as the wild pursuit of competition and as the typically modern
disloyalty with regard to taste, style, opinions and personal relationships. 34
Given the objective autonomy of fashion and style, we as individuals are now
confronted with "these forms on the one side, and our subjectivity on the other."
Modern man is so surrounded by nothing but impersonal objects that he
becomes more and more conditioned into accepting the idea of an anti-
individualistic social order - though, of course, he may also oppose it.
Cultural objects increasingly evolve into an interconnected enclosed world that
has increasingly fewer points at which the subjective soul can interpose its will
and feelings. And this trend is supported by a certain autonomous mobility on
the part of objects.... Both material and intellectual objects today move
331bid., 39
34Simmel, The Philosonhv of Money 484
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independently, without personal representatives or transport. Objects and
people have become separated from one another.35
Style thus e-erges for Simmel as a paradoxical form of protective distance between
subject and object. Style is a sublimation of subjective contradictions - the tension
between individualism and socialism - and of the oppressive externalities of modern
life that threatens the subject's constitution. Style is a veil, however illusory, behind
which the fragmented subject can escape the nervous intensity (Nervenleben) of
modernity.
It is no surprise, then, that stylization is most intensified in the specialized
spatial realm of the bourgeois interior and its household objects, the realm where an
autonomous individualism is clung to most desparately and symbolized most
completely. "The Problem of Style" was written after the time when artists and
architects had devised the notion of Gesamtkunstwerk - a total stylization and
imaginary projection of authorial integrity, whose very conceptualization is possible
only when the apparatus of style has first been isolated and developed into an
independent sign system. This autonomization of style then enables its various
constitutive forms (from tableware and chairs, to construction details, to entire city
scenes) to carry more elaborate symbolic meanings. Gottfried Semper, Alois Riegl,
and others had already argued that utilitarian objects and the handling of their different
materials and labors give us an insight into the culture of a period. But as long as the
notion of style is seen as the simple product or epiphenomenon of a particular social
35Ibid., 460
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life, its symbolic extension is limited by our description of that social life. Only the
autonomization and specialization of style as enunciated by Simmel makes possible the
desire for a modem style yet to be invented, and the projection of that desire onto
objects in the world.
The libidinal energy of the Jugendstil stylizations is striking. And it is in this
context of desire and the increasingly rarefied researches into style that the figure of
Adolf Loos appears. The Loosian "solution" to the desparate desire to find a modem
style, his answer to all the overly-anxious, overly-eroticized Jugendstil fantasies of
inventing a total architectural language in adequation of the emergent differentiations of
bourgeois society, is a kind of negation of the negation of that desire - a critical
procedure whereby the desired language of differentiation, the style, is magically
revealed by way of its very renunciation.
[D]o we need 'artists of applied arts'? No. All the industries that have
succeeded to the present in staving off this superfluous element from their work
have reached their highest level. Only the products of those industries really
represent the style of our time. They so fully express the style of our time that
we - and this is the only valid criterion of judgment - do not in fact even
notice that we have a style.... What we need is a civilization of carpenters. If
the artist of the applied arts would only go back to painting pictures or take to
sweeping the streets, we would have it.36
For Loos, as concerns buildings and objects of everyday use, the dreams and
fantasies of design must confront the reality principle of the division of labor - the
36Adolf Loos, "Die Oberflssigen" (1908), in Loos, Smtiliche Schriften (Vienna-Munich, 1962)
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superego of capitalist society, and the differentiated cultural field of the present which it
sponsors. Indeed, it seems that the production of Loos's entire ideology of a
Sachlichkeit imposed through social utility - his Anglo-Saxon empiricism and
fascination with American engineering, his attention to everyday concerns such as
plumbing, underwear, and shoes, the famous effacements and renunciations of formal
pretensions - is aimed at providing something like a censoring device for the desiring,
designing subject. It is this reality principle that is the means of canceling the
superfluous decoration and ornamental excessess that do actual cultural harm. As
Theodor Adorno writes,
Pleasure appears, according to the bourgeois work ethic, as wasted energy.
Loos's formulation makes clear how much as an early cultural critic he was
fundamentally attached to that order whose manifestations he chastised
wherever they failed to follow their own principles: "Ornament is wasted work
energy and thereby wasted health. It has always been so. But today it also
means wasted material, and both mean wasted captial." [Loos] Two
irreconcilable motifs coincide in this statement: economy, for where else, if not
in the norms of profitability, is it stated that nothing should be wasted; and the
dream of the totally technological world, free from the shame of work. The
second motif points beyond the commercial world. For Loos it takes the form
of the realization that the widely lamented impotency to create ornament and the
so-called extinction of stylizing energy... imply an advance in the arts.37
37Theodor Adomo, "Functionalism Today,"Oppositions 17 (Summer 1979 [1965]): 35
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At the same time, the desired differentiations sought superfluously by "artists of
applied arts" are already given by the various labors associated with different uses and
held separate within an articulate cultural field.
The work of art is brought into the world without there being any need for it.
The house on the other hand satisfies a need.... The work of art is
revolutionary, the house is conservative.... So the house should have nothing
to do with art, and architecture should not be numbered among the arts?
Exactly so. Only a very small part of architecture belongs to art: the tomb and
the monument. The rest, everything which serves an end, should be excluded
from the realm of art.38
A certain amount of unpleasure must be accepted in order to comply with cultural and
social needs, and moreover, this demands the maintenance of certain boundaries. As
Karl Kraus put it,
Adolf Loos and I, he in facts and I in words, have done nothing but show that
there is a difference between the urn and the chamber-pot and that culture plays
itself out on this difference. The others, however, the defenders of positive
knowledge, can be divided into two groups: those who take the urn for a
chamber-pot and those who mistake a chamber-pot for an urn.39
And then, too, there is a differentiation and autonomy at the level of languages of
material.
38Loos, "Architektur" (1910), in Samtliche Schriften
39Karl Kraus, in Adolf Loos. Festschrift zum 60. Geburstag (Vienna, 1930), 27
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Every material possesses a formal language which belongs to it alone and no
other material can take on the forms proper to another.... No material permits
any intrusion on its own repertoire of forms. 40
This principle of Materialgerechtigkeit is also based on the division of labor. It is the
insistence on divisions, boundaries, and plays of difference based on wholly present
distinctions of labor, use, and materials which produces the radical formal
discontinuities in the commercial building on the Michaelerplatz, holds the life of the
interior of the private houses separate from the public sphere of the metropolis, and
further differentiates the private space of the bourgeois family into distinct zones of
habitation and correlated furnishings. Loos's Raumplan is a continuous spatial
sequence, but the rooms it comprises are discreetely related to the specific life habits of
their occupants - the men's smoking room and the leather sofa (fig. 216), the Zimmer
der Dame with its raised seating occupying the center of the house (fig. 217),41 the
dining room where the drama of the family's social life is staged (fig. 220), Lina
Loos's bedroom (fig. 219),42 Josephine Baker's swimming pool. Similarly, the labors
involved in the production of the co-existing Egyptian stool, the modem bench with its
Liberty fabric, the ceiling beams and the fireplace sitting nook, the Kokoschka
paintings on the mantel with nineteenth century clocks and lamps (fig. 221), are all
radically different, but their value is equal in the thoroughgoing relativity of a
40Loos, "Das Prinzip der Bekleidung" (1898), in Sumtliche Schriften
4 1For a discussion see Beatriz Colomina, "Intimacy and Spectacle: the architectural production of the
modem subject," MS., S.O.M. Foundation, Chicago, 1988
42A characteristically laconic comment by Loos reads, "Adolf Loos, my wife's bedroom, white walls,
white curtains, white Angora sheepskin." Cited in Benedetto Gravagnuolo, Adolf Loos (New York:
Rizzoli, 1982), 102.
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Sachlichkeit based on what Adorno called "a utopia of concretely fulfilled presence, no
longer in need of symbols."43 They attest to what Stanford Anderson has termed
Loos's "critical presentism,"44 and constitute a critique of the pompous bourgeois
interior and, simultaneously, an acceptance of what adequately functions, physically
and psychologically, regardless of its style.
It is in Loos's "critical presentism" - what I take to be his reconciliation of
bourgeois commercial activity, aristocratic formal traditions, and present technology,
his formalization of bourgeois schizophrenia, his acceptance of the destiny of the
capitalist mode of production, and his radical defense of individual private life - that
we detect the same "strange interplay between reactionary theory and revolutionary
practice" that Walter Benjaminin identified in Karl Kraus.
Indeed, to secure private life against morality and concepts in a society that
perpetrates the political radioscopy of sexuality and family, of economic and
physical existence, in a society that is in the process of building houses with
glass walls, and patios extending far into the drawing rooms that are no longer
drawing rooms - such a watchword would be the most reactionary of all were
not the private life that Kraus had made it his business to defend precisely that
which, unlike the bourgeois form, is in strict accordance with this social
upheaval; in other words, the private life that is dismantling itself....45
43Adorno, "Functionalism Today," 35
44Stanford Anderson, in courses at MIT. See his "Critical Conventionalism in Architecture," a lecture
of 1982 published in Assemblage 1 (October 1986), esp. pp. 13-16.
45Walter Benjamin, "Karl Kraus," in Benjamin, Reflections (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1978 [orig. German, 1955]), 247; emphasis added
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And if, on the one hand, Loos's practice, with its stress on the use-value of objects as a
criterion of their modernity, may be read as a critique of the autonomization and
specialization of style mentioned above - that is, the conceptualization of style or
formal language as a thing-in-itself - nevertheless, his insistence on the insuperable
partitions between languages of form is continuous with the contemporaneous
structural processes of reification, by which human relations and social forms are
systematically broken up into their individual components and abstracted from concrete
experience. What is interesting in the present context is that, as with the Co-op work of
Meyer, reification becomes the historical concept by which the emergence of Loos's
different version of the posthumanist subject can be understood. The dissolution of the
older organic and seamless social fabric, its displacement by the now universally
commodified labor power of highly differentiated individuals (from plumbers to shoe
makers to Kokoschkas and Schiinbergs), and the confrontaion of these individual
labors within the matrix of equivalencies of metropolitan life, allow Loos to
hypothesize a rich and differentiated subjectivity. Yet, unlike the case of Meyer, this
securing of subjective differentiations is achieved only within boundaries of existing
antagonisms, identified by Simmel, between public and private, society and the
individual, all of which Loos's schizophrenic subject replicates or reproduces at the
level of architectural theory.
Simmel's account of style and Loos's denunciation of it thus share a referent in
the Nervenleben of the monadic metropolitan protagonist. However, what Simmel
theorized in historical anxiety as the hyper-sensitivity and fetishization of the mind,
Loos cynically asserts as the ideal consciousness of the modern individual. For
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Simmel, as we have seen, style is the buffer between the subject, its raw nerves
exposed, and the world.
Here, the distance that art already places between ourselves and the objects is
extended yet a stage further, in that the notions that form the content of the
ultimately stimulating psychic experience no longer have a visible counterpart in
the work of art itself, but are only provoked by perceptions of quite a different
kind. In all this we discover an emotional trait whose pathological deformation
is the so-called 'agoraphobia:' the fear of coming into too close a contact with
objects, a consequence of hyperaesthesia, for which every direct and energetic
disturbance causes pain.46
In contrast, Loos's subject was to "have modem nerves, the nerves which the
Americans possess today,"47 and style could therefore be renounced. And where
Simmel saw the barriers between individuals and their social environment as the
extreme consequences of the money economy understood as the very motor of the
accelerating opposition between subjective and objective culture, Loos saw the
countervalue of silent walls that separated the protected private interior from the public
exterior as the only possible sign of an architectural culture for the present (fig. 215).
Meanwhile, as we have seen, in other registers of representation, "the modem"
has a related but quite different ideological function to play, and serves an ideal
antithetical to that of private life in either its reactive or critical versions, lending up its
forms, reification and all, to visions of individuality dissolved into an effect of
collective life. It is here that Meyer's Co-op Zimmer makes its conceptual presence felt.
46Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 474
47Loos, "Kultur" (1908), in Samtliche Schriften
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"Co-op Zimmer" is something of a misnomer, for the project is, in fact, a
photograph (fig. 222). Of course, a historical interpretation of any no longer existing
interior must, at another moment in time, be based primarily on photographs.48 But
Meyer's Co-op interior has been always only a photograph. The "room" is mocked up
of white fabric, a folding wood and canvas chair, a cot, and a phonograph on a
collapsible stool; the uncropped version also shows shelves of food products. The Co-
op Zimmer is an assemblage, a circuit or pattern of preliminary and interrelated signs, a
"conspicuous arrangement" (Meyer), not of reified, isolated objects of contemplation,
but of quasi-independent signs that still function within some larger cultural machinery
that includes a conceptualization of the mobility enabled by the portable furniture, the
alimentary products, and the invasion of the bedroom by the jazz band whose sound is
now severed from its instruments and flattened onto a reproducible disk.49 Meyer's
interior is a text, if you will, provided the extension of that term is understood as
metaphorically including such things as life habits and daily routines, means of
knowing, belonging, and practicing, all fixed through chains of signification. And if
we have recently learned the impropriety of asking the "meaning" of such
arrangements, we can nevertheless ask of its connection to, and function within, other
arrangements. In particular, it is inseperable from the article in which, along with the
Co-op Vitrine, the Co-op interior first appeared, Meyer's "Die neue Welt."50 The Co-
op interior appears as the example of "Die Wohnung," on a spread entitled "Der
48It is, perhaps, of some interest to recall Loos's assertion that his interiors could not be perceived in
photographs.
49In the article, "Die neue Welt," Meyer lists phonographic recordings "appropriate for the times."
50Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt." The excerpts of Meyer that follow are from that article unless
otherwise noted.
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Standard" (fig. 223), as illustration of the essay's aesthetic of standardization,
repetition, mechanized media, nomadicism, impersonality, and collectivity, and its
polemical folding of one set of signs into the terms of another. Meyer introduces the
Co-op Zimmer as follows:
The demands we make on life today are all of the same nature depending on
social stratification. The surest sign of true community is the satisfaction of the
same needs by the same means. The upshot of such a collective demand is the
standard product. The folding chair, roll-top desk, light bulb, bath tub and
portable gramophone are typical standard products manufactured internationally
and showing a uniform design. They are apparatus in the mechanization of our
daily life. They are manufactured in quantity as a mass-produced article, as a
mass-produced device, as a mass-produced structural element, as a mass-
produced house. The standard mental product is called a "hit." Because the
standardization of his needs as regards housing, food and mental sustenance,
the semi-nomad of our modern productive system has the benefit of freedom of
movement, economies, simplification and relaxation, all of which are vitally
important for him. The degree of our standardization is an index of our
communal productive system.
The essay itself is an urgent and intense description of the "psychological
preconditions" of a subjectivity already identified by Simmel as paradigmatic of
modernity: a nervous personality which "originates in the bustle and excitement of
modern life," and in "that increasing distance from nature and that particularly abstract
existence that urban life, based on the money economy, has forced upon us," and
which is induced by the experience of the metropolis itself, "with every crossing of the
street, with the speed and diversity of economic professional, social life." Meyer's
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opening lines repeat Simmel's description of the "leveling tendencies" and "fragmenting
images" of "the clamorous splendor of the scientific technological age." 51
The flight of the "Norge" to the North Pole, the Zeiss planetarium at Jena and
Flettner's rotor ship represent the latest stages to be reported in the
mechanization of our planet. Being the outcome of extreme precision in
thought, they all provide striking evidence of the way in which science
continues to permeate our environment. Thus in the diagram of the present age
we find everywhere amidst the sinuous lines of its social and economic fields of
force straight lines which are mechanical and scientific in origin. They are
cogent evidence of the victory of man the thinker over amorphous nature....
Motor cars dash along our streets. On a traffic island in the Champs Elysdes
from 6 to 8 p.m. there rages round one metropolitan dynamicism at its most
strident. "Ford" and "Rolls Royce" have burst open the core of the town,
obliterating distance and effacing the boundaries between town and country....
Illuminated signs twinkle, loud-speakers screech, posters advertise, display
windows shine forth.
But Meyer reverses the valence of the subjective consequences of such overstimulation,
seeing its effects as expanding and sharpening our consciousness.
The simultaneity of events enormously extends our concept of "space and
time," it enriches our life. We live faster and therefore longer. We have a
keener sense of speed than ever before, and speed records are a direct gain for
all. Gliding, parachute descents and music hall acrobatics refine our desire for
balance. The precise division into hours of the time we spend working in office
and factory and the split-minute timing of railway timetables make us live more
consciously.
51Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 484
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Co-op Zimmer produces a concept of a smoothly traversable, nomadic space
which is continuous with a new collectivism and objectively determined by the
imposition of new products and external forces that operate to dissolve established
boundaries within various forms of experience and cognition.
Borrough's calculating machine sets free our brain, the dictaphone our hand,
Ford's motor our placebound senses and Handley Page our earthbound spirits.
Radio, marconigram and phototelegraphy liberate us from our national
seclusion and make us part of a world community. The gramophone,
microphone, orchestrion and pianola accustom our ears to the sound of
impersonal-mechanized rhythms: "His Master's Voice," "Vox," and
"Brunswick" see to the musical needs of millions. Psychoanalysis has burst
open the all too narrow dwelling of the soul and graphology has laid bare the
character of the individual.... National costume is giving way to fashion and
the external masculinization of woman shows that inwardly the two sexes have
equal rights. Biology, psychoanalysis, relativity and entomology are common
intellectual property: France, Einstein, Freud and Fabre are the saints of this
latterday. Our homes are more mobile than ever. Large blocks of flats,
sleeping cars, house yachts and transatlantic liners undermine the local concept
of the "homeland." The fatherland goes into a decline. We learn Esperanto.
We become cosmopolitan.
By extending and prolonging the sense of each singular verbal image in the
passage above, and producing a kind of transversel communication between verbal and
visual images, Meyer weaves a network of externalities that map the reality of "the new
world." In the chains of diverse references organized serially as facts in declarative
sentences, the reader cannot help feeling a kind of dispersion, as of tracers sent out in
124
Contra the Bourgeois Interior: Co-op Zimmer
scattered directions registering functions of instruments, disciplines, modes of thought,
habitats and habits, all of which are constituent parts of the life figured by the Co-op
Zimmer.
The next passage of Meyer's essay begins with those new "factographic"
methods of visual sign production which the most advanced artist in Europe and Russia
were beginning to develop, and quickly moves to the psycho-visual effects of those
methods.
The steadily increasing perfection attained in printing, photographic and
cinematographic processes enables the real world to be reproduced with an ever
greater degreee of accuracy. The picture the landscape presents to the eye today
is more diversified than ever before; hangars and power houses are the
cathedrals of the spirit of the age. This picture has the power to influence
through the specific shapes, colors and lights of its modem elements: the
wireless aerials, the dams, the lattice girders; through the parabola of the
airship, the triangle of the traffic signs, the circle of the railway signal, the
rectangle of the billboard; throught the linear element of transmission lines:
telephone wires, overhead tram wires, high-tension cables; through radio
towers, concrete posts, flashing lights and filling stations.
It does not simplify Meyer's enterprise to insist that the images conjured up
signify modernity, for what we understand by the significance of Meyer's "picture" of
the mass industrial and mass cultural landscape has less to do with the latter as a source
of sheer aesthetic experimentation than it does with this picture's claim to cognitive and
practical as well as visual status. The appropriation and presentation of the multiplicity
of diverse images testifies to Meyer's preoccupation not only with the industrialization
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process, but also with the forms of experience that are the indirect consequences of
such a process. This play of images - whose emblematic value is reasserted by the
presence in Meyer's article of exemplary photographs including scenes of industry and
its use objects, and its repetitive morphology (fig. 223) - seeks to satisfy not only the
appetite for form, but also the appetite for matter. The pictures stand as facts of seeing,
as the actual forms of our knowledge of things (figs. 225, 226). And their richness
may therefore be recognized in terms of their ability to assimilate material and
productive values to visual and psychological effects, to convert the qualities of one
into the forms of the other, and thereby to reunite the two levels of subjective mental
labor and the objective realities of production. Co-op form attests to the possibility that
forms of simultaneous collective reception, by linking the structure of subjectivity
directly to the inexorable movement of mass production, can afford a kind of
protopolitical and practical apprenticeship for the collective society to come. The
concrete experience of the visual products of mechanization - which, understood in
terms of received theories of alienation and reification, would have to stand condemned
- when understood as affording epistemic access to, or a symbolic and cognitive
mapping of, the now vivid and tractable consequences of modernity, may be conceived
as a kind of revolutionary blueprint for action.
In the work of Loos, as we have suggested, the presence of the real is signaled
not only by the isolation of the interior from the city, but also by the spatial and material
discontinuities in the very fabric of the building, and the heterogeneity of kinds of labor
given form in the furnishings, all of which constantly threatens to fragment the Loosian
interior into a disjunctive series of vertical indicators of present actualities and the life
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habits developed to manage them. Whereas the Co-op interior, understood as one point
of ramification in the surface of a multiplicity of texts, maps its real on a horizontal
plane. Which is not to deny that the entities, events, and actualities Meyer recounts
indeed exist, but rather to return to the repudiation of that traditional view of
representation broached earlier, which sees the real as something pre-existing that lies
somewhere remote from the artwork, to which the latter, through subjectively reflected
and conventionalized illusion, makes reference. In contrast, the constellation which is
Meyer's new world absorbs the present actualities to which it makes such obsessive
reference, reorganizes and extends their lines of connectivity, creates new potential
subject/object relations, and thereby constitutes the very raw material of which it can
then claim to be the description or representation. The real is not something that, in its
plenitude, shines through the work; rather the real is won within the work itself,52 but
it is no less real for that. Which is precisely what we are able to grasp, once we
understand representation as an act of enunciating - as process, performativity, and
productivity.
What is more, the recasting of artistic practice itself within the categories of
technical labor entails a repudiation of the traditional base/superstructure model of
reality and art, and installs artistic production as a co-force of material production
generally. In 1923 Boris Arvatov had characterized this new status of artistic work as
analogous to the products of craft labor.
52The locution "winning of a world" is from Stanford Anderson. See especially his "The Fiction of
Function," Assemblage 2 (February 1987).
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The artist began to relate to the picture, not as a field for the illusionistic
depiction of objects, but as a real object. He began to work on the picture as a
worker in wood works on a piece of wood.... He became in his own way a
specialist and the only difference was that for him the construction was an aim
in itself.53
But the artistic process here compared to craft production, and the connotations carried
by the terminology of "worker" and "specialist," Meyer transferred to a more advanced
level where the rapprochment of art and production is achieved with the formative
principles of mass technology - montage, repetition, seriality, dispersion.
Fredric Jameson has argued that what I have construed as a particular sort of
representational procedure operative in Meyer's 1926 constructions is characteristic of
utopian thought generally:
[I]t is possible to understand the Utopian text as a deteminate type of praxis,
rather than as a specific mode of representation, a praxis that has less to do with
the construction and perfection of someone's "idea" of a "perfect society" than it
does with a concrete set of mental operations to be performed on a determinate
type of raw material given in advance, which is contemporary society itself -
or, what amounts to the same thing, on those collective representations of
contemporary society that inform our ideologies just as they order our
experience of daily life. 54
53Boris Arvatov, Iskusstvo i klassy (Moscow, 1923), 83; cited in Christina Lodder, Russian
Constructivism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 74.
54Fredric Jameson, "Of Islands and Trenches: Neutralizaion and the Production of Utopian Discourse"(1977), in Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory. Essays 1971-1986. vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1988), 81
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The utopian label seems right for Meyer. It is not an unfamiliar one. But I want to
suggest more than the hopeful naivete that is usually meant by the designation, and to
relate his utopian stance, and the corollaries of collectivism and nomadicism, to a
conception of the subject as it is constructed within and by distinct modes of production
which are historically conceived but not entirely constrained by the present.
As we have seen, Loos's interior architecture is a particularly vivid
demonstration, over and against the Gesamtkunstwerk of Jugendstil with its optical
illusion of individual existence, of subject-positions still available to architectural
representation in the early 1920s. What we must now observe, however, is that that
demonstration traces its norms, however accomodating or liberating, on a background
of an economy still not fully industrialized and rationalized. The characteristic, typal
objects and motives of Loosian Sachlichkeit - the leather goods and umbrellas, wood
and marble paneling, oriental carpets, Kokosckas and all - still show traces of
production by artisanal labor and distribution by an organization of merchants over the
small shop counters designed by Loos; the individual human origins of the typal objects
of this period have not yet been completely erased. Moreover, Loos's subject-positions
as described by his architecture retain the ideal of individualism, and are based on a
present in which the bourgeoisie was still a rising and progressive class, the nuclear
family still a viable structure, and the monadic subject still in possession of some
degree of resistance to the complete penetration of commodification into the innermost
depths of the psyche.
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We need only juxtapose Meyer's own description of the economies of "Trade
union, co-operative, Ltd., Inc., cartel, trust and the League of Nations" as the forms of
social expression of his present to feel the difference.
Yesterday is dead; Bohemia is dead. Dead are atmosphere, color values, burr,
mellow tones and random brush-strokes. Dead the novel: we have neither the
suspension of disbelief nor the time to read. Dead picture and sculpture as
images of the real world: in the age of films and photos they are a dissipation of
effort and the endless "beautification" of our real world through the
interpretations of "artists" is presumptuous. Dead is the work of art as a "thing
in itself," as "art for art's sake": our communal consciousness will not tolerate
any individualist excesses.... Co-operation rules the world. The community
rules the individual.
Henceforth the products of mass culture are completely without depth, horizontal
relations replace vertical ones, and signs of individualism are precluded from the outset.
While Loos's thinking maintains a continuity between the bourgeois order and what is
to develop out of it, Meyer's demands an absolute break with the past and a taking hold
of the ineluctable progress of history toward the socialist future. "[0]ur knowledge of
the past is a burden that weighs upon us, and inherent in our advanced education are
impediments tragically barring our new paths. The unqualified affirmation of the
present age presupposes the ruthless denial of the past." The Co-op form stands as a
sign of the kind of mental retooling the human subject must undergo to divest itself of
its historically conditioned defects and failures of development and begin its journey
toward the classless future.
130
Contra the Bourgeois Interior: Co-op Zimmer
To be sure, then, Meyer's Co-op interior has its preconditions in capitalist
modes of production even more advanced than those Loos conceived across the
watershed of World War I. It is, however, the anticipatory representation of an
altogether different international culture of the future that seeks to emerge from the
dominant modes of production of the present which distinguishes the Co-op interior
from those of Loos. And it is this same partisan commitment to that utopian mode of
production that also distinguishes the two in terms of subjectivity. For while the
subjects constructed by Loos and Meyer are both born of their historical present and, as
such, are historically decentered, Co-op form differs not only in its more complete
massification and dispersion of the subject, but also in that it is predicated on a
conception of the subject at the other end of historical time, indeed, on the possibility
that some transformation of society will have put behind it that class organization,
alienated labor, and the market economy from which it emerged. It is only from this
utopian vantageground that Meyer's antihumanist subjectivity has any purchase.
This said, and with Jameson's thesis in mind that utopian thought can be
understood essentially as a process of mediation or neutralization55 - a resolution, by
way of figural thinking, of a real social contradiction between infrastructure and
superstructure - Co-op form can be construed as the structural resolution of the
dilemma of historical materialist thought: the insertion of the subject into an as-yet-
unachieved (but presently emergent) mode of production. As such, Co-op form is,
moreover, the structural obversion of Simmel's theory of style, which is itself
presented as the resolution or mediation of monadic subjectivity and the capitalist mode
55Jameson, "Of Islands and Trenches," passim.
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of production. All of which can now be represented diagrammatically as a structure of
signification with what A. J. Greimas calls his "semiotic rectangle."5 6
This rudimentary structure (fig. 228) is capable of generating a number of
distinct mediatory combinations. First, a complex term C mediates between two
primary terms of opposition, S and -S. Two secondary terms of opposition, B and -8,
are expressed as involutions of the first. This second opposition, in turn, produces as
its resolution what is virtually a double cancellation of the initial contradiction, which
is, in effect, the latter's neutralization, the so-called neutral term, N. In our present
case (fig. 229), Simmel's concept of style is the complex term, and Loos's anti-style
can be situated coincidently with Simmel's style as a mediation of the intolerable
contradictions between the monadic subject and capitalism, except with a negative
valence. The term of involution of capitalism - the "not-capitalism," so to speak, of
the semiotic rectangle - then comprises not only the sense of the anticipated mode of
production of achieved socialism according to a classical historical materialist
interpretation, but also the forms of reception and other indirect consequences of such a
process, which Meyer described in "Die neue Welt." The involution of the centered,
monadic subject can analogously be thought in negative terms as the loss, dissolution,
and cancellation of the subject - as the "not-subject" of the semiotic rectangle - or in
positive terms as the displacement of the monadic, centered subject by a decentered
subject-effect, what I have called the nomadic, collective, antihumanist subject.
Finally, the notion of Co-op , which organizes both the objects of a future mode of
56See A. J. Greimas and Frangois Rastier, "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints," Yale French
Studies 41 (1968): 86-105.
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production and antihumanist subjectivity as a mode of reception, can be understood as
the neutral, or mediatory, utopian term of the structure, what I have earlier called the
obversion of Simmel's complex term of style.
The scheme suggests, in general as Jameson argues, that the vocation of the
neutral term, here Co-op, is "to permit a desperate (and impossible) final attempt to
eradicate the contradictions of the system by some extreme gesture."57 It also
repudiates the conventional understanding of Meyer's utopia as a mere invocation or
image of some ideal society, and substitutes a notion of utopia as a process whereby
something is done to the real, and whereby the operations performed and actualized are
initiated and carried by a reading of the Co-op projects themselves.
Now, recognizing that the signifying object, the Co-op form, in some sense
adequately names that which propels this process, this activity of reading, then we have
also finally landed here on the notion, invoked earlier, of performativity - now
understood in the properly utopian sense that crtical reading performs and constitutes
that which in the present world always escapes us. Concretely, this emphasis on
performativity implies that the potential for conceptualizing change, the potential even
of meaningful protopolitical action, is produced and made available, albeit only in a
symbolic mode, in the analyses of the aesthetic construct and the ideological-material
conditions that determine its formation.
But further, by focusing his analysis on the status of the subject as constructed
and situated by those same conditions, Meyer invites us to conceive of the function of
the centered subject of bourgeois humanism as a kind of imposition of blindness or
57Jameson, 91
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obstruction of inquiry into the hidden institutional frameworks and ideological factors
that determine the work and the conditions under which it is apprehended. This is the
case most obviously in the work of architects where the objects themselves operate to
discourage if not preclude considerations of the necessary constitutive preconditions of
their formation; but it is also the case, it should be added, in those critical-interpretive
positions that confine a "correct" reading of an architectural object to an acceptance of
the position from which the immanent characteristics of the architectural object have
exclusive importance over its external historical and ideological determinants: the
position of a transcendental subject. In contrast, Meyer will seek, within the terms
provided by Co-op form, to develop a more full-blown architecture - a project for
constructing, for acting, for building - that problematizes architecture as such - as a
discipline, an ideology, a cultural institution - and that dismantles our routine,
institutionalized business of design and our habitual, institutionalized modes of
perception, all in order to show just how deeply questionable the architectural,
interpretive, and cultural values bourgeois humanism has taken for granted actually are.
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215. Adolf Loos, Moller house, Vienna,
1928
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216. Loos, Steiner house, Vienna, 1910,
men's smoking room
217. Steiner house, Zimmer der Dame
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218. Loos, architect's apartment
219. Loos, Lina Loos's bedroom
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220. Moller house, dining room
221. Steiner house, living room
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222. Hannes Meyer, Co-op Zimmer, 1926
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DER STANDARD
_ 7
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DER STANDARD
~N~N....I >7
223. Spread entitled "Der Standard" from
Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt," Das Werk
7 (Bern, 1926), showing the Co-op Zimmer
with other standardized productions
224. Heinz Loew, Self-portrait in record
player: sandwich photo, c. 1928
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225. Hannes Meyer, "Photographing," c.
1928
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226. Meyer, photographs of high tension
wires, turbine hall, and building crane, all
near Basel, c. 1926
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DIE ZEITSCHRIFT
227. "Magazines and books adequate to out
time" selected by Meyer from his library
published with "Die neue Welt"
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C
complex term
--S
-B
neutralized term
228. Diagram of semiotic rectangle from A.
J. Greimas
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style (Simmel)
anti-style (Loos)
centered subject
"not-subject"
or
decentered, nomadic,
collective, anti-humanist
subject
- capitalist mode
of production
not-capitalism"
or
anticipated new
mode of reception
Co-op Form
obversion
229. Diagram of Co-op form as resolution
of antihumanist subjectivity and anticapitalist
mode of production
155
J inversion
5mureen-rabalniad-r.hi":-991'--h-dMNNid-"'Wile-der-NN:PNA-N-tja--a.94=-Miresyfe-.N-eim-Eise.g."./.6,s:-a..:.Gr.a-r.a.,2-se,-a:Ga-.. - ,.,,
Co-op Building between Avant-garde
and Instrumentalization:
The Petersschule
In the section of his Das Prinzip Hoffnung, "Building in Empty Spaces," Ernst Bloch
characterized the neue Sachlichkeit in architecture:
Today, in many places, houses look as if they were ready to travel [reisefertig].
Although they are unadorned, or precisely because of that, they express their
farewell. Their interior is bright and sterile like hospital rooms, the exterior
looks like boxes on top of mobile poles, but also like ships. They have flat
decks, portholes, gangways, railings; they shine white and to the south, and as
ships they like to disappear. 58
Writing in America during 1938-49, Bloch found little hope expressed in such
architecture, product as it was of "the late capitalist hollow space" and abstract
technology. "Rather this hollow space penetrates the so-called art of engineering
[Ingenieurkunst] as much as the latter increases the hollowness by its own emptiness."
Nevertheless,
recently there is a particularly alienating motive, which is basically the only
original one. It is engineering as architecture, which has a significant utopian
effect. Now it is engineering into which architecture as the real art has been
58Ernst Bloch, "Die Bebauung des Hohlraums," in Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1959), published as "Building in Empty Spaces," in Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art
and Literature, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988); passage cited
is on 187.
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incorporated and from which it has to reemerge on the threshold of a concrete
society. What it means here is the new combination of the old utopia of
crystallization [of Ledoux et al.] with the desire to disorganize. This kind of
combination is precisely related to the abstract technolgy itself with which the
new architecture is so closely linked and provides also disorganization sui
generis for the crystalline urban utopia.... Thus the house without aura, the city
map made of affirmed lifelessness and distance to people... corresponds to the
machine that no longer resembles the human being. Functional architecture
reflects and doubles anyway the icy realm of commodity world automation, its
alienation, its labor-divided human beings, its abstract technology.... 59
Only a new classless society would make a "true" architecture possible. Thus for
Bloch, "The only significant thing in all this is the direction of the departure of these
phenomena generated by themselves, i.e., the house as a ship."60
It is on the whole a negative judgment of the architecture of the neue
Sachlichkeit, and it could just as well apply specifically to the buildings designed by
Hannes Meyer. Yet one aspect of the architecture described by Bloch hangs in our
minds with disturbingly ambiguous resonance: the architecture likes to disappear. It is
this anti-social and negational quality of this sharp, stark, "hollow" architecture, but
also and not inconsistently its utopian effect, that must concern us now, as we verify
the observations made thus far against Meyer's "Co-op building," the Petersschule
project for Basel of 1926 (fig. 229). This machine-building "no longer resembles the
human being," we will agree, but it is precisely in defining the nature of the
Petersschule's dislocation of the spectator from his accustomed imaginary possession
59Bloch, "Building in Empty Spaces," 196; emphasis in original60Ibid., 190
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of a unified architectural object that resembles his desired unified self that we will gain a
description of the architectural object such that its protopolitical character becomes
visible. For in the case of the Petersschule, as with all Co-op form, it is not a matter of
inventing representational forms adequate to the content of "the new world," but rather
of producing the content of that world through the work and the reorganization of
perceptual conventions by which the object is apprehended. Like other Co-op form,
the building is constructed from appropriated raw material. In readying itself for travel,
therefore, the Petersschule must take on certain presumedly negative, alienating and
reified characteristics of the very condition it seeks to transform, as well as of the
ideologies and institutions that, incompletely liquidated, still survive from that older
mode of production which the avant-garde generally sought to address. What this will
mean in the case of the Petersschule, not unlike the case of the Co-op Vitrine, is a
paradoxical and disjunctive imbrecation of different architectural modes. First are the
modernist autotelic formal strategies, previously worked out as critical negations of
traditional, institutionalized perceptual conventions. Second are the techniques of a
different functionalist or utilitarian kind, which involve an assault on the modernist
notion of aesthetic autonomy, even as a strategy of resistance, and imply an
instrumentalization of the architectural object now indistinquishable from an industrial
tool.
As we have seen, Meyer's Freidorf experience should be understood to stand
behind his Co-op work. After 1900 a number of progressive architects turned to a
rationalized, mensurable, artless, and practical architecture which attempted to
synthesize and maintain the best of English and German domestic building traditions.
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For Meyer, it was this same architecture, conjoined with the reformist planning of the
garden city movement, that seemed to best accomodate and represent cooperative life
(see figs. 231-237). At Freidorf, the cooperative hall (Genossenschafthaus) is
configured as a Zellenbau, its monumentality dissolved by a celluar structure repeated
through all the buildings (figs. 233, 235, 236). Meyer's own description of the project
is sufficient. As well as the garden city model of planning, Freidorf was based on
Palladian proportional systems. In 1916 Meyer had
used my free time to draw all Palladio's plans on thirty standard sheets of paper
(size 420/594) in common scale. This work on Palladio prompted me to design
my first housing scheme, the Freidorf estate on the modular system of an
architectural order. By means of this system all the external spaces... and all
public internal spaces... were laid out in an artistic pattern which would be
perceived by those living there as the spatial harmony of proportion.61
The conception of form as "applied psychology"62 reconfirms the beginning of
Meyer's trajectory toward the radicalization of perception. Proportional harmony for
Meyer is the architecturalization of the harmony of socialism (a compositional harmony
replaced in his subsequent work with a "constructed" asymmetry which "symbolizes
nothing"63). Likewise the Siedlung's red color, what Adolf Behne called a "symphony
in red"64 stands as a symbol of Freidorf's social commitments. The architecture is
61Hannes Meyer, "Wie ich arbeite," Architektura CCCP 6 (Moskow, 1933); MS in German; partial
translation in Schnaidt, Hannes Mey. 19-21; my emphasis62Letter from Meyer to Graf Dfirckheim 24 August 1930, in Hannes Meyer. Bauen und Gesellschaft.
Schriften. Briefe. Projekte (Dresden: VEB Verlag der Kunst, 1980)63See section III on the League of Nations project.
64Adolf Behne, paraphrasing Meyer in a review of Meyer's ADGB school, Pidagogische Beilage zur
SAchsischen Schulzeitung 20, no. 5 (June 1928): 41
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perceived as an instrument of social perceptual change. Meyer continues his
description:
All the building elements used at Freidorf were standardized and these standard
elements conferred a certain unity upon each type of house. At the start there
were no Swiss standards for building with standardized elements and in this
important field of house building we had to start from scratch. It was in this
way that Freidorf standards came into being: dimensions, shapes and materials
for framing timbers, mouldings and balusters, for four types of window and
three types of door, the the house entrance, staircase and verandah, central
stove and animal hutches. Although the co-operators no doubt appreciated the
economic aspects of this standardization, it mostly ran counter to their sense of
beauty. In regard to architectural simplification, the Freidorf standards go the
the utmost limits of what the individualistic Swiss will tolerated in matters of
taste and any further paring away of "architecture" will be branded as "prison
and barrack" building and meet with an almost unbroken front of public
resistance....
Both inside and outside [the cooperative hall] has yielded to the law of
uniformity governing the estate and only the double scale on which everything
is built marks the public building. Man looks small once he enters the temple of
the community. Even the layman, faced with the interplay of wall surfaces and
window apertures, becomes dimly aware of the influence of an all-dominating
module.... 65
The function of Meyer's repetitive language is to write across the face of the
architecture the reiterative, serial building system of a collective society, to unfold
65Hannes Meyer, "Freidorf housing estate, near Basle, 1919-21," trans. in Schnaidt, 7, 13; my
emphasis
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architecture into the exteriority of mass technology and language, which would be more
aggressively presented in the Petersschule and the League of Nations.
By 1926 Meyer had inverted and questioned the tradition on which his Siedlung
was based as a viable mode of revolutionary and transformatory signification,
renouncing Freidorf as the "product of an incomprehensible time." 66 In the
Petersschule, the fundamental architectural principles of the Siedlung Freidorf are
exploded by modernity and the machine.
Meyer's travels during 1923-2667 acquainted him with the various avant-garde
formal practices and the most progressive constructivist and productivist theories in
Europe and the Soviet Union, the last of which, in their attempt to link artistic activity
directly to material-social production, drew to some extent on the former, but also
voiced an optimism concerning the revolutionary powers of mechanization, Taylorism,
and the Americanization of culture. By the time Meyer began the Petersschule project,
the standardization and machine production of buildings and building components was
a well rehearsed topic, but still one of intense ambiguity and irresolution.
Indeed, within the Soviet context, theorists like Boris Arvatov and Sergei Tretyakov
strove for a materialist definition of art practice which challenged the premises of
bourgeois aesthetics, but also implicitly those of Leninst aesthetics as well. What links
bourgeois and Leninist conceptions of art is the emphasis on an ontological and
66Hannes Meyer, "Die Siedlung Freidorf," Das Werk 12, no. 2 (1925): 40-51. But see Jacque
Gubler's discussion in Nationalisme et intemationalisme dans l'architecture moderne de la Suisse
(Laussanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1975) where he argues that significant lessons of the Freidorf experience
can be traced throughout Meyer's later work. Gubler's argument is consistent, I think, with the
trajectory I am constructing here.67Hannes Meyer, "Curriculum vitae," in Meyer, Bauen und Gesellschaft 10-14
162
Co-op Building between Avant-Garde and Instrumentalization: The Petersschule
epistemological independence of artistic values, an artistic consciousness that is a
subjectively reflected and passive repository for finished products of thought. When
Arvatov denounced "easel art" - art as a supplementation and sublimation of a
disharmonized reality - and when he called for art not as something autonomous and
self-contained but rather as a desublimatized form of destruction of the division
between artistic technique and social technology - "the possibility of using a mighty
and all-enveloping technology consciously to create and build [society's] life" 68 - he
directly challenged bourgeois avantgardism and socialist realism. For socialist realism
amounts to an art that, rather than a "winning of reality," is a represention or reflection
of a preexisting reality, a communicable duplicate or replica of pre-established modes of
knowing and being, such as the inevitable coming of socialism through the collapse of
capitalism, and the Party as a mediator of that process.
Hence, too, the ambiguity of the work of the two figures who were most
influential in Meyer's development, El Lissitzky and Le Corbusier, and their attitude
toward machine technology. Lissitzky, presumed to be doing above-ground work for
an international constructivism, was, at the same time, adjusting his position in
adequation of emergent Leninist directives for art and its audience. In 1924, Lissitzky
wrote, "We have had enough of perpetually hearing MACHINE, MACHINE,
MACHINE, when it comes to modem art production. The machine is no more than a
brush, and a very primitive one at that, which portrays a view of life on the canvas." 69
68Boris Arvatov, cited in Christina Lodder, Russian Constructivism (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1983), 10669E1 Lissitzky, "Nasci" (1924), in El Lissitzky: Life, Letters, Texts, ed. Sophie Lissitzky-Kuppers
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1983), 330. Compare Arvatov's statement that "the specific
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Without sacrificing the autonomy and self-referentiality of a thoroughly modem
artform, Lissitzky reintroduced into his veschist work after 1922 new sources and
strategies for affirmative representation which were parallel to ongoing socialist realist
experiments. 70
Meanwhile, within the discourse of L'Esprit Nouveau, between 1920 and
1922, Le Corbusier had developed the Maison Citrohan (fig. 242), a standardized
house constructed of a monolithic concrete frame, and comprising a simple volumetric
unit with a single major light source, a roof terrace, an exterior stair and, in a version
raised on piloti, a balcony wrapping around its volume. As the name indicates, the
Maison Citrohan was emblematic of an entire ethos of building now standardized and
mass produced like a car, and it can stand, along with the "Horizontal Skyscraper" of
Lissitzky (fig. 238), and a 1922 Vkhutemas project from N. A. Lodovsky's studio for
a restaurant suspended from a cliff over the sea (fig. 239), published in ABC 3-4 in
1925,71 as a primary predecessor of the Petersschule, in terms of both its volumetric
typology and emblematic status as a reproducible unit.72 The Petersschule is built on a
instrument of aesthetic painting, the brush, plays an increasingly small role in art; it is supplanted by
planes, files, emery paper, drills, etc." Cited in Lodder, 105.
LSee my essay, "Photomontage and Its Audiences, Berlin, circa 1922," in Harvard Architecture
Review 6 (New York: Rizzoli, 1987), and Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, "From Faktura to Factography,"
October 30 (Fall 1984): 82-119.
71The caption in ABC reads "Gestaltung der technischen Mglichkeiten moderner Materialien und
Konstruktionen. Studium der Funktionen von Treppen, Plattformen und Aufziigen." The project was
from Ladovsky's course of 1922 for the design of a building of a functionally specific task and the
demonstration of mass and balance.
72Francesco Passanti, in a lecture to the Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, 4 April 1990,
has pointed out that the terms under which the Maison Citrohan was introduced by Le Corbusier - les
standarts, type, and machine d - were already understood to convey a sense of collectivity. This was
continuous with the concerns of some members of the Werkbund (such as Hermann Muthesius) for the
expression of a collective experience of existing, German society. But it also could have been
understood by Meyer as an international collective.
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steel framework resting on eight columns, possibly a transformation of the Maison
Citrohan's concrete frame. And the balcony of Maison Citrohan, wrapping around the
basic volumetric unit, becomes in the Petersschule the suspended platforms for the play
area. Alternatively, the volumetric unit of the Petersschule can be seen as an analogoue
to the reiterative volumes of the restaurant suspended from a cliff, or of Lissitzky's
"skycraper," and the suspended platform as a technical expedient increasing the
building's use value and accomodating it to the particulars of its site.
As concerns the consequent conception of the architectural object and its author,
however, Meyer departs from both Lissitzky's and Le Corbusier's research.
Lissitzky's depiction of art and life in his Proun constructions, for example, is
accomplished through a rarefied mode of sublation: his pieces of the world have been
transfigured into thoroughly special, uncommon, abstracted meanings, saturated with
mystical, transcendental aspirations. The remoteness of his practice is captured by
Ernst Kallai in his essay, "Lissitzky."
The man of the future, liberated from social anarchy and the dark ferment of
psychosis... is today still a beginning, a single cell, simple, elementary, but
with definite possibilities of future heroic realization. For this very reason,
however, in no case must he become entangled in the net of contradictory,
impure relationships of the present, with its tattered and mediocre reality.7 3
In the transcendental space of the Prouns, the last contingencies of raw materiality and
circumstantiality are absorbed into forms built up stereometrically from dematerialized
73Emst Kallai, "Lissitzky," in El Lissizky: Life. Letters. Texts; my emphasis
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planes intersecting along an imaginary, generative armature. With the insertion of
iconic elements into this spatial structure, the surface tension of the Proun is relaxed in
favor of a kind of pictorial space into which we can enter - a space apart from life, a
space in which the mind is free to make its own connections, to dream of the new
world to emerge fom the final denouement of the revolution, to escape from the
present, to be suspended between the contaminated real and the disinfected unreal.
Thus, though he could agree with Lissitzky's dictum that the mission of art "is not,
after all, to embellish life but to organize it,"74 Meyer, at this point in the trajectory of
his work, still sought an aesthetic of non-consent - one immersed in the contradictory,
impure reality but with a negative stance toward it - and redirected what lessons he
may have learned from Lissitzky toward engagement and pleasure in untransformed
materials more dialectically related to formal organization.
Consider, for example, Meyer's Co-op Construction I of 1926 (fig. 244), the
only example of Meyer's own work published in ABC 2, which he edited.75 It
resembles in its formal organization nothing so much as a three-dimensional Proun with
its layered space, diagonal placement within the frame of the photograph, geometrical
purity, and visual transparency. These are the signs of the formal avant-garde. But in
the context of Meyer's Co-op work (the title "Co-op Construction" is not unimportant),
the piece takes on another signification. The glass fragments are unworked; they are
palpably glass; they do not consent to a purely visual apprehension but tend toward
74E1 Lissitzky, "The blockade of Russia moves toward its end," in Veshch, 1922; reprinted in El
Lissitzky: Life. Letters. Texts, 340-41
750ther works published were by W. Baumeister, N. Gabo, K. Malewitsch, G. Vantongerloo,
Mondrian, L. Moholy-Nagy, V. Servrankx, W. Dexel, L. Kassak, 0. Nerlinger, and El Lissitzky: the
Prounenraum, 1922, and Proun, 1925.
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factural and technical construction. More important, the white ovoid is, after all, an
egg, which tends, beyond its geometrical purity, toward an identification with the
alimentary products of cooperative societies like Freidorf and the utopian modes of
production and consumption they anticipate. As Jacques Gubler has written, "the co-
op egg of 1926 is consumable, not by way of the oneiric, not in the sense of
surrealism, but rather by way of the oral."76 And the piece is, after all, constructed,
not painted or carved, which links the activity of creation to the activity of work.77 The
construction of the object begins to enter the process of collective-cooperative
organization directed toward the socialization of all objects of use. In this doubled
signficance, formal and constructive, visual and factural, the Co-op Construction I
stands between the experiments of the avant-garde and the specific instruments of
social-perceptual change.
Similarly, the Petersschule comprises two orders of parts: the reproducible
volumetric unit and the various attachments of platforms, walkways, and stairs (fig.
243). Like the egg, the reproducibility of the basic unit of the school shifts our
conception of the building's production from one of a unique creation to one of
standardization and repeatability. And like the planes of glass of the Co-op
Construction, the attachments to the volume convey a sense of constructedness and
tactility, of appropriated industrial components organized in terms of utility and
76Jacque Gubler (ed.), ABC. Architettura e avanguardia. 1924-1928 (Milano: Electa, 1983), 128; my
translation
77Lest this assertion seem overly facile, the reader may recall Mikhail Tarabukin's remarks that the
artist's task is that of "linking the very process of work with that of creativity," of creating "real
objects" which have no prototype in the real world but are "constructed from start to finish outside
lines which could be extended from it to reality." For a discussion, see Lodder, 101 ff.
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intensified visual effect The specific attachments constitute the volume as particular,
while the reproducible volume constitutes the whole as a generally available,
standardized system of construction and use.
On the other hand, while Le Corbusier maintained a distinction between the
practical, technical role of the engineer and the artistic, poetic role of the architect in
order to preserve the humanist autonomy of the latter, Meyer sought to eliminate
traditionally conceived art altogether in favor of pure technique and the technical
organization of a building in a collaborative practice. Thus to Le Corbusier's
"engineering on the one hand, architecture on the other,"78 Meyer would reply,
The new building is a prefabricated unit for site assembly and, as such, an
industrial product and a work of specialists: economists, statisticians,
hygienists, climatologists, industrial engineers, standards experts, heat
engineers ... and the architect? He was an artist and has become a specialist in
organization!7 9
As in similar pronouncements made by Soviet productivists, the term "specialist" here
carries a paradoxical repudiation of the individuation of the artist separate from other
workers, and thereby articulates a sense of sublation of art and life divergent from that
of Lissitzky's and Le Corbusier's.
78Le Corbusier, "The New Spirit in Architecture" (1924), in L'Almanach d'Architecture Modeme
(Paris: Editions Cr6s, 1925): 21-23; translated in Form and Function: A Source Book for the History
of Architecture and Design 1890-1939, ed. Tim and Charlotte Benton (London: The Open University
Press, 1975), 134-3679Hannes Meyer, "bauen" (1928), trans. in Schnaidt; ellipsis in original
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In a rudimentary sense, Meyer's conception of the mechanization of building,
already enunciated in the Co-op work considered earlier, is summarized in the
manifesto, "ABC fordert die Diktatur der Maschine," published by Mart Stam and Hans
Schmidt in ABC 4, series 2, 1927-28. It will be helpful in advancing the present
argument to compare this summary to Le Corbusier's position.
The machine is neither the coming paradise in which technology will fulfill all
our wishes - nor the approaching hell in which all human development will be
destroyed -
The machine is nothing more than the inexorable dictator of the possibilities and
tasks common to all our lives.
But we are still in a state of becoming, of transition. The machine has become
the servant of bourgeois individualist culture born of the Renaissance. Just as
the servant is paid and despised by the same master, so the machine is
simultaneously used by the citizen and damned by his intellectual court, his
artists, scholars and philosophers. The machine is not a servant, however, but
a dictator - it dictates how we are to think and what we have to understand.
As leader of the masses, who are inescapably bound up with it, it demands
more insistently every year the transformation of our econmy, our culture....
We have taken thefirst step: the transition from an individualistically producing
society held together ideally by the concepts of the national State and a racially
delimited religious outlook, to a capitalistically producing society materially
organized in response to the need for industrialization and the international
exhange of goods....
We have to take the second step: the transition from a society that is compelled
to produce collectively but is still individualistically oriented to a society that
consciously thinks and works collectively. Empty phrases? Empty phrases to
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the ears of bourgeois armchair sceptics - implacable necessity to the masses
who have today been thrust out to to the edge of survival.... 80
In contrast to this linking of machine technology to the capitalist mode of
production in terms of how the technology is used and to whose advantage,
foregrounding capitalism's emancipatory possibilities from the vantage of their fuller
realiization in the posthumanist future and thereby demanding a corresponding and
historically inevitable transformation of artistic institutions, Le Corbusier saw the
consequences of mechanization primarily in received humanist terms of hierarchy,
affect, and the maintanence of distinctions. For instance, in his L'Art d6coratif
d'aujourd'hui of 1925, he offered a selection of photographs of a turbine, ship
propellers, and a light house beacon81 as examples in the chapter "The Lesson of the
Machine," as an "apology for what is simply banal, indifferent, or void of artistic
intention." Yet, at the same time, he could compare the evocations of these modern
machines to the most primitive and powerful of emotions.
He was thunderstruck by a turbine of which he could see no more than the
envelope, though he could hear its fearsome roar, because he knew that as a
result of this noise, something would now run along those wires, those cables,
and bring light and energy to the furthest corners of the country, and death to
those who touched them. This light-house beacon by Sauter-Harld, standing as
pure as a negro god, sent out a beam of intense light over fabulous distances on
80ABC 4, vol. 2, (1927-28); translation in Ulrich Conrads, Programs and manifestoes on 20th-century
architecture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 115-116
81In fact, the illustrtion for the lighthouse beacon did not arrive in time for publication. On page 108
of L'Art d6coratif, Le Courbusier noted: "Entire page reserved for illustration of a lighthouse beacon by
ANCIENS ETABLISSEMENTS SAUTER-HARL, 16 Avenue de Suffren, PARIS." The illustration
is reproduced in Assemblage 4 (1987): 5.
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stormy nights at sea.... Everything overwhelmed him, even the astonishing
taste shown in the colors used by engineers to finish off their products. 82
Le Corbusier's is a poignant struggle to reconcile the fact of machine technology, the
signs of industry, their representation and rearrangement in photographs,
advertisements, paintings, and buildings, with the inexorable desire for contemporary
objects with all the auratic power of a primitive totem. A theme throughout L'Esprit
Nouveau is the tension between the values of industrialization and those required to
practice his classically conceived art, between standardized mass culture and the
traditional conception of the auratic object, or to put it another way, between the
lighthouse beacon and the "negro god." Moreover, Le Corbusier's is an effort to
distinquish and uphold the continuity of the cult of genius with respect to a
humanistically conceived tradition of art.
[W]e have to pass judgment: The Sistine Chapel first, then chairs and file
cabinets - to tell the truth, problems of a second order, as the cut of a man's
suit is a second-order problem in his life. Hierarchy. First the Sistine Chapel,
that is, works where passion is inscribed. Then, machines for sitting, for
classifying, for illuminating, machine-types, problems of purification, of
cleanliness. 83
82Le Corbusier, L'Art decoratif d'auiourd'hui (Paris: Editions Crds, 1925), p. 109-10; translated as The
Decorative Art of Today, trans. James Dunnett (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987)
83Le Corbusier, The Decorative Art of Today, 57
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It is precisely Meyer's refusal of a such a reconciliation or hierarchy of "art" and
techniques of mass production that has routinely offended his critics. "Die neue Welt"
announces,
Art has an undisputed right to exist provided the speculative spirit of mankind
has need of it after the graphic-colored, plastic-constructive, musical-kinetic
overthrow of its philosophy of life.... The artist's studio has become a
scientific and technical laboratory.... The new work of art is for all, not a
collector's piece or the privilege of a single individual.... Dead is the work of
art as a 'thing in itself,' as 'art for art's sake'.... And personality? The heart??
The soul??? Our plea is for absolute segregation.M
Meyer's ruthless denunciation of art has been seen by critics as a naive positivism, an
instrumentalization of architecture that implicates his work in a purely technocratic and
administrative logic. But accusations based on his subordination of aesthetic autonomy
to positivist instrumentality ignore, for one thing, that authorial autonomy and artistic
purity was in the process of being progressively dismantled by dadaism after 1913, and
constructivism and productivism right up until the time of Meyer's own work. The
technological, social, and political changes that conditioned that dismantling constitute a
historically irreversible reality to which Meyer was sensitive. "The machine is nothing
more than the inexorable dictator of the possibilities and tasks common to all our lives."
Such a statement should not be understood as a matter of autonomous technology, but
rather the contrary, of deciding how and for whom technology is to be used and how
artistic practice must correspondingly be transformed. What is more, as we have
8Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt," trans. in Schnaidt
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already seen, Meyer recognized that industrial production is not wedded to the social
relations that engendered it; it could be brought into service for other forms of society.
Meyer would later elaborate his conception of a changed design practice in an
essay, "Wie ich arbeite," published in Architektura CCCP 6.85 In the essay Meyer
stresses design as collaborative work and emphasizes how objectivity and rigid
standardization - of building components, of functional spaces, of drawing formats
(in the "tersely standardized form" of DIN or OCT standards, or in axonometrics
showing the elements of the building in measurable relationships and "mercilessly"
exposing errors of judgment) - inexorably evacuate the individual authorial subject.
And in his "Ober marxistische Architektur," of 1931, he further asserts thirteen points
of socialist architecture, including the following:
5. The ABCs of socialist architecture in a planned economy are composed of
norms, types and standards. We normalize dimensional requirements to typical
space and typical equipment. We organize these typical elements as standard
organic building entities for the socialist praxis of life [socialistische
Lebenpraxis].
6. As the socialist planned economy materializes in the sphere of building, the
steady diminution of the multiplicity of standard elements (equipment, building
parts, spaces) is an indication of the steady socialization of mass life
[Massenlebens]....
11. In line with the Marxist maxim that "being detemines consciousness" the
socialist building is a factor in mass psychology. Hence cities and their
building components must be organized psychologically in keeping with the
findings of a science in which psychology is kept constantly in the foreground.
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The individual pretentions of perceptions [Empfindungsansprache] of the artist-
architect must not be allowed to determine the psychological effect of the
building. The elements in a building that have a telling psychological effect
(poster area, loudspeaker, light dispenser, staircase, color, etc.) must be
organically integrated so as to accord with our profoundest insights into the
laws of perception....
13. For [the Marxist architect] architecture is not an aesthetic stimulus but a
keen edged weapon in the class struggle.86
So the point of the technical reproducibility and standardization of the
Petersschule is not only a technical one. The conception of architecture as an industrial
product, the insistence on design as technique rather than inspired creation, in short, the
disfranchisement of the humanist demiurge to which both Lissitzky and Le Corbusier
still clung, hollows out the imaginary plentitude of artistic creation and deconstructs the
work of architecture into its material determinants and the social conditions of its
making. The building just is these conditions. It is in this sense that the architecture
tries to disappear, to become an aleatory effect. The Petersschule produces a significant
absence, that is to say an absence which it at the same time represents. In contrast to
the hermetic "silence" of the architectural sign, purified and reduced to its presumed
"essence" - from Lissitzky's Prouns, to Le Corbusier's Purism, to de Stijl, to Mies's
wall-as-an-independent-principle, all produced in an effort to salvage a degree of artistic
resistance and independent value over against an ever encroaching commodified and
instrumentalized world - the Petersschule harrasses received perceptions of
86Hannes Meyer, "Ober marxistische Architektur," MS 1931; reprinted in Meyer, Bauen und
Gesellschaft partial English translation in Schnaidt
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architecture's autonomy, fullness, intrinsic value, and resistance to commodity form by
presenting the building as an organization of the very reified, sachlich components and
materials that art traditionally has seen as its duty to either block out or transfigure.
(See fig. 241.) An architecture of non-consent. The effect of which is estrangement,
and absences of different sorts - absence of finish or refinement or closure, absence
of the self-identity and independent value of the visual sign, absence of the subjective
interiority of creator or viewer, absence of determinant meaning, absence of emotive
depth and the myth of plentitude. Out of these absences comes the recognition that
what had seemed, within conceptions of "architecture-as-such," essentially natural and
given is in fact historically and socially produced, and therefore open to radical
transformation. As Terry Eagleton has written,
The socialist revolution will take its poetry from the future, and since the future,
much more palpably than the past, does not exist, this is as much as to say that
it takes its poetry from absence. For it seems to me that the "future" of which
Marx's text speaks here is not to be grasped as a utopian model to which the
present must be conformed - not, in short, as a positivity - but is rather
nothing less than the space into which the thrust of socialist transformation
ceaselessly projects itself, the space created by that thrust.87
With the Petersschule, as with all the Co-op work, the word materialism -
understood as determination by the mode of production as well as a mere obsession
with the stuff of building - imposes more than suggests itself. But we must extract
the term from its primarily eighteenth-century Enlightenment and nineteenth-century
87Terry Eagleton, "Ideology, Fiction, Narrative," Social Text 2 (1980): 75
175
Hannes Meyer and the Radicalization of Perception
positivist associations. Meyer's materialism is, for one thing, an attempt conceptually
to overcome the division of labor.
The nine muses were long ago abducted by practical men and have stepped
down again into life from their high pedestals, more humdrum and more
reasonable. Their fields have been expropriated, confused and blurred. The
boundaries between painting, mathematics and music can no longer be defined;
and between sound and color there is only the gradual difference of oscillatory
frequency. The depreciation of all works of art is indisputable, and there can be
no question that the continued utilization of new and exact knowledge in their
place is merely a matter of time.88
As we have seen, within Meyer's epistemology, knowing and acting are both practices
and both forms of production; knowing the world is thought together with changing the
world. And the denunciation of art is itself a means of erasing boundaries between
socio-cultural fields, annulling the separation between physical and mental activity,
negating the distinction between worker and intellectual, and refusing the division of
labor that is fundamental to bourgeois society.
But materialism is also, as I have suggested, aesthetic pleasure in its own right.
In his essay "bauen" of 1928, Meyer would repeat and expand a list of materials, first
announced in "Die neue Welt," now spaced out on the page so that even the graphic
materiality of the words could not be missed.
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ferroconcrete
synthetic rubber
synthetic leather
foam concrete
wood's metal
silicon steel
cold glue
cellular concrete
rolled glass
xelotekt
wire glass
cork composition
synthetic resin
synthetic horn
synthetic wood
ripolin
viscose
etemit
goudron
canvas
aluminum
eubdolith
plywood
gum elastic
torfoleum
asbestos
acetone
casein
trolit
tombak
we organize these building materials on economic principles into a constructive
whole. thus the individual shape, the body of the structure, the color of the
material and the texture of the surface come automatically into being and are
determined by life.89
The Petersschule is an assemblage of just such materials whose qualities, tough
and impersonal, "come automatically into being." (See figs. 229, 246, 247, 249.)
The building is built on a steel framework resting on only 8 columns and with
outside walls of this section: facing of chequered aluminum sheet - pumice
conrete slabs - air space - kieselguhr slabs - air space - polished Eternit
sheets. Fitting out [Bautechnische Ausstattung]: steel framed hopper-type
windows, aluminum sheet doors, steel furniture, halls and stairs covered with
rubber flooring.90
By conferring specific forms on its reified materials - by purging materials of
all mythical, auratic, transcendental meaning - the Petersschule transmutes them into
rhetorcial form analogous to propaganda. Ordinarily one would expect some
89Meyer, "bauen"
90Hannes Meyer, "Projekt fur die Petersschule, Basle, 1926," in Schnaidt, 17
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overarching, unifiying spatial or formal system that would give a fullness and presence
to the various building components and materials. But the Petersschule disenfranchises
the spatial and the visual as dominant categories of architectural constitution. Previous
hierarchies governed by the distinction of art from objects of everday are now dissolved
by the formative principles and categories of machine production. Volumetric
components are conceived in functional terms - simple adjacencies grouped according
to use - which are completely independent of visual affect. And "elements that have a
telling psychological effect," according to Meyer, such as the stairs, walkways, and
suspended platforms, are standardized or confiscated like so many found elements, and
affixed or grafted on to the basic unit of the building (figs. 247, 249). All of which
operates to negate the relational compositional strategies identified with traditional art of
human facture, and to substitute things untouched by personality. Each material is
experienced as such and as infiltrating our everyday lives with the new associations of
the industrial landscape.
Like the space of modernity described in "Die neue Welt", the space of the
Petersschule is temporalized: we apprehend it only as we traverse it. In the
Petersschule, space is a product of the disjunctive building parts and materials, the way
in which they are used, and the time in which we encounter them. Where humanism,
in its ceaseless effort to fill the void between ourselves and the world, forever finds
ways to convert things into their images, into their names, into abstractions, into
totems, Meyer intensifies the raw materiality of the thing - the glaring brightness, the
hardness, the smell, the taste - and thrusts the experience of that thing, previously
indifferent and unimaginably external, toward the subject with unpadded harshness.
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His materialism emphasizes the heterogeneous properities of things and their effects in
real space and real time, and induces a play of sensuous energies in the viewer, a
compulsional pleasure taken in the quiddity of the building parts, but also in the
contradictions, the disruptions, the gaps and silences, all of which explodes the
received social meanings of those things. This is nothing less, I would suggest, than
Bloch's utopian desire to disorganize. The cancelling of fixed meanings, the shattering
of the illusion of individual centrality, in short, the production of absence, all organize a
political metaphor: things can be made different. Bloch's empty space becomes
productively empty.
So, then, there is no materiality without its flow of contradictory and disruptive
signification, and no absence - of whatever sort - without a structure of presence.
In the Petersschule's materialist opposition to all transcendental stabilizers of
signification, which induces an experience of the world increasingly as a succession of
completed material substances seemingly operating through automatic mechanisms, the
viewer becomes disoriented and dislodged from conventionally secure spaces of
aesthetic apprehension and tends toward the merely factual understanding and
description of objective reality from which he feels estranged. But the practice of
estrangement, or the production of a Verfremdungseffekt, if we may now use, correctly
I think, that concept from Brechtian theater - the staging of action in such a way that
what had seemed natural and unquestionable is now revealed as historical and thus
open to revolutionary change - such production is plausible for the viewer only if a
certain verisimilitude is posited. So the Petersschule can do its job of cancelling,
disrupting, and decentering only if certain identities are maintained.
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Traditionally, one of the devices that has insured a sense of palpable presence in
a building is the understanding of the building as a transcription of the human body. In
the chapter "Humanist Values" in his The Architecture of Humanism, Geoffrey Scott,
sustaining observations derived from Heinrich Wbfflin, identifies two complementary
principles of humanism. One is founded on our response to the appearance of stability
or instability and our corporeal identification with the building itself: "We have
transcribed ourselves into terms of architecture."91 Another is founded on our
unconscious investment of the building with human movement and human moods:
"We transcribe architecture into terms of ourselves."92 Thus Scott concludes that
"architecture, to communicate the vital values of the spirit must appear organic, like the
body," and declares
The scientific perception of the world is forced upon us; the humanist
perception of it is ours by right. The scientific method [of criticism] is
intellectually and practically useful, but the naive, the anthropomorphic way
which humanizes the world and interprets it by analogy with our own bodies
and our own wills, is still the aesthetic way; it is the basis of poetry, and it is the
foundation of architecture. 93
9 1Geoffrey Scott, The Architecture of Humanism (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1924 [orig.
1914]), 213; emphasis in original. See also Heinrich W~fflin, Renaissance and Baroque, trans. K.
Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); and Georg Simmel, "The Aesthetic Significance of
the Face," trans. Lore Ferguson, in Georg Simmel. 1858-1918, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1959 [orig. German 1901]), 276-81. For a preliminary sketch of the notion of
physiognomy in architecture, see Anthony Vidler, The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in
the Late Enlightment (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987), 118 ff.
92Scott, 213
93Ibid., 218
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But such inscription of the body is, of course, never innocent. And so, for
example, in the monumentalized modernism of at least some of the Italian rationalists,
syntactical and typological invention within a classicizing, anthropomorphizing
conceptual frame becomes the basis for reconnecting the architectural sign with its
affirmative cultural and disciplinary conventions, now in service of the fascist State.
Giuseppe Pagano, Marcello Piacentini, Ludovico Quaroni, and others assimilate the
critical analytical and negational tendencies of modernism, reconnect the architectural
sign to the referential realm, and demonstrate the availability of seemingly autonomous
or critical formal manipulations for institutionalized and domesticated ends. A
synthesis of formal abstraction with a conception of spatial order and harmony derived
from classical proportional systems serves in the buildings of these architects merely to
prop up the myth of cultural continuity and progress, as if their monumentality and
awe-inspiring physical presence were in compensation for a seemingly unchangeable
status quo.94
On the other hand, expressionist architecture renovates the body and the
phenomenology of its representation as orientation points that might prove resistant to
the uncritical, potentially instrumentalizing tendencies of industrialized architecture.
And yet, in a society where objects appear as alienated and cut off from human
purposes, this, too, is a consoling doctrine: the world is grasped in relation to me, as a
94I have not been entirely careful here in my criticism of these architects. For a more balanced and
nuanced analysis of the problematic of Italian modem architecture, the state, and the regime, see
Giorgio Ciucci, "Pagano und Terragni: Faschistische Architektur als Ideal und als Staatsstil," in
Hartmut Frank, ed., Faschistische Architekturen: Planen und Bauen in Europa 1930 bis 1945
(Hasmburg: Hans Christian Verlag, 1985), 123-38; and "Italian Architecture during the Fascist Period:
The Many Souls of the Classical," The Harvard Architecture Review 6 (1987): 76-87.
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correlate of my body and my consciousness, and this is reassuring; it restores the
individual subject, which the technological avant-garde sought to liquidate, to its
rightful throne, seen as the source and origin of all meaning.
We can theorize this latter proposition using Jacque Lacan's metaphor of the
mirror image of the subject: If we imagine with Lacan a small child contemplating
itself in a mirror - Lacan's "mirror stage" - we can see how the child's first
development of an ego, of an integrated self-image, is constructed as an imaginary state
of being. The child finds reflected back to itself in the mirror a gratifyingly unified
image of itself that resolves its prior "morcelated body." The identification with an
image of one's self is constitutive of that self, and this constitution is the structural
precondition for any ideological manipulation or massage of the subject. Ss the mirror
situation suggests, this self is essentially narcissistic: we arrive at a sense of selfhood
by finding a favorable image of ourselves reflected back to ourselves by some object.
For Lacan, the ego is just this narcissistic process whereby we construct a fiction of
unitary selfhood by finding some externality with which we can identify.95
Architecture based on the human body similarly lures the ego by offering an
image of its mirror-self, a kind of mirroring object. This is a condition that
expressionism at once exemplifies and problematizes. In the buildings of Hans Poelzig
or Eric Mendolsohn, for example, the viewer encounters an architecture now overtly
anthropomorphic but not quite human. We see not so much a reflection of ourselves as
a shadow or a distortion, an image that disturbs the narcissistic gaze of the viewer
95See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection trans. Alan Sheridan (London and New York: W.W.
norton, 1977).
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through what Lacan called an "inmixing of Otherness," presenting itself as other to our
body and our subjectivity. The differential play between subject and object that takes
place along the axis of the viewer and his reflection in the mirror metaphor now finds
its analogue in the object itself; the object takes on subjective attributes. Like the
animals in a fable who speak with human voices, expressionist objects are the obverse
of classical humanist representations - that is, they do not render to us our narcissistic
object of desire so directly - but they, nonetheless, restore the individual subjectivity
that modernity threatened to displace, in objects that can be seen as parables of a
privileged because private psychological moment.
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of these positions to which we might
compare that of Meyer, all imply an attempt to restore the symbolic authenticity of
traditional content or individual authorship, an attempt to re-bound architecture, to re-
colonize it within humanist conceptions of cultural institutions, functionality, and
individuality. The Petersschule, in contrast, inverts the signs of the body in ways that
extend similar inversions in Le Corbusier's Maison Citrohan - the base of the building
is nullified, the roof of the building is occupiable (fig. 248), the elevational and
volumetric organizations interdict visual frontality and the search for human
countenance (figs. 229, 247). But what is more important is that the threat of
dissolution, which Le Corbusier and expressionism conceptualize in terms of the body,
is converted by the Petersschule into a treat of dissolution of that different entity, whose
construction on the model of the body image is designated by Lacan's mirror stage: the
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subject, the personality, the individual itself.96 And it is not difficult to associate this
threat of dissolution, which stuns the psychological subject into a recognition of
ideological-material mechanisms as its causes, with the mixture of anguish and
exhilaration, of pain and compulsion, that we have described as Meyer's materialist
pleasure.
The structure of presence in the Petersschule also involves, as we have seen,
considerations of the advancement of technology, and the links between the
transformations of technology and the transformations of artistic practice and social
forms. But it further involves the city, the physical and social context into which the
Petersschule irrupts. The site of the Petersschule lies on the eastern periphery of the
inner city wall, a former Roman fortification, adjacent to the Peterskirche (figs. 230,
245).97 Meyer's project isolates itself on the site, holding the street line to the west and
leaving over half of the eastern part of the site free on the ground plane. The entry,
which is an extended spatial and temporal sequence through the system of open and
glazed stairs, begins at the western street, visible from the square in front of the church,
and wraps around the north side of the building. The passageway formed by the the
Freifldchen, or suspended platforms on the north of the building, operate like an upper-
level loggia in concert with the deep entry door to the first level and the large window
of the ground level (fig. 229) to describe a zone of circulation at the northern edge of
the site which extends the space of the narrow passage that enters the site from the east
961 borrow this formulation from Fredrich Jameson, "Pleasure: A Political Issue," in Jameson, The
Ideologies of Theory. Essays 1971-1986, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988),
71-72.
970. Birkner, J. Herzong, and P. DeMeuron, "Die Peterschule in Basel ( '26-1929)," Werk/Archithese
13-14 (January-February 1978)
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and continues parallel to the south facade of Peterskirche (fig. 245), all of which further
sponsors the preeminence of the diagonality so apparent in the perspective and
axonometric drawings. 98 The vertical organization of the building (fig. 248) is also
determined by the Freifldchen which Meyer proposed in substitution for the playground
required by the building program: the ground level is left open for public circulation
and parking; only the gymnasium, swimming pool, and kitchen are located at ground
level or below; and the whole implies a reorganization of functions and spaces
extending out into the traditional urban fabric.
Meyer writes, "The school itself is raised as far as possible above ground to a
level where there is sunlight and fresh air... and all the flat roofs of the building are
assigned to the children for recreation, providing a total area of 1250 sq. meters of
sunny space away from the old town." The emphasis of these last lines on the salutary
vocation of architecture, conjoined with and enabled by its technical advancement, is
standard modernist fare, but what I wish to draw attention to, one last time, is the
unexpected fit between the Petersschule and Bloch's description of "building in empty
spaces": "Today, in many places, houses look as if they were ready to travel.... Their
interior is bright and sterile like hospital rooms, the exterior looks like boxes on top of
mobile poles, but also like ships. They have flat decks, portholes, gangways,
railings..., and as ships they like to disappear." On the one hand, as we have seen,
Meyer's materialism seeks to dissolve the Petersschule as a purely visual object. And
on the other hand, the flying decks of the Petersschule - perhaps even more intensely
981t is of interest to compare this upper level loggia to the more conventional interpretation of a loggia
in the Pettersschule project by Hans Schmidt. Such a comparison serves to confirm the spatial reading
of Meyer's extruded circulation system.
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than the earlier projects of Ladovky's studio, or Lissitzky's project for a "Horizontal
Skyscraper" of 1923-25 - organize a constructional metaphor that struggles to
distantiate and extract the building from its context, to enunciate a conception of space
that is other than the one we have. The building is "ready to travel," provided we
understand by that statement not only that the building is a visual metaphor, but also
that the building is the actual production of a concept of an alternative space. We
should link the metaphor of the platforms and the group of children engaged in
Pestalozzian learning with other images like those which appeared in the pages of ABC
- the planetarium construction, Lyubov' Popova and Aleksandr Vesnin's propaganda
apparatus, and Lissitzky's Lenin Tribune project in ABC 1 (fig. 251), the circus tent
and amusement park ride in ABC 4 (fig. 250) - all of which attempt tofigure the
various city-machines conjoined with mass society in signs of collective participation
within the spectacle of modernization.
Looking at the asymmetry of the Freifldchen grafted onto the functional volume
of the school, one is also reminded of the poignant image of Paul Klee's "Hero with the
Wing" (fig. 252), and of Klee's diary entry,
Today is the great transition from past to present. In the huge pit of forms there
lies rubble to which one still clings in part. It furnishes the stuff for abstraction.
A rubble field of spurious elements, for the formation of impure crystals.
That is how it is today...
In order to work myself out of my rubble, I had to fly.
And I did fly. In that shattered world I remain only in memory, as one thinks
back sometimes.
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Thus I am "abstract with memories."99
Like an enormous prosthetic device for a city that is unable to function adequately on its
own, the Petersschule organizes its elements in such a way as to reveal the present
order as crippled and unsatisfactory, physically and socially, and to propose an anti-
social response as a possible way out: the Petersschule would like to disappear.
99Paul Klee, Tagebacher, ed. Felix Klee (Cologne, 1957), 323 ff. The diary entry is from 1915. For
a discussion, see 0. K. Werkmeister, "Walter Benjamin, Paul Klee, and the Angel of History,"
Oppositions 25 (Fall 1982): 102-25
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229. Hannes Meyer, project for the
Petersschule, Basel, 1926, perspective
230. Petersschule, site plan
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231. Meyer, project for the central
cemetery, Basel, 1923, elevational view of
the urn grove and the columbarium
232. Central cemetery, aerial perspective of
the site
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233. Meyer, Freidorf Siedlung, near Basel,
1919-21, communal house, plans,
elevations, and sections
234. Meyer, Co-op Lino (Abstract
Architecture I), 1925, abstraction of the
entrance hall of the communal building
235. Freidorf Siedlung, communal building
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237. Freidorf Siedlung, views
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238. El Lissitzky, project for a
Wolkenbiigelhochhauses for Moscow, 1925
239. Vkhutemas (N. A. Ludovsky's
studio), project of a restaurant suspended
from a cliff over the sea, 1922-23
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240. Hannes Meyer and Hans Wittwer,
architects' office, Basel, c. 1926
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241. Petersschule, publication of project
with calculations for light, from Bauhaus 2
(Dessau, 1927)
242. Le Corbusier, Maison Citrohan, 1922
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243. Petersschule, isometric
244. Meyer, Co-op Construction I, 1926
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245. Petersschule, plan
246. Petersschule,view of model
(constructed for 1989 exhibition)
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L POPOVA UND A. VESNINE FLIEGENDE PROPAGANDA.
250. Illustrations of a circus tent and
amusement park ride, from ABC 4 (second
series), 1927-28
251. Illustrations of El Lissitzky's Lenin
Tribune, the dome of the Zeiss Planetarium
in Jena, and Lyubov' Popova and
Aleksandr Vesnin's propadanda apparatus,
from ABC 1 (second series), 1926
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252. Paul Klee, Hero with the Wing,
etching, 1905
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The Bauhaus and the
Radicalization of Building
the dessau bauhaus is not an artistic,
but a social phenomenon.
as gestalter
our activities are determined by society,
and the scope of our tasks is set by society.
does not our present society in Germany call for
thousands of people's schools, people's parks, people's houses?
millions of pieces of people's furniture???
(what are the connoisseur's gibberings worth when set against these)
(A .ad the cubistic cubes of bauhaus sachlichkeit?)....
the new bauhaus seaool
as a center of education in shaping life
makes no selection of the gifted.
it despises
the imitative intellectual mobility of talent,
it is alive to the danger of intellectual schism:
inbreeeding, egocentrism, unworldlines, aloofness.
the new building school.... 100
100Hannes Meyer, "bauhaus and society," 1929, in Schnaidt, Hannes Meyer. Original is written in
lower case; my emphasis.
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With this tough and exact rhetoric, Hannes Meyer addressed the representatives of the
student body of the Bauhaus on the occasion of his appointment to the post of director
in February 1928. It is the sort of rhetoric that has prompted critics and historians to
label him functionalist, naive radical, petty-bourgeois, and "gravedigger" of the
Bauhaus. 101 Within the context of the analysis here, however, we will understand the
rhetoric to be indicative of Meyer's task to bring into the Bauhaus the related theories of
aesthetic practice as social production and the aesthetic object as an image of the
productive cycle, now with the concommitant hope of an actual intervention into the
organizational processes of that cycle. At the Bauhaus, Meyer attempts to carry
through his previous research in the performativity of form to the radicalization of the
process of building itself. He thereby pushes the hypothesis of an engaged architecture
to a limit unknown at the Bauhaus during the time of Walter Gropius's administration.
As most critics have recognized, such a radicalization is manifest as a substantial
accentuation in the school of social, technical, and practical aspects of architecture, a
search for a more concrete and practical role for the school in the actual production and
distribution of its designs, and a diminution of the importance of studies of form and
self expression, the effect of which is the overturning of some of the most engrained
and cherished pedagogic principles of the Bauhaus tradition. What critics have not
seemed willing to admit is that the insertion of Meyer's radical hypotheses into the
101Walter Gropius, who has set the tone for most subsequent criticisms of Meyer's work at the
Bauhaus, condemns Meyer in a letter to TomAs Maldonado: "I cannot allot to [Meyer] the importance
with which you credit him during the years of the Bauhaus. His strategy and tactics were too petty; he
was a radical petit bourgeois. His philosophy culminates in the assertion that 'life is oxygen plus
sugar plus starch plus protein,' to which Mies promptly retorted: Try stirring all that together; it
stinks."' Publisher's epilogue, Schnaidt, 123
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tradition of the Bauhaus resulted in anything other than a story of futility, nay-saying,
and waste within the "venerable" school.' 0 2
A few critics recently have attempted to confront the general problematic of the
social engagement of architecture. Michael Muller, for one, in Architektur und
Avantgarde103 follows Peter BUrger's Theory of the Avant-Garde in supporting a
definitional distinction to be made between those modem artistic practices based
primarly on issues of form and those, like Meyer's work at the Bauhaus, that
incorporate problems of the relationship between art and the socio-institutional
lifeworld. Such a distinction goes some way toward breaking up the notion of a
monolithic "modem movement," but it is still not fine enough to aid us here. For by
arguing a definition of the avant-garde that embraces socio-political themes and
practical, utilitarian concerns, BUrger and MUller can set such a practice against
nineteenth-century bourgeois aestheticism and its ongoing transformations in the
twentieth-century, but cannot then adequately differentiate an altogether different avant-
garde of the twentieth century, which would indeed become a dominant stance: the one
perhaps best exemplified by Gropius's lifelong concern with a policy of reconciliation
102Almost every commentator on the Bauhaus follows this pattern, if they do not ignore Meyer
altogether. A recent and claimed "reassessment" is one of the most balanced criticisms: "Since Meyer
aroused so much controversy, on ideological as well as personal and political grounds during his two
years as director of the school, it is not easy to evaluate his achievements there. There is no doubt that
his policies were successful on a practical level, and that under his direction the workshops produced
designs in keeping with the requirements of German industry and the domestic market the Bauhaus
did, in fact, become a competent "trade school," with, at last, an active architecture department. His
design theory at that time, however, was so totally materialistic and reductionist that it is difficult to
take it seriously; nevertheless he identified and challenged some of the uneasy assumptions about
radicalism in design on which teaching at the school was based. He was politically aware, although
not politically astute, and he was prepared to sacrifice the school for his convictions." Gillian Naylor,
The Bauhaus Reassessed (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1985), 174
103Michael Muller, Architektur und Avantgarde (Frankfut am Main: Syndikat, 1984)
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between the common formal language of the avant-gardes, the social and technological
research of production art, and the consistent endeavor to preserve the traditional,
institutional autonomy of the artist.
Shifting from the earlier position of the Arbeitsrat fir Kunst, which in 1919 in
Berlin had affimed that "the political revolution must be used to liberate art from
decades of regimentation," and that "art and people must form a unity,"104 Gropius at
the Bauhaus increasingly demonstrated a detachment from political reality, an
equivocation about the role of intellectual labor, and a synthesizing, conciliatory
tendency summarized in the new slogan of 1923, "Art and Technology - a New
Unity," all of which ultimately amounted to little more than a proposition for a
technological aesthetic or style organized and operated by artists from above. As
Francesco Dal Co has argued, in what is still the primary critical comparison between
the Bauhaus of Gropius and that of Meyer,
The fundamental contradiction hidden in the work of Gropius becomes clear
when we underline the evident mystification into which those fall who want to
credit Gropius with having conducted a "heroic battle" for the unification of the
work of intellectual design (progettazione), for the overcoming of the division
between art and the world, between art and work, between art and society;
definitively, that is, for overcoming the principle of the division of labor as the
fundamental structure of bourgeois society.105
104Arbeitsrat fbr Kunst circular, translated in Ulrich Conrads, Programs and manifestoes on 20th-
century architecture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 44
105Francesco Dal Co, "Hannes Meyer e la 'venerabile scuola di Dessau'," introduction to Hannes
Meyer, Architettura o rivoluzione (Padua: Marsilio, 1973); my translation
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Gropius's Bauhaus can be undertood as a confirmation and verification of the
evolution of the modernist paradigm as the latter has been constructed by Dal Co,
Manfredo Tafuri, and the Venice School. In their construction (which follows to a
certain extent the thought of the Frankfurt School of critical theory) the loss of
traditional artistic values - a loss that the radical avant-gardes refused to lament - was
the sign inside art of a wider cultural decomposition. Avant-garde experiments between
1919 and 1930 were an attempt to capture the lack of consistent and repeatable
meanings in the culture, to register it, and make it over into form. The endeavors to
picture an alternative reality, one that must perforce be irrational given the logic of the
present, clarify the historical aim of the various avant-garde ideological formulations to
have been the wish to accept contradiction, to make contradiction the very object of art
- through irony or disgust, through the registration and intensification of given
conditions, through chance and irrationality, even through the annulment of art itself.
This process of continually activating and making "operative" the contradictions of the
real - presenting art as the dialectical negation of what is given in the present - is, for
the Venice School, the historical factor that unites the experience of all the progressive
and radical art of the twentieth century.10 6 The historical destiny of the Bauhaus can
106Dal Co notes that, when Tristan Tzara affirms that the informing principle of his dadaist project "is
not art but disgust," and that "every pictorial or plastic art is useless," Tzara articulates a
disenchantment of the present world which leads to the discovery of the structural inadequacy of this
world's art. Then there comes the search for that "irrational order" Jean Arp speaks about, whose
"irrationality" is determined solely by the relationship with the contingent, an order that, inasmuch as
it is irrational with respect to the given historical conditions, is intended as a possible alternative to
what Arp called "this sad tale of humanity." This search for an existence that is elsewhere, that is
other, for a condition reachable "through a way entirely other than a reasonable way" was also, Dal Co
further contends, the aim of the first surrealist manifesto of Breton. See also Manfredo Tafuri, The
Sphere and the Labyrinth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987 [orig. Italian, 1980]).
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then be seen within this paradigm as an ideological tendency to convert negativity into a
positive force by discovering "the Plan" for the real - a program for social
development, an overarching order for modernity - and attempting to realize that plan,
to produce that form of reality which the avant-gardes had been able only to envision.
But Gropius, and with him the Bauhaus up to 1928, will never resolve this
contradiction intrinsic to intellectual work; the demand and the ideological
prefiguration of the program and of the plan on a general social level, if it is, on
the one hand, the ultimate aspiration of bourgeois art, it is, on the other hand,
also its extreme ideological product; it is, therefore, the last possibility of the
survival of art; art now becomes a directly social function and as such annuls its
own intrinsic values to become annexed itself, as value and function of society.
In the practice of [Gropius's] Bauhaus, however, all this remains largely
unrealized. It is a present but constantly refused destiny.107
For Gropius the condition for the new "unification" of art and life remains the
fact that the process of design is a process of creating an eidetic image - a mental
image of a new art, vivid and detailed, but disengaged - which is to say, design
remains intellectual work as such and only. Reading Gropius's early writings, in
particular the Bauhaus program of 1919, and looking at the work of the Bduhauslers
after 1923, it seems right to affirm a relationship to, and a notable influence of, the
radical artistic movements on the organization and subsequent development of the
school. The Bauhaus was, in Manfredo Tafuri's words, "the decantation chamber, the
refinery, of the European avant-gardes... and the ideological symbol of the unity of the
107Dal Co, "Hannes Meyer e la 'venerabile scuola di Dessau'," 43
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modem movement as a whole." 108 Accepting the weight of this tradition, Gropius,
however, shows his willingness to endorse the formal experiments of the avant-gardes
but to change their social role and meaning at the same time, by transferring the critical
negational strategies of the immediate post-war period to an affirmative, operative level.
This transference signalled a break not only with the anti-art and often destructive
activities of the dadaists, but also with the proposals of the Novembergruppe, the
constructivists, and the productivists for a more concretely engaged architecture. 109
Gropius sought to defuse the protopolitical mechanisms of radical art, demonstrate their
availability for use in mediating between crafts and industry, and raise artisanal work to
a new level through the application of the formal research of the avant-garde, thereby
reestablishing contacts with the tenets of the Werkbund and weaving emergent artistic
experiments into the fabric of the bourgeois aesthetic tradition. He makes these themes
explicit in 1926.
[Industry and the crafts] are constantly getting closer to each other. The crafts
of the past have changed, and future crafts will be merged in a new productive
unity in which they will carry out the experimental work for industrial
production. Speculative experiments in laboratory workshops will yield models
and prototypes for productive implementation in factories.110
108Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modem Architecture, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc.),
132
109The contact with neo-plasticist and constructivist experiences become fully evident in the project of
1926 by Georg Muche and Richard Paulick for a steel house, in the analytic experiments by Moholy-
Nagy, in the graphics of Herbert Bayer, and in the furniture by Marcel Breuer.
110Walter Gropius, "Bauhaus Dessau - Principles of Bauhaus Production," 1926; translated in Form
and Function: A Source Book for the History of Architecture and Design 1890-1939 ed. Tim and
Charlotte Benton (London: The Open University Press, 1975), 149
223
Hannes Meyer and the Radicalization of Perception
It is symptomatic that in these terms Gropius is so impressed with the example
of Moholy-Nagy, who in 1922 had shown at the Der Sturm gallery in Berlin a series of
paintings produced by dictating instructions for the making of the pictures over the
telephone "to a head of a coat-of-arms shop." Moholy writes:
In 1922 I ordered by telephone from a sign factory five paintings in porcelain
enamel. I had the factory's color chart before me and I sketched my paintings
on graph paper. At the other end of the telephone the factory supervisor had the
same kind of paper, divided into squares. He took down the dictated shapes in
the correct position.11'
As a simple metaphor for a supposed overcoming of the distance between art and life
that would then be realized practically by Gropius in the Bauhaus, this anecdote shows
how remote design in fact could remain, and how far the Bauhaus ideology in fact was
from a real overcoming of the division of labor, from a real synthesis of art and life.
The sense of Moholy's anecdote is different from the seemingly similar anonymous text
of 1924, published by Hans Arp and El Lissitzky in Kunstismen:
With the increasing frequency of the square in painting, the art institutions have
offered everybody the means to make art. Now the production of art has been
simplified to such an extent that one can do no better than order one's paintings
by telephone from a house painter while one is lying in bed.112
111Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, in Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy: Experiment in Totality (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1969)112The author of the text is either El Lissitzky or Malevich. It was originally published in Hans Arp
and El Lissitzky, Kunstismen (Munich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1925), ix-x. For a discussion, see
Yve-Alain Bois, "Malevich, le carr6, le degr6 z6ro," Macula. 1 (1978): 28-49.
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In contrast to the latter text, which implies a renunciation of the traditional role of the
individual artist and his specialized vision, in Moholy's text, art is still transcendental
and mystified; art tries to control, in its own institutional terms, what Walter Benjamin
called the presence of the "technological accident." In a comparison of the painter and
the cameraman through the analogy of the magician and the surgeon, which provides
the terms for a comparison of Gropius and Meyer, Benjamin writes,
The magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and himself;
though he reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he greatly
increases it by virtue of his authority. The surgeon does exactly the reverse; he
greatly diminishes the distance between himself and the patient by penetrating
into the patient's body, and increases it but little by the caution with which his
hand moves among the organs.113
Along these same lines, Dal Co argues that another example of Gropius's
conservative vision of the role of art in society lies in the facts of the transfer of the
Bauhaus from Weimar to Dessau. After the announcement of the proposed transfer
from Weimar, several German cities offered to host the Bauhaus, including Frankfurt,
Hagen, Mannheim, and Darmstadt. In support of his choice of Dessau, Gropius cites
some motivations that are revealing for an understanding of his vision of the architect's
role. He says that he prefers a direct relationship with the "dynamic" Burgermeister
Hesse 114, whose "courage" and "spirit of initiative" he praises, inasmuch as this allows
113Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Benjamin,
Illuminations ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), 233
114Hesse would later oust Meyer from the Bauhaus. See Hannes Meyer, "My Dismissal from the
Bauhaus" (1930), an open letter to Oberbargermeister Hesse, in Schnaidt.
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him to remain sufficiently outside the political problems that the settlement of the
Bauhaus in other cities would have stirred up. Nor is this just an indication of a wish
to preserve the autonomy of the school. The refusal to transfer the Bauhaus to
Frankfurt, for example, if it can be partly justified for reasons of economic convenience
and the possible affiliation with big industry, is also dictated, as Dal Co argues, by a
fundamental political choice: Gropius wanted to avoid a confrontation with that
experience and that attempt of an overall management of the city with which the most
advanced architects of German social democracy were experimenting and which in
Frankfurt, with the work of Ernst May, had its most evident success. Gropius in effect
demonstrates that he does not wish to take part in the possibility of an architectural
intervention in the general problems of the city, and he refuses to submit himself and
the Bauhaus to those political conditions that alone would have allowed for that greater
merging of art and life that he continued to invoke rhetorically. He preferred instead to
safeguard his own limited autonomy as an artist. The potential for effective
intervention realized by May, Gropius entrusted to the "courage" of the political forces,
status quo. The history of Gropius's Bauhaus, I would assert polemically, is a history
of such compromises.
Upon Meyer's appointment as director of the Bauhaus, Oskar Schlemmer wrote
to Otto Meyer, '"The Bauhaus will reorient itself in the direction of architecture,
industrial production, and the intellectual aspect of technology. The painters are merely
tolerated as a necessary evil now." 115 Perhaps in anticipation of being marginalized, or
1150skar Schlemmer, "To Otto Meyer," in The Letters and Diaries of Oskar Schlemmer, Tut
Schlemmer, ed. (Wesleyan University Press 1972), 221
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perhaps on principle, Marcel Breuer, Herbert Bayer, and Moholy-Nagy had already
resigned before Gropius's decision to leave the school was announced. Moholy-Nagy
made his intentions clear in a letter to the Meisterrat in January 1928.
As soon as creating an object becomes a speciality, and work becomes trade,
the process of education loses all vitality. There must be room for teaching the
basic ideas which keep human content alert and vital. For this we fought and
for this we exhausted ourselves. I can no longer keep up with the stronger and
stronger tendency toward trade specialization in the workshops.... The spirit of
construction for which I and others gave all we had - and gave it gladly - has
been replaced by a tendency towards application. My realm was the
construction of school and man. 116
The criticism of the tendency toward specialization and the emphasis on man
are, no doubt, directed at Meyer's negation of the traditional artistic practice and the
new subjectivities it engenders. One would think, at first gloss, that Meyer and
Moholy would be close in their conceptualization of design. Both claimed to be more
concerned with social issues of design than form alone; Meyer had published Moholy's
essay "Ismus oder Kunst" along with a Bildconstruktion and a Metalconstruktion in
ABC 2; their positions would seem to be commensurable. But the terms of their
disagreement is instructive for a fuller understanding of Meyer's thinking. Oskar
Schlemmer, who shared his house with Meyer when Meyer first arrived at the
Bauhaus, had already perceived a tension between Meyer and Moholy, as well as other
main figures:
227
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[Meyer] was not interested in Klee; he says Klee must be in a perpetual trance;
Feininger does not appeal to him, either. Kandinsky [does] because of his
theoretical underpinnings. In terms of character he feels closest to Moholy,
although he is very critical towards much about him - his manner (officious),
his false teachings (which students also see as such and reject); he was not
interested in Muche's steel-construction new building, since steel is the least
important element in it. Gropius can count himself fortunate to have this honest
fellow as the latest feather in his cap.117
Moholy's stress on man rather than the social-material product, his preoccupation with
forms that bore no real relationship to either the actual techniques of production or the
actual demands of mass consumption, and his pseudo-scientific teaching methods of a
"master," all entailed an affirmation of a humanist conception of art that Meyer could
not countenance. And Meyer's stress on the collectivity of the "design brigade," and
his recasting of design practice within the categories of labor and material production
implied an undermining of artistic institutions that Moholy could not tolerate.
Meyer's transformation of the Bauhaus was destructive; but it was not
destructive only. Claude Schnaidt's account of Meyer's activity at the Bauhaus remains
the most adequate, and it is enough only to recall a few positive achievements here.
Within the new educational program, for the first time in the school's history, building
1170skar Schlemmer, "To Otto Meyer," 202. Tensions between them notwithstanding, Klee would
support Meyer when he was threatened with dismissal, and Meyer would write to him, "You must not
think that I am in any way embittered. On the contrary the events have revived powers that I have had
to stifle in Dessau. I feel younger and more ready for battle than ever.... You know that we will
always reach out our hands to each other over the barriers that divide us. I will always remian grateful
to you." Hannes Meyer, Letter to Paul Klee, Berlin 23.8.30, in Meyer, Bauen und Gesellschaft.
Schriften. Briefe. Projekte (Dredsden: VEB Verlag der Kunst, 1980),74-75.
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became a program on its own, with Ludwig Hilberseimer appointed its director. Other
appointments made by Meyer included: Anton Brenner, who had studied with Peter
Behrens and worked with Ernst May in Frankfurt; Edvard Heiberg, a Norwegian
architect and theorist; Alcar Rudelk, a construction engineer, Walter Peterhans, whose
conception of photography as a science Meyer had hoped would contribute to the
"training [of] camera reporters and advertising photographers;" 118 and Mart Stam, a
Dutch architect and co-editor of ABC, and Hans Wittwer, who both contributed to the
program as guest lecturers on mechanical engineering and town planning. Theoretical
discussions were fueled by guests that included the Viennese logical positivists
Rudolph Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Herbert Feigl, as well as Karel Teige, Hermann
Finsterlin, Ernst Toller, Piet Zwart, and Dziga Vertov. "I never design alone," wrote
Meyer. "That is why I consider the choosing of suitable associates to be the most
important act in preparing for a creative work in architecture. The more contrasted the
abilities of the designing brigade, the greater its capabilities and creative power."119
With new and previously appointed faculty, four departments were established
within the school: building, headed by Hilberseimer; interior design, which
incorporated the previous workshops in metal, wall-painting, and furniture, and was
headed by Alfred Arndt, a former student; advertising, headed by Joost Schmidt, which
incorporated the graphic and printing workshops as well as a new photography
program under Peterhans; and textiles. Meyer had also intended to introduce courses
on Gestalt psychology, sociology, and social economics. (See fig. 253.)
118Hannes Meyer, "Bauhaus Dessau. My experience of a polytechnical education" (1940), in Schnaidt
119Hannes Meyer, "Wie ich arbeite," Architektura CCCP 6 (Moskow, 1933); MS in German; partial
translation in Schnaidt
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The focal point of the school were three eight-hour workshops per week, now
organized to work as collective, collaborative "vertical brigades." It was Meyer's
intention to take the Bauhaus away from "a 'university of design' which made the
shape of every tea-glass a problem in constructivist aesthetics,"120 and to make the
workshops self-supporting by marketing their designs through a commercial
organization, the Bauhaus G.m.b.H. Wallpapers designed at the Bauhaus were made
and marketed by Rasch and Co. and brought in significant royalities for the school.
Meyer wrote,
In 1929 alone (the year they were introduced) more than 20,000 rooms in
Germany and neighboring countries were papered with them. From the
educational point of view, they provided an opportunity of dealing with the
problem of 'color in the interior" as a general principle and also of making
"hygiene in the worker's house" a reality, by producing cheap washable
wallpapers. 121
The advertising and textile departments were also commercially successful and each
achieved its aim of a working liason with industry to mass produce goods at low cost.
Meyer wrote,
The annual production, amounting to about RM 128 000 (1928) has been
almost doubled..... In the last business year, RM 32 000 was paid out to
students in the way of wages and this enabled those who were less well-off to
study there. A Bauhaus travelling exhibition publicized our ideas in Basle,
Breslau, Dessau, Essen, Mannheim and Zurich.... Industrial firms came along
120Meyer, "My Dismissal from the Bauhaus," 101
121Meyer, "Bauhaus Dessau. My experience of a polytechnical education," 111
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with urgent requests, engaged Bauhaus students on their staffs, and concluded
licence agreements for Bauhaus fabrics, lamps, standard furniture and
wallpapers. Thus there was every prospect of our finances being improved in
future in the only really sound way, namely through self-help. 122
It is an ironic fact that the close cooperation with the workers' movement and the trade
unions, and the involvement of Meyer and a few students in the miner's strike, would
eventually result in his dismissal from the Bauhaus.
Between 1928 and 1930, Meyer continued the work already begun by Gropius
on the Siedlung Tbrten at Dessau. The most important building project of Meyer and
the Bauhaus brigades, however, was the Federal School of the General German Trade
Unions Federation (ADGB) of 1928-30 at Bernau near Berlin (figs. 254-267). Meyer
brought the commission with him to Dessau after winning in 1927 the limited
competition with invited entries from Max Berg, Alois Klement, Willy Ludewig, Eric
Mendelsohn, and Max Taut as well as Meyer, judged by Adolf Behne, Otto Hessler,
Theoder Leipart, chairman of the executuive council of the Federation, and Heinrich
Tessenow. The school was to house Trades Union members and officials attending
short courses and comprised residential blocks and teachers' dormitories as well as
classrooms, a lecture theater, dining hall, and gymnasium. In his design, Meyer
revised the basic proposition announced in the Petersschule of a simple volume of
framed construction with fenestration determined by light and view, now treated as a
sort of constructional integer repeated in a series across the site (figs. 256, 257). As in
122Meyer, "My Dismissal from the Bauhaus," 103. Note that the self-help ideology can be traced back
to Meyer's experience at Siedlung Freidorf.
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the Petersschule, the circulation is contained and denoted by glazed passageways
grafted to the series of volumes (figs. 261, 262); and the building components are
disjunctively combined to stress the implicit reproducibility and rearrangeability of the
execution.
If the plan form of the school belies Meyer's continued fascination with the
dynamic graphic experiments of the elementarist and constructivist avant-gardes as the
organizing matrix within which the aggressively tough, unsentimental building is
executed (figs. 255, 259), and if such a synthesis would seem, on a purely formal
gloss, to be continuous with the synthesizing, conciliatory ideology of Gropius, the
changed historical and theoretical determinants of Meyer's building changes the
meaning of the immanent formal structure accordingly. If we understand the work of
both Meyer and Gropius to evidence the imprint of a particular historical mode of
production, we must also recognize that the work registers that imprint in different
ways. No single building - neither the most engaged nor the most autonomous, the
most pedestrain nor the most distinguished - can reflect or duplicate or refuse cultural
reality with perfect fidelity. To the extent that a work is architecture - that is, to the
extent that it is inscribed in an already constituted field of cultural and disciplinary
conventions that generate or enable the architect's intention to make architecture as
opposed to making something else - it differs qualitatively from a simple mirror of an
external reality; it interprets reality. But the difference, the interpretation, carries
ideological motivation. It should be possible to recognize both the means by which
architecture maintains a certain distance from all that is outside architecture - the
specific use of the medium within an irreducible architectural modality - and the
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conditions that permit the existence of that distance. It is the historical conditions and
the theoretical transciptions of those conditions that I have been attempting to chart
here. And what I am now suggesting is that historical contingency and theoretical
specificity, as well as the artifact's persisting material particularity, must all be
considered as incorporated into the very fabric of the ADGB; they saturate the very
essence of the work.
This understood, and having traced Meyer's interpretation of the conjunction of
culture, politics, and form, a summary characterization of Meyer's early commenced
but never completed collapse of architectural practice into social production can now be
offered. At the Bauhaus, Meyer continued the process of shifting his activities from
those of an avant-garde artist to an active producer in social development. Between
1928 and 1930, there emerged work of a more "utilitarian" kind, the attributes of which
I have described. "Is our work to be determined from inside or ourside?" Meyer's
answer to his own question is clear, and it is a radical choice. What we witness here, it
seems to me, is a fundamential revision of the terms of architectural practice which -
rather than simply "applying" design to a given end, with all the inherited productive
relations involved with "being an artist" left intact, as it was with Gropius - is made in
an effort to anticipate the classic Marxist movement toward workers' control of
production as part of the transition from the capitalist state to socialism. Rather than
bending an already established practice to a given end, Meyer's shift at the Bauhaus
amounts to the abandonment of the notion of the resistant avant-garde artist in favor of
some other role, which we might call, following the Benjaminian model, "the artist as
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producer." 123 And yet, Meyer's work by 1927 had already anticipated, as I have
argued, within the logic offormal investigation, an ideological program which
remained central to his utilitarian work at the Bauhaus. Thus, even though Meyer
moves some distance from standard notions of the avant-garde artist, his position is
never entirely severed from its avant-garde heritage. This is important because it
demonstrates a double movement in the trajectory of his practice: a dialectic of internal
formal and external socio-cultural determinations. Seen in this light, the significant
factor for us is less Meyer's self-identification with a social revolution that could only
remain in the distant future than his understanding of the preconditions for achieving it:
namely, that a transformatory cultural practice must relate to an anticipated different
mode of production by changing its formal means, audience relations, and the
perceptual mechanisms for apprehending those forms accordingly.
The standard received interpretation of the successive historical shifts from
traditional representational form, to abstract and autotelic "modern" form, and then to
"utilitarian" or "functionalist" work -such as that of the Russian productivists, of the
neues bauen of Martin Wagner or Ernst May, or of Marxists like Mart Stam, Hans
Schmidt, and Meyer - is something like this: The ornamental, representational
qualities of the traditional architecture of, say, neoclassicism or the Beaux Arts are
historically contingent accretions on an idealized architecture which consists
fundamentally of abstract tectonic and spatial organizations, of compositions of pure
form and space. Renouncing traditional symbolic or representational form, as the
123Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer," in Benjamin, Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978)
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avant-garde artists and architects were supposed to have done, means that one is
producing an altogether diffferent kind of object - a nonrepresentational,
nonutilitarian, purely self-referential object of autonomous value. A utilitarian turn,
such as Meyer's in his work after 1926, for example, is then seen as substituting for
that essentially self-referential, aesthetic purpose, a nonaesthetic, functional, and social
one. All of which is to say that how we understand the theoretical validity of the
utilitarian turn or of functionalism generally rests upon a very particular interpretation of
the previous avant-garde formal strategies.
But the notion of avant-garde work as abstract, and nonrepresentational
architecture has been based on a reading of its forms and its modes of reception that is
too narrow; and the concommitant interpretation of Meyer's "functionalism" stands at
the end of a chain of wrong inferences. If my attempt to remap the trajectory of
Meyer's work according to a double movement of internal formal investigations derived
from avant-garde research and a direct confrontation of those external determinations of
psychic life under capitalism, which I have designated as reification and rationalization,
is correct, then Meyer's work, any of it, cannot be said to be nonrepresentational in any
but a reductive sense. The fact that Meyer's Co-op Vitrine or Co-op Zimmer, his
Petersschule or his Trade Unions building do not look like classical sculptures,
interiors, or buildings does not mean that nothing is represented. Architecture can
construct a physical world, or present arguments about the nature of the architectural
discipline, or narrate a vision about how we should live; in any case one is dealing with
representation. Meyer's work seeks to fulfill the aesthetic, ideological, and
protopolitical mission to recode the reified content of the objective, material world and
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to make it available for simultaneous collective reception on a subjective, aesthetic level.
The vestiges of the raw material of mechanical reproduction and reification remain
visible in Meyer's projects, constituting the materials out of which the historical subtext
of capitalist commodification could be constructed. At the same time, however, the
transmutation of the world and its data, in terms of perception as a semiautonomous,
performative activity, can be understood as an anticipatory representation of a future,
nomadic society and a future or utopian mode of production and reception which seek
to emerge from the hegemonic mode of production of the present. The possibility of
the concrete aesthetic representation of social development is the precondition for
Meyer's formal research having any moment at all.
This assertion can be verified in a kind of negative syllogism, borrowed from
Paul Wood.124 An important aspect in the transformation of the social relations of
production concerns the division of labor, as we have seen, and in particular that
between mental and manual labor. Workers' control of production functions as a sort
of bridge in a transitional period, prior to the future realization of socialism. During
such period of transition, when the workers' state has replaced the bourgeois state, the
status of specialists like artists and architects undergoes a fundamental change. While
such specialists are necessary to production both for capitalism and socialism, under the
former system they are placed in the hierarchy of production above the worker, and
under the workers' state the specialists are subservient to the collective will of the
workers. According to the Marxist account, if such a situation should come about
124Paul Wood, "Art and Politics in a Workers' State," a review of Christina Lodder's Russian
Constructivism in Art HisIor 8, no. 1 (March 1985)
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prematurely, the specialists could be expected to align themselves against the workers'
state. Overwhelmingly, this turned out to be true in Russia after October 1917, with
the exception of some of the constructivists and productivists, and it was also
analogously the case within the Bauhaus after 1923. That it was not so for Meyer may
indicate that his understanding of his own position was rather more astute than the
commonly accepted image of a naive radical aligning himself, more or less prudently,
with the bolsheviks, and emphasizing social concerns over "properly" architectural
ones. Indeed, Meyer's vision of the changed role of the architect is central to socialist
strategy, was held by him almost alone in the Bauhaus, and clearly stood counter to all
the implications of Bauhaus policy before 1928, with its emphasis on the autonomous
or managerial status of the designer.
Of course, the fulfillment of socialism is precisely what did not happen in
Germany in the late 1920's, and the good intentions of a few cultural workers,
however rigorously evolved in their own terms, could not make it so. And not by
chance Meyer eludes himself that he will find in the Soviet Union, in the country of
realized revolution, that which he had invoked in vain and showed to be impossible in
the old and decrepit Germany by now heading toward Nazism. In what Meyer himself
termed as a "flight into life," 125 he wrote, "I am going to work in the Soviet Union,
where a true proletarian culture is developing, where socialism was born, and where
there exists a society for which we, here, in a capitalist regime, have fought." 126
125Hannes Meyer, "Flucht ins Leben," in Bauen und Gesellschaft, 185
126Hannes Meyer, interview in Sovremennaya architektura 5 (Moscow, 1930); cited in Schnaidt, 27.
Like many radical artists and architects, Meyer would remain optimistic about the possibilities for the
Soviet Union long after it was warranted. See, especially, "Antworten auf Fragen der Prager
Architektengruppe 'Leva Fronta"' (1933), in Meyer, Bauen und Gesellschaft, 121 ff. The problem of
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My attempt here has not been to assert a unitary causal factor for Meyer's
production, certainly not an "ideological" or "political" one as against a "formal" one.
The important issue is awareness of the prejudices and preoccupations of
historiography: so that in the constellation of conditions surrounding any work, factors
that have been marginalized without warrent may once more be considered along with
those that have been foregrounded. In the case of Meyer's work, both the social and
the formal preoccupations are central to the project. It is more difficult, and more
important, to elucidate the relationship between these, now that in recent critical practice
they are so often held separate.
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Meyer's affiliation with Stalinism and those raised by his move to Mexico in 1939 cannot be dealt
with in this dissertation. Yet the point of such an analysis would be the same: to interrogate the
politics of form as well as politics and form.
The Bauhaus and the Radicalization of Building
253. Semester plan of study at the Bauhaus
under Hannes Meyer
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254. Walter Peterhans. "Hollow Concrete
Blocks,' 1929. The photograph was taken
on the construction site of the ADGB school
255. Hannes Meyer, Federal School of the
General Geman Trade Unions Federation
(ADGB), Bernau, 1928-30, site plan
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259. ADGB school, ground floor plan
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260. ADGB school, housing blocks during
construction
261. Housing blocks after completion
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264. Reading room
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IlIl. Reproduction and Negation:
the Cognitive Project of
Sachlichkeit
No firm criterion can draw the line between
a determinate negation of meaning and a bad
positivism of meaninglessness, as an
assiduous soldiering on just for the sake of
it. Least of all can such a line be based on
an appeal to human values, and a curse of
mechanization. Works of art which by their
existence take the side of the victims of a
rationality that subjugates nature, are even in
their protest constitutively implicated in the
process of rationalization itself. Were they
to try to disown it, they would become both
aesthetically and socially powerless: mere
clay. The organizing, unifying principle of
each and every work of art is borrowed from
that very rationality whose claim to totality it
seeks to defy.
Theodor Adorno, "Commitment," in Aesthetics and Politics, Perry Anderson, et al., eds. (London:
Verso, 1977), 191-92
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Reproduction and Negation: the Cognitive Project of Sachlichkeit
The twentieth-century avant-garde's critique of traditional modes of artistic production
and reception arises in a context of industrialized mass production. Mass production is
predicated on reproducible operations and objects, which in turn necessitates a
reconceptualization not only of the object (re)produced, but also of the relationships
between the object and its maker, and between the object and its reception. The
bourgeois humanist conception of the creating or viewing subject is one of a free,
active, autonomous, and unified personality appropriate for the freedoms of an
emergent capitalist society; and the formal ideologies of humanism reinforce this self-
created signification. But industrial capitalism also engenders acute anxieties deriving
from the chaotic metropolitan experience that challenge the viability of such a
conception. In order to criticize and dismantle the humanist subject and its mode of
artistic reception, the avant-garde draws upon certain negative aspects of the actual
experience of such subjects in industrial society and injects into bourgeois humanist
normality the alienating dissonances and contradictions that characterize rapid
industrialization in tension with the persistant but now anachronistic ideals of unity and
homology. 1 Industrial reproduction is in this sense constitutively involved in the avant-
garde's practice of negation. To illustrate this postulate through a reading of Hannes
Meyer's competition project of 1926-27 for the League of Nations and Ludwig
Hilberseimer's Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung of 19302 is the intention of this section.
1Hans Sedlmayer already lamented this "loss of center" in his Verlust der Mitte (Salzburg, 1948).
2 Throughout this essay I will follow the convention of referring to the author of the League of Nations
project as Hannes Meyer, even though Hans Wittwer surely played an important role in the design.
Meyer and Wittwer received one of nine third prizes in the controversial competition. Hilberseimer's
project was first prepared in 1928 and published in 1930 in Die Form.
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As an initial characterization of both these projects, I shall adopt a distinction
made by Peter BUrger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde. 3 BUrger argues that, rather
than merely to change received representational conventions, the major goal of the
historical avant-garde was to undermine and transform the very institution of art and its
ideology of autonomy. In BUrger's account the avant-garde was primarily an attack on
the "highness" of high art and its separateness from everyday life as it had evolved
under the precepts of nineteenth century aestheticism. BUrger suggests that the avant-
garde attempted to reintegrate art with social practice as a whole, or to use his
formulation, to sublate art into life.4
Such a distinction already permits a preliminary articulation of some of the
different programs within modernist practice, and allows a revaluation of the usual
equation of modernism with the avant-garde. Various transformations of the presumed
modernist paradigm have depended on the notion of a removed, inward, self-critical
and self-referential architectural practice, one in which autonomy is taken as a sign of
architecture's irreducible value as a high art. Moreover, the recurring idealist position
in architectural historiography - the successful suppression of everything that is hors
architecture in favor of strict formal analysis - stems from this same ideology of high
art.5 For the avant-garde to militate against this ideology, indeed, presupposed a
3Peter Barger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
4
"Sublation," as we have been using the concept here, is the English approximation of Hegel's
notoriously untranslatable term Aufhebung which means simultaneously "negation" and "preservation"
in a different, usually "redeemed," form.
5I am adapting Edward Said's analysis of the literary establishment (see his The World. the Text. and
the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983)) to architecture in suggesting that humanist
ideology has produced a profession of specialists, usually called historians of architecture, who have
claimed as their domain a limited field of affirmative formal connoisseurship. Operating entirely
within this domain, their formal analyses validate the work of architecture, the work validates the
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contemporaneous high art in commerce with a rather entrenched cultural establishment
and its claims to authentic aesthetic knowledge. The avant-garde sought to destroy this
myth of authenticity, to demystify and undermine the legitimizing discourse of the
dominant culture, whose ambition it was to salvage the purity of art from the
encroachments of technological modernization and mass industrialization. 6
An effort to exten the explication of some of these delegitimizing procedures
will involve us in a further discussion of the ways in which the avant-garde of the netie
Sachlichkeit problematized the notion of autonomous architectural form and the
concomitant centrality of the humanist subject. It will be helpful to begin the discussion
with an example of an interpretive method in which form is still seen as autonomous
and the subject remains at the center of meaning.
The cognitive project of humanist modernism
culture that produced it, and the culture validates the humanist historian. My point is that authority is
maintained by such consensus as well as as by repression.
6I am to some extent eliding Barger's analysis of the institution of art with that of architecture. Surely
these two institutions are distinct, but they are also related. The valorization of aesthetic judgment
dissociated from other realms of judgment and value is common to much of the historiography and
criticism of both disciplines. Ludwig Hilberseimer indicates the contemporaneous perception of the
close relationship between avant-garde artistic and architectural practices, and the commitment of both
to the life world in his article "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst" (1923), cited by Manfredo Tafuri in
"U.S.S.R. - Berlin, 1922: From Populism to 'Constructivist International,"' Joan Ockman et al.,
eds., Architecture. Criticism. Ideology (Princeton, 1985), 179-81, n. 89: "With great resolve, the
constructivists have traveled a new path. That of reality. In their first constructions, which were not
yet utilitarian, one can recognize a very clear will to take possession of the real. From construction in
painting the constructivists have moved on to the construction of objects. To architecture in the
broadest sense of the word. Constructivism is the logical consequence of methods of work that are
based on the collectivity of our time. Thus it has a base that is of a general rather than a subjective
nature. It perceives the subordination of art to society without reserve, as of all of life. It seeks its
elements in the expressions of our mechanized and industrialized time.... The constructivist method
brings any object into the ambit of formation. Not suppressing liveliness, but forming a reality."
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That architecture is deeply and inescapably enmeshed in the material world may,
on first reflection, hardly seem a contentious proposition. Yet a transcendent autonomy
is exactly the objective of humanist readings of architecture, even in their more
sophisticated and critical moments. For example, in their essay "Transparency: Literal
and Phenomenal," Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky concern themselves with
architectural form as "a continuous dialectic between fact and implication." 7 Rowe and
Slutzky demonstrate that the brute facts of physical organization can be presented with a
significant, inherent ambiguity such that those facts may be read in terms of competing
mental constructs. As an example, Rowe and Slutzky analyze Le Corbusier's League
of Nations project (figs. 301, 302) and the opposition it induces between the reality of
deep space and the implication of shallow space, "so that finally, by a series of positive
and negative implications, the whole area [of the project] becomes a monumental
debate, an argument between a real and deep space and an ideal and shallow one.8
Through the "argument" - the continuous fluctuation between alternative
interpretations - the building is experienced not as an inert, mute object, but as a topos
of meanings constituted by a process of cognitive differentiation.9
The consequences of this kind of cognitive project are important. First there is
a distinction between the real, unmediated object in time and space and the virtual object
of the mind, a distinction dependent on the capacity of the viewer who encounters the
7Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, "Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal," in The Mathematics of the
Ideal Villa and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 170; reprinted from Perspecta 8 (1963).8Ibid., 174.
9Rosalind Krauss discusses the at once liberating and tendentious imperatives of Rowe and Slutzky's
formalism in "Death of a Herneneutic Phantom: Materialization of the Sign in the Work of Peter
Eisenman," Architecture and Urbanism (January 1980): 189-219. I am indebted to her reading of the
Rowe and Slutzky text for my analysis here.
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real object to organize, reflect, and interpret. Yet in order to make sense of the
building, the viewer must have recourse to a set of ideal meanings of which he himself
is the generator; each individual must create a transcendental object that stands in some
kind of reciprocal relation to himself as a transcendental ego. The physical forms are
thus subsumed by their own contemplation, and the goal of this contemplation is the
constitution of an ideated, unified form. The intent is precisely to avoid any of the
worldly, circumstantial, or socially "contaminated" content of history, for such material
grounding would impinge upon the subject's interpretive freedom.
Rowe's and Slutzky's reading of Le Corbusier's League of Nations project is a
particularly cogent example of what might be called the cognitive project of humanism.
Without downgrading the technical brilliance and fruitfulness of this enterprise, I wish
to insist on its inadequacy as an understanding of modernism. The hegemony of such a
humanist ideology has created in the critical establishment a consensus based on a
restricted kind of formal analysis of "disinfected" objects. This effectively reconfirms
the culture enforcing these restrictions, blinding us to modernism's more anguished
occasions, its active engagements in material and ideological struggle. It is an
instructive coincidence that we can directly compare Hannes Meyer's most famous
design, his League of Nations project, to Le Corbusier's. In what follows I shall argue
that Hannes Meyer's League of Nations, as an engaged, avant-garde work, challenges
the cognitive project of humanism by problematizing the cognitive status of
autonomous form as well as the subject for which that form is a metaphor. I shall
maintain an attention to architectural form, but shall try to recast the formal logic by
which the avant-garde has conventionally been analyzed in order to include aspects of
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modernist practice that have been neglected or denigrated. Meyer's project redirects
our attention to those processes of modern life that lie beyond the individual subject,
and we can detect this critical attitude within the forms themselves.
This attitude is not, of course, unproblematic. Later in this section, Ludwig
Hilberseimer's Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung of 1930 will provide an illustration of the
ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this posthumanist avant-garde, of the internal
resistances to its self-declared forward movement, seeds of which are already present in
Meyer's project.
The operative technique in the cognitive project of the avant-garde is the practice
of negation 10 - the dismantling of architecture's formal conventions, the production
of ruptures and discontinuities, the repudiation of the individual author as the originator
of meaning, and the denial of the viewing subject a space apart from life in which the
mind is free to dream, to make its own connections, to escape. This practice of
negation proceeds by a number of specific strategies.
Factural indexicality
Meyer's.project comprises two related architectural propositions which follow
some of the procedures already ennunciated in the Petersschule. The first is a building
system of reiterative spatial and constructional cells (figs. 306-318) - part of an open-
10 The terminology "practice of negation" was suggested by T. J. Clark's "More on the Differences
between Comrade Greenberg and Ourselves,"in Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Serge Guilbaut, and David
Solkin, eds., Modernism and Modernity (Halifax: University of Nova Scotia Press, 1983). I have
modified Clark's concept according to the differences in the practices that he discusses and those of
Meyer and Hilberseimer, but I wish to reconfirm his assertion that negation is a constitutive part of
modernism.
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ended, nonhierarchical field of spatial and structural coordinates - coupled with plain,
tough, essentially modem building materials like "Eternit" (an asbestos cement cladding
used in place of a more honorific material like stone), steel, concrete, and glass, with
rubber flooring, cork-slab walls, and aluminum-sheet ceilings on the interior. 11 Such a
building system resists the appearance of having been manipulated or mediated by a
particular artistic personality or of having been fabricated for a particular (here
monumental) purpose. The spatial and constructional elements convey instead their
availability to society at large, and the fact that they are the result of certain modes of
production, reproducible for a wide variety of uses. It is difficult, then, to read the
building system as representational in any traditional, mimetic sense, or as having been
deformed according to some autonomously conceived formal necessity. With its
emphasis on the material congruence of the building system and the signification of the
work, with its incorporation of the technical means of its facture into the form of the
object itself, the work is, at least in part, a trace or direct registration of those materials
and procedures of reproduction from which it is constructed. As such, it tends to resist
assimilation in ideational terms, remaining obdurately external to subjective, aesthetic
comprehension. The subject must rather think through the causal structures and
processes operating behind the forms. I shall refer to this condition of the work of
architecture as itsfactural indexicality, by which I understand that the work points to
the (reproductive) processes of its making, seemingly generating its own representation
without authorial mediation.
11As Kenneth Frampton has pointed out, Meyer was careful to list the materials in his project
statement and to insist on the status of the project as "building" rather than "palace."
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The emphasis on the indexical status of the architectural object should be seen
as part of an important step within the general transformation of the avant-garde in the
1920s. Though Meyer surely courts a kind of positivism here, I do not intend to
construe his attitude as a deterministic understanding of architecture as index. What I
wish to suggest instead is that his strategy effectively serves to block any aesthetic
contemplation from a distance. At this point in the development of the avant-garde,
factural indexicality means more than an emphasis on the formal self-referentiality of
architecture, more than a coming to terms with its "medium" or its "constituent facts." 12
The indexical status of Meyer's project signifies nothing less than a rejection of any
transcendental conception of the architectural object in favor of a conception of
architectural practice as a worldly, engaged activity, a material intervention and
organizing force; as an indication of the potential involvement of the architect with
certain socially developed processes, materials, and standards of production that, in
turn, are identified with social revolution; and as an expression of a wish to take part in
the work of negation that is fundamental in other avant-garde practices, such as
constructivism and dadaism.
Compare, for example, Alexander Rodchenko's Hanging Construction (fig.
320), part of a series subtitled Surfaces Reflecting Light of 1921. The engagement of
the sculptural object with the viewer and the real world may be defined in terms of,
first, the kinetic potential of the construction - the reflective surfaces register the
changing movements of light, air, and touch - and second, the indexical status of the
121 am referring, of course, to Clement Greenberg's concept of medium and Sigfried Giedion's concept
of constituent facts.
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object - the serially organized form is a product of repetitive circular motions, a kind
of simulated mass-production emphasizing the causal relationship between the
sculptural sign and its referent of reproduction. What I am calling factural indexicality
is, then, perhaps analogous to one interpretation of the Soviet avant-garde's concern for
an indexical and textural faktura. As Benjamin Buchloh has written,
Quite unlike the traditional idea offattura orfacture in painting, where the
masterful facture of a painter's hand spiritualizes the mere materiality of the
pictorial production, and where the hand becomes at the same time the substitute
or the totalization of the identifying signature (as the guarantee of authenticity, it
justifies the painting's exchange value and maintains its commodity existence),
the new concern forfaktura in the Soviet avant-garde emphasizes precisely the
mechanical quality, the materiality, and the anonymity of the painterly procedure
from a perspective of empirico-critical positivism. It demystifies and
devalidates not only the claims for the authenticity of the spiritual and the
transcendental in the painterly execution but, as well, the authenticity of the
exchange value of the work of art that is bestowed on it by the first. 13
In his development of an architecture conceived according to a factural
indexicality with its basis in reproduction, Meyer must have learned from Soviet
experiments. Thus the rhetoric of his essay "Die neue Welt" of 1926 echoes
Constructivist concerns:
Instead of easel-work, we have the drafting machine. Instead of the French
horn, the saxophone. Instead of a copy of light reflections, we use light itself
to create with.... Instead of the sculptural imitation of movement, we have
13Benjamin Buchloh, "From Faktura to Factography," October 30 (1984): 87, n. 6.
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movement itself.... Instead of lyrics, we have the sound poem. Instead of the
novel, the short story. Instead of color tone, we have value of the color in
luxes. Instead of sculpture, we have construction. Instead of caricature,
photosculpture. Instead of drama, the sketch. Instead of opera, the revue.
Instead of frescos, the poster. Instead of painted material, the color of the
material itself. ("Painting without a brush" in itself calls for picture construction
for manual reasons)... The depreciation of all works of art is indisputable, and
there can be no question that the continued utilization of new and exact
knowledge in their place is merely a matter of time. The art of felt imitation is in
the process of being dismantled. Art is becoming invention and controlled
reality. And personality? The heart?? The soul??? Our plea is for absolute
segregation.14
Meyer's effort to define what he considers to be an adequate artistic sensibility
seems interminable; he pushes each signifying practice to its limits, where it turns back
into unworked material - tough, emphatic, worldly. The radical quality of Meyer's
approach, as of Rodchenko's, a quality continually perceived by audiences as an
aggression toward the architectural object's status as high art and toward the individual
or class for which that object is a metaphor, lies largely in factural indexicality as a
negational operation.
Exteriority
Meyer's League of Nations project seems prompted by the acute awareness that
neither the individual subject nor subjective attempts to recover the authenticity of the
object any longer have a place in the mass-industrialized city, by the acknowledgment
14Hannes Meyer, "Die neue Welt" (1926) in Schnaidt, Hannes Meyer 95.
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of the absolute incompatibility between the realm of mass culture as a socioeconomic
totality and the realm of contemplative inner experience. The second proposition of his
project thus involves a search for sense within a larger conception of the reality of the
metropolis, beyond interiority. Regarding this new frame of meaning, Meyer writes in
his essay "bauen,"
all things in this world are a product of the formula: (function times
economics).
so none of these things are works of art:
all art is composition and hence unsuited to a particular end.
all life is function and therefore not artistic.
the idea of the "composition of a dock" is enough to make a cat laugh!
but how is a town plan designed? or the plan of a dwelling? composition or
function? art or life????? building is a biological process. building is not an
aesthetic process....
architecture as an "embodiment of the artist's emotions" has no justification.
architecture as "continuing the building tradition" means being carried on the
tide of building history. 15
The statement is first an aggressively rhetorical, materialist refusal of
signification based on composition, a refusal of mimetic representation, of form itself.
Second, it is an explicit desire to integrate art with life, or to eliminate the need for art
from life, or, in either case, to deny a secondary level of aesthetic meaning beyond the
physical traces of rationalized building technique. For to be "carried on the tide of
15Hannes Meyer, "bauen" (1928), trans. in Schnaidt, 95. Original is in lower case letters.
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building history" is to conjoin building technique with emergent social needs. Meyer
does not seek to propose a set of physical notations that can produce a transcendental
object (the virtual object of a humanist reading) as their meaning; the architectural
elements articulate an available reproductive system rather than a self-involved object.
Moreover, history is posited as the driving force of this system. This disprivileging of
a preordained, static, aesthetic ideal in favor of a nexus of relationships between modes
of production and changing human needs means shifting architecture's meaning to the
outside, so to speak, where structure is no longer predicated on private, psychological
space but rather on public, conventional, cultural space.
We should recall here Walter Benjamin's insight that as one approaches those
mediums that are inherently multiple and reproducible, not only does the authenticity of
the object as a repository of meaning become reduced, but also the reproductive
technique as procedure takes on the features of a system of signification. In refusing
traditional representational forms, avant-garde architects reevaluated the logic of a
particular source of meaning; they did not deny meaning altogether. They saw meaning
as arising from the multiple forces of social practice rather than the formal qualities of
the auratic art object.
There are representational and formal consequences to this relocation of
meaning, nonetheless, and we are led now to consider them. As Meyer states about his
project,
Our League of Nations building symbolizes nothing. Its size is automatically
determined by the dimensions and conditions of the program. As an organic
building it expresses unfeignedly that it is intended to be a building for work
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and co-operation.... This building is neither beautiful nor ugly. It asks to be
evaluated as a structural invention. 16
The architect's polemical ambition is the automatic transcription of a socially
determined, empirical program into built form. The architect himself is only a
switching mechanism who sets in motion the processes of assembling an object made
up of use values and visual codes already consolidated by society, thereby negating the
controlling action of the artist as the determination of the architectural signification. To
this end, Meyer deploys a number of strategies to redirect the cognitive project away
from the production of ideated figures or formal unities.
First, the overall configuration is organized in relation to vehicular movement
around and through the building (figs. 304, 305), with the pilotis of the assembly
building (fig. 306) accommodating the access and storage of automobiles, 600 all
together, six times the number required by the competition program. The vehicular
provision also serves, along with the multiple elevator banks (figs. 306, 307), to
categorize and distribute types of users of the building - personnel, journalists,
delegates, and the general public. Furthermore, in spite of a competition program with
an appendix of ten photographs showing the site's grandeur and pastoral qualities,
Meyer's drawings, with their black shadows and depersonalized line work (figs. 303,
304), deliberately refuse the natural site conditions. Instead the project declares itself to
be involved in the quotidian but dynamic, mechanized world of which the automobile is
the primary agent. If in Le Corbusier's project one senses the attempt to isolate the
16Hannes Meyer, "Projekt far den Vb1kerbundpalast, Genf, 1928," in Schnaidt, 25.
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architectural object in nature (fig. 301), its true ambience being somehow different from
the randomly organized, gritty world of driving and parking, the consequence of
Meyer's basic organization is to insist that the building is continuous with this space of
the world and dependent on it for its existence. 17
Moreover, unlike Le Corbusier's project with its central axis and stratification
of spaces - "the essence of that phenomenal transparency" articultated by Rowe and
Slutzky (fig. 302) - Meyer's project is egregiously decentered and dissymetrical.
Disparate architectures, abutting or nesting, articulate themselves from the same tectonic
system (figs. 310, 316, 317). The discreteness of the two halves of the building, the
secretariat tower and assembly hall (figs. 309, 311), declares the absence of any
underlying formal armature that might in turn engender a series of spatial emanations.
The cognitive map that a centralizing datum or ground would normally provide is
thereby obstructed, and tension, contradiction, and difference define the relationships
between elements.
Intensifying this perception within each of the two main halves of the building
is the renunciation of a compositional device that would organize the diverse parts into a
coherent unit, thus further exaggerating differences within the system. The general
tendency in the fundamental building system toward an atomization of tectonic parts
belonging to a larger but indeterminate whole is supported and developed by a
secondary level of architectonic elements - agglomerations of skylighted commission
rooms, lecture rooms, offices, a restaurant, and a library; movement systems like the
17Cf. Kenneth Frampton, "The Humanist versus the Utilitarian Ideal," Architectural Design 38(1968): 134-36.
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glazed stairways, elevators, and "toboggan" emergency ramps; and information-
disseminating devices like radio antennae and illuminated sky signs (figs. 303, 316,
317). The unstable syntax of these elements is determined by their specific functional
relations, "automatically" superimposed on the general system; their semantics arise
from the mass-cultural, industrial city itself - plain, factorylike, porous, unyielding.
"No pillared reception rooms for weary monarchs but hygienic workrooms for the busy
representatives of their people. No back corridors for backstairs diplomacy but open
glazed rooms for the public negotiations of honest men." 18 Local symmetries and
unities are deployed in elevation and plan but with disjunctive relationships to one
another. Thus, articulations within the lattice of the elevations are made to seem
randomly distributed over the surface, the stepped plan profile to seem aleatory and
open-ended, and the architectural elements completely detachable and rearrangeable.
To be sure, substantial formal decisions have been made by the architect, but with the
effect that we conceive the building not as an integral formal organism but as an
assemblage of architectural particularities, each clashing with the other, defined wholly
in terms of their separate functional and material life. The body of the building thus
contorts to assume the forms cast upon it by the forces of the city.
Finally, Meyer resists as far as possible the creation of any processional space
that might result in a monumental unity. The classification of users by parking pattern
at ground level allows him to rely on vertical modes of access to all floors above; the
interjection of various banks of elevators at strategic points in the plan affords direct
access to the vestibules located between the wings of the secretariat or around the
18Meyer, "Projekt far den Volkerbundpalast, Genf," 29.
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periphery of the auditorium (fig. 307). Spaces of reception and passage are pushed to
the perforated perimeter in a general avoidance of closure and containment. The viewer
walking through the building finds himself always in residual spaces, in the gaps
between the primary spatial units, compelled to move, constantly differentiating and
recombining spatial experiences, but only in pieces, and only in time.
How can we characterize overall the strategies deployed by Meyer? In what is
still the most convincing interpretation of Meyer's League of Nations project, Kenneth
Frampton suggested,
Meyer sought to express his egalitarianism through the repetition of a standard
structural module, part of an infinite field of coordinates. On this field his
structural arrangement would arise in much the same manner as the 'image'
came into being on a Mondrian canvas. The Platonic element for Meyer was the
structural grid.19
Such an analogy means to claim for the League of Nations project a spatial
order that arises from an a priori mental construct; it further implies an equivalence of
signification between form and simple utility. While the analogy is helpful, I would
like to offer an alternative one, which sees the reiterative building system and its
relationship to the functional units as comparable to a dada photomontage, 20 with the
bits and fragments of the real world registered on its blank page. The analogy derives
19Frampton, 135. This is an early formulation; Frampton revises it in his later publications.
20For a more thorough explication of dada photomontage and the practice of negation, see my
"Photomontage and Its Audiences, Berlin, circa 1922," Harvard Architecture Review 6 (1987).
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from the fact that both Meyer's system and photomontage induce the perception of a
condition of exteriority.21
Ordinarily we discover meaning in an architectural object or on a pictorial
surface by claiming some sense from the outside world and constructing a unified,
integral image of that world within the object or on the surface - a kind of surrogate
for the perceiving subject, a metaphor for the integral self. But in dada photomontage
what we experience more than a unified surface or pictorial whole are the fissures and
gaps between disjunctive representations, and the interferences between signs from
different systems (fig. 322). The dada surface does not allow us to impute to it any
formal unity that we can press into service inward; rather it registers each of a series of
intruder objects, securing them in isolation, holding each within a condition of
separateness and difference. Such an atomization of material is governed by a system
of meaning that is extra-objective. Thus, the dada photomontage, like Meyer's
building, is less significant as an object than as a procedure. As Walter Benjamin has
written, "What [the dadaists] achieved was a relentless destruction of the aura of their
creations, which they branded as reproductions with the very means of production." 22
The medium of photomontage exactly suffices dada's destructive, negational
task. It draws its material from those enunciative formations - such as advertising,
2 1The principle of exteriority is derived from Michel Foucault. "[This principle] holds that we are not
to burrow to the hidden core of discourse, to the heart of the thought or meaning manifested in it;
instead, taking the discourse itself, its appearance and its regularity, that we should look for its external
conditions of existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series of events and fixes its limits."
From "The Discourse on Language," translation of L'ordre du discours (Paris, 1971) by Rupert Swyer,
reprinted as an appendix to Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, 1972), 229.
22Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations (New
York: Schocken, 1969), 238.
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journalism, and mass production - that were already consolidated by society, just as
Meyer uses mass-produced constructional ready-mades widely available for building.
Dada photomontage exaggerates the chance accretion of fragments of manufactured
experience, just as Meyer exaggerates the "automatic" accumulation of diverse
functions. By showing reality sequentially and decomposed - one thing after another
and one thing external to another - dada destroys the image of simultaneous presence
that is a metaphor for the integral psyche. Dada montage exhausts, overwhelms the
individual subject by constituting another place, another history, another way of
thinking beyond the self, more powerful than the self. Exteriority, then, is this
displacement of sense outward; and dada photomontage is precisely this exteriority
given form, a topos of negation and estrangement.
Meyer's League of Nations project involves a more structured, perhaps more
abstract version of the notion of exteriority. The architectural medium is understood as
a construct encoding sociopolitical and economic processes and functions in the real
world that are wholly in place before either the architect or the viewer encounters them,
reproducing them for the benefit of the world and according to conditions set by and in
the world. The analysis of Meyer's building, then, cannot proceed by means of a
reduction of the complex form to a simple, unified diagram orparti. The building
should rather be seen as a marking or trace of a larger, more complex totality - dense,
quotidian, aleatory, exceeding individual, intuitive grasp. This is precisely the same
exteriority that dada photomontage and Meyer's Co-op factography traces. Thus
Meyer's functional markings come to us as a succession of units, as if from the
unreeling of those larger cultural processes, a serial progression of separate integers
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whose differences are not mediated by composition but rather revealed by an
architecture conscious of the irreducibility of its disjunctions. Like the dada
photomontage, Meyer's building presents itself less as an object than a multilayered
field of convergence for the forces and signs of the mass-industrial city.
In pointing to certain attitudes common to Meyer and the dadaists, I do not
intend to attribute to either an unself-consciousness with regard to form, but rather to
query the grounds on which their formal manipulations are made. The works of Meyer
and the dadaists reflect a wry, derisive awareness of the normative humanist subject
they deface and of the humanist ideology of autonomy they renounce. Just as the dada
photomontage adheres to the bourgeois artistic convention of presenting a unique,
fabricated, rectangularly framed object even as it subversively injects into the
singularity of that object the reproduced and dispersed images of bourgeois culture, so
Meyer is driven toward conventional ways of architectural sense-making that are at
once unacceptable to him but inescapable, vestiges of humanist perceptions that have
become progressively empty but continue to exert their force. A whole tradition of
representation is in crisis, but the search for meaning is not abandoned. That
contradiction, that search, I believe, is what drove Meyer toward an insurrectionary
participation in the discipline of architecture, toward architecture as social practice.
The radical quality of Meyer's modernism lies in the difficult truth that things
are just what they are, utterly shorn of any metaphysical illusions of artistic
authenticity, unity, or depth. Suspicious of subjectivity and the unified whole in which
subjectivity affirms itself, the League of Nations project is a reaction against the very
idea of an autonomous work of art, a refusal of the very possibility of the architectural
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masterpiece existing in and for itself. With the renunciation of the organizational value
of a purely internal formal necessity, the concept of the work as a self-involved object
is shattered. The work no longer presents an unbroken and homogeneous appearance,
no longer stands complete and suspended, as it were, against the world, but rather falls
into the world, becoming one worldly thing (Sache) among others. The boundaries
between the facts of modern society and aesthetic production are thereby dismantled,
and that production returned to its unprivileged place within the totality of social
practices.
The deconstruction of functionalism
Within the discourse of Sachlichkeit, the architectural avant-garde in the late
1920s was to rationalize its program in terms of overcoming the dialectic between
whole and part already formulated by Meyer, between the totality of the city and the
elementary cell. In his Groszstadtarchitektur of 1927, Ludwig Hilberseimer writes,
The architecture of the metropolis depends essentially on the solution given to
two factors: the elementary cell and the urban organism as a whole. The single
room as the constituent element of the habitation will determine the aspect of the
habitation, and since the habitations in turn form blocks, the room will become
a factor of urban configuration, which is architecture's true goal. Reciprocally,
the planimetric structure of the city will have a substantial influence on the
design of the habitation and the room.23
23 Ludwig Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur (Stuttgart: Verlag Julius Hoffmann, 1927).
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The metropolis for Hilberseimer is a complex homeostatic machine. The
reproducible elements at the molecular level - each identical in size and shape, without
a priori determined points of focus or termination - translate and relay information
received from the global structure of the city, even as these same elements are, in turn,
the prime constitutive units of that structure. The abolition of the gap between the
urban order and the individual cell eliminates the possibility of attributing significance
to the act of selecting or arranging forms. The auratic architectural object is
systematically and utterly defeated by techniques of reproduction now radically
rationalized and expanded.
From this analysis comes Hilberseimer's Hochhausstadt project of 1924 (fig.
323),24 which he reproduces in his Groszstadtarchitektur. It is a project menaced with
ambiguity. As a first characterization, it may be construed as an attempt at a complete
encoding, within the conventions of architectural representation, of the condition of
exteriority. The most striking aspect of Hilberseimer's perspective drawings is their
quality of persistance - the relentless repetition of the same cellular blocks without any
climax, seemingly without any personality having given them form or direction,
without subjectivity (excepting, perhaps, some vestigial anguish for the suppressed
subject in the drawing's texture, size, and above-eye-level vanishing point). The
formerly self-constituting subject, now disencumbered of all remnants of independent
personality, no longer attends, reflects, or organizes; Hilberseimer's perspective is not
the same "view" one has in a humanist perspective where the form of representation
functions as a system of knowledge organized around and for the viewer's own
24The project was first published in Die Form, 1926.
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centrality. The subject - still a concrete individual, but at the same time part of a more
general, collective human substance, a component in a larger totality of interlocking
mechanical processes and social institutions - is now constituted by the system. And
the subject's conscious experience of interpretation (which used to correspond to its
ability to reason and reflect) becomes little more than a process of acknowledging the
extension of a code, tracing the external network of socioeconomic and historical
circumstances that determine and manipulate the subject, recognizing that the network
exists beyond the present moment and that one will, in the course of one's movement
through the world, come into contact with further aspects of it.
On this view, Hilberseimer's project carries to completion a latent tendency in
Meyer's work toward an overdetermination of all elements, but, in contrast to Meyer,
results in an abolition of contingencies, an assimilation or absorption of all particularity
in the raw material into the totalizing structure of the work itself. In Hilberseimer's
own words, "the general case and the law are emphasized and made evident, while the
exception is put aside, the nuance canceled."25
Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that while Hilberseimer's total unification of
repetitive cells and the global structure of the city may have been effective in shifting
architectural meaning from the aesthetic realm to a deeper logic of the socioeconomic
metropolis itself, the architect as hard put to find in this logic a source for invention. It
risks little to assert that from the time Hilberseimer committed himself to the totalization
announced in the Hochhausstadt, his work virtually ceased to develop and instead
became involved with radical repetition. Thus he could propose only the same
25Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur
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organization for hisVorschlag zur City-Bebauung of 1930 (fig. 325) as he had for his
Hochhausstadt of 1924, and for Chicago as he had for Berlin (fig. 326).26 In 1926
and '27, Hilberseimer exhibited a project for a tower made of six of his fifteen-story
buildings, now stacked (fig.327). 27 That Hilberseimer should have maneuvered
himself into this particular position is quite interesting. For we are led to focus on the
apparent fact that logically, axiomatically, such a totalizing organization - one in
which the productive, causal source of signification is based on reproduction - can
only be repeated.28
The case is made dramatically in Hilberseimer's Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung
of 1930 (fig.325). To begin with there are the anti-illusionisitic strategies of the
axonometric drawing; the margin of the drawing cuts the outer blocks, and the letters of
the title are placed within the margins of the image in such a way as to suppress all
effect of depth. But what I wish to concentrate on is the insertion in the drawing of
what is apparently a variant scheme. The drawing with its insertion becomes a kind of
mise-en-abime, for the variant is simply an axonometric reproduction of the
Hochhausstadt of 1924 (!), and its insertion places within the field of the representation
another representation reduplicated by the first. The insertion serves to focus our
attention precisely on the absence of origins.
2 6The Berlin application was published in Die Form, 1930.
2 7 The model was exhibited at the Ausstellung der freie Wohlfahrtspflege in Dsseldorf in May-October
1926, and in Stuttgart in May-June 1927.
28For this analysis of the nonoriginality of origins, I am indebted to Rosalind Krauss's discussion of
the pictorial grid in "The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition," Octobe 18
(1981): 47-66.
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What we witness in this mise-en-abime is nothing less than a subtle
deconstruction of the notion of function as the origin of architectural form. The notion
of functionalism - the originary status of the brute, objective facts of utility
intersecting with measured, standardized means of production - has been supposed to
provide a fundamental demarcation within modern architecture, one made manifest by
Sachlichkeit. Yet Hilberseimer's drawing makes it clear that the originary status of
function is a fiction.
Between the multilayered functions within the city, the means of production,
and the architectural form that is supposed to be their product, there does not obtain the
determined correspondence necessary for a notion of origin. On the one hand, the
serial cellular organism that constitutes Hilberseimer's city follows the implacable logic
of the city's production cycles. But it is not transparent to those cycles. It is rather a
tissue of representation that reveals only their most salient contours. Hilberseimer's
project organizes a metaphor for the city's own productive and functional procedures,
mediating those procedures through the conventions of architectural form, and thus
effectively truncating the complex technical, social, and economic conditions that
produced it, concealing the "real" origins of its formation by displacing them with a
substitute - an irreducibly architectural form.
Therefore, on the other hand, the form also precedes the functional and
productive factors. Behind Hilberseimer's representation, his system of signs, are all
those other representations through which the city's activities and production - its
material life - are necessarily described. To the extent that it is architecture,
Hilberseimer's project is inscribed in a particular field of representations that is already
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constituted as architectural; his project summarizes other projects, only the most
obvious of which is his own. Whatever sense we make of the project has to do with
our use of conventions of meaning that allow us to sort the architectural elements into
significance. Hilberseimer's architecture thus does not (cannot) absolutely correspond
to material life, but rather translates it from one sign system (socioeconomic) into
another (architectural). Sachlichkeit, however much it resisted a basis in form, was
brought into play with formal metaphors, with the architectural medium in all its
quiddity as a vehicle for certain senses, qualities, and values: architecture seen as the
production of material life, as function. Hilberseimer's drawing demonstrates
peremptorily that form can only follow function when function has first been
interpreted as a possibility of form.
Within the discourse of modem architecture the originary status of function as a
generator of form and of the active human subject as a generator of meaning have been
presumptions upon which corollaries of authenticity, affirmation, and fullness and
communicability of meaning are based. The analysis here leads us to suggest that it is
within an altogether different realm that a definition of the historical avant-garde might
be found - in the realm where naive functionalism and the self-constituted subject are
both defeated by the coupling of reproduction and negation.
The negation of negation
Hilberseimer's ultimate solution is not, however, without further inherent
contradictions. The characterization of Hilberseimer's system as "total" deliberately
emphasizes the term of affiliation of his project with an emerging tendency in the
287
Reproduction and Negation: the Cognitive Project of Sachlichkeit
socioeconomic structure of the modem world toward radical systematization, a
tendency of which fascist political regimes have been only the most malevolent
manifestation. 29 If Hilberseimer's drawing comprises a sign system for an external
network of socioeconomic and historical circumstances, it does so at a particular
moment in the historical development of these circumstances. For in the later stages of
monopoly capitalism all the multiplicity and particularity of activities - of production,
distribution, and reception - are rationalized into a single all-absorbing mechanism.
And with Hilberseimer's project, so radically linked to the mindset of modernization,
this new totalitarian planification of the public realm is operative in the structure of the
work of architecture itself. In his drawing all dissonances and disjunctions are
absorbed, all differences canceled; the metropolis described here does not permit
alternatives. The project is not simply an available, neutral matrix in which monopoly
capitalism might incidentally play itself out, absorbing all things, people, and thought
into a single-market system; it is itself a form of that system. Now a constraint more
than a liberating convention, Sachlichkeit's ambition of negation turns back on itself,
reentering the work as its opposite - as ideology, as fixed patterns of form, action,
and thought, as hypostatized rationalism.
The disintegrating ambiguity of Hilberseimer's work stands in poignant parallel
to the disintegration of Weimar Germany and its passage into fascism. This is the crisis
of modernist culture itself: adversarial, as we saw with Meyer, but in its drive toward a
291 was led to this understanding of Hilberseimer through a reading of Theodor Adorno's analysis of
Schoenberg in The Philosophy of New Music.
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total organization of the city, conceptually and practically bound up with capitalist
modernization and its consequences.
Perhaps I can make my the foregoing points clearer by making my judgment
more explicit. It is the relentlessness of Meyer's practice of negation that is admirable
and, I believe, still a viable project for architectural practice - his annihilation of the
traditional, hegemonic repertoire of traditional representational form, his fragmentation
of form and registration of dissonances, and his shattering of the basis of traditional
artistic totalization, the contemplative subject. The problem remains, however, that the
process of negation tends in the long run to overwhelm avant-garde practice; it quickly
becomes cumulative and uncontrollable. 30 Thus, Hilberseimer's work, identifying too
completely with the processes and structures of modernization and its promise of
progress, is absorbed in the totalization of monopoly capital, ironically becoming the
very form of totalization that Meyer sought to avoid through his critical assertion of
radical fragmentation. Without straying from the terrain of architecture, the avant-garde
finds itself deeply implicated in a struggle between adversarial negation and affirmation
of the structure of totalitarian society.
Avant-garde practice is predicated on reproduction as negation, a strategy that is
inscribed in the very forms in which others would find synthesis and reintegration or
self-delighting formal play. In avant-garde practice negation appears not as a
redemptive effort that blazes the way for a new fullness of meaning, but rather as an all-
encompassing fact, pulling like an undertow, ultimately swallowing meaning
altogether. To pierce through negation is to find, on one side, emptiness, and, on the
30Cf. Clark, "More on the Differences," 185.
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other, totalization: this is the dilemma the avant-garde confronted constantly, the terms
of which it tried constantly to refuse.
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301. Le Corbusier, League of Nations
project, 1926-27,
302. Rowe-Slutzky diagram of Le
Corbusier's League of Nations project
291
- --- -1-1----A ----
Reproduction and Negation: The Cognitive Project of Sachlichkeit
303. Hannes Meyer, League of Nations
project, 1926-27, preliminary axonometric
293

Reproduction and Negation: The Cognitive Project of Sachlichkeit
'4-..-
'ii----
1~
304. League of Nations, site plan
305. Hans Wittwer, League of Nations,
preliminary sketch
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306. League of Nations, ground plan
307. Mezzanine plan
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308. View of south elevation of model
(model constructed for 1989 exhibition)
309. South elevation
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310. View of north elevation of model
311. North elevation
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312. View of west elevation of model
313. West elevation
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314. View of east elevation of model
315. East elevation
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316. View of model, southeast
317. View of model, northwest
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320. Alexander Rodchenko, Spatial
Constructions
321. Alexander Rodchenko, Hanging
Construction
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322. Hannah Hoch, Cut with the Kitchen
Knife, photomontage, 1919
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323. Ludwig Hilberseimer, Hochhausstadt
project, 1924, perspective
324. Paul Klee, Room Perspective with
Inhabitants, 1921
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325. Hilberseimer, Vorschlag zur
Citybebauung, 1930; (a) axonometric with
insert of alternative scheme, (b) plan
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326. Hilberseimer, project for the
construction of a city applied to the center of
Berlin, 1928, photomontage
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327. Hilberseimer standing before a model
of a tower made of six fifteen-story
buildings from the "Welfare City" project,
1927
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IV. Ludwig Hilberseimer
and the Inscription of
the Paranoid Subject
Interjection
Herr Bertolt Brecht maintains: a man is a man.
And that is something anyone can prove.
But then, Herr Bertolt Brecht also proves
That one can do as much as one likes with a person.
Here this evening, a man will be reassembled like a car
Without losing anything in the process.
The man will be approached humanely
He will be requested firmly, without vexation
To accomodate himself to the course of the world
And to let his private fish swim away.
And no matter what he is remodeled into,
In doing so no mistake has been made.
One can, if we do not watch over him,
also make him overnight into our butcher.
Herr Bertolt Brecht hopes that you will see the ground
On which you stand disappear like snow under your feet
And that you will notice about the packer Galy Gay
That life on earth is dangerous.
Bertolt Brecht, "Mann ist Mann," Erste Sticke, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1953),
229-20
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Within the discourse of modernism has developed a critical practice, associated with an
ongoing tradition of humanism, which confines a "correct" reading of an architectural
object to an acceptance of the position from which the settled unity of the immanent
characteristics of the object has precedence over its unsettling external historical and
ideological determinants: the position of a transcendental subject. Recent critical theory
has challenged this increasingly apparent stasis in humanist thinking from an
antihumanist vantagepoint that is definitively tied to a postmodernism in which the
intrinsic uncertainty and disunity of processes of signification are stressed. 1 It has been
my argument in the preceeding sections of this thesis that a rigorous antihumanist
trajectory can be found historically within modern architecture. At this point, however,
I wish to begin to elaborate the suggestion of section III that certain points along such a
trajectory prove at times to be less unambiguously fruitful than one might hope. For
the decoding and dismantling of the older forms of experience, such as the transcendent
or the sacred, and the substitution of new forms of standardization, reification, and
planification of both subject and object pose crippling problems for architectural pratice.
1Jacques Derrida, for example, criticizes the postulation of an untouchable transcendental center outside
the structure of a system of signification, which does the structuring: "...the structurality of
structure... has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or
referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was... above all to make
sure that the orgainizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call thefreeplay of the
structure... the center closes off the freeplay it opens up and makes possible.... it has always been
thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure
which governs the structure, while escaping structurality... The center is at the center of the totality,
and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality... the totality has its center elsewhere.... With
this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being
implicated in the game...." Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences," in Structuralist Controversy , ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1972), 247-48. To Derrida's critique of structuralism, one could add
Foucauldian and Lacanian scholarship and criticism as examples of what I am calling postmodern
antihumanism.
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And modernism's various attempts to invent new and elaborate, desacralized and
critical formal strategies with which to figure, if not resolve, what seemed to be the
utter incompatibility between the emerging social structure and individual lived
experience are each differently marked by their immersion into a radically discontinuous
and fragmenting reality.
The orders of those strategies range from structural intimations of a classless
society of prehistory - of which the work of Hannes Meyer is an example - to the
lingering phenomenological spaces of the now threatened bourgeois private subject -
of which the work of Adolf Loos is, I have argued, an example - to the decentering
and complete dispersion of this last. The different forces of the two latter
stigmatizations can be felt (once again, perhaps) in the comparison of two such attempts
at figuration with which I begin this section.
After looking closely at the formal characteristics of Hilberseimer's
posthumanist architecture in this first part - its less than consequential circuit of signs
- we will want to return in the second part to the question of the status of the subject
as inscribed by Hilberseimer in his theoretical writings, especially on expressionism
and dadaism. It will then emerge that the ambiguity and dissolution found in his
architectural representations are not at all inconsistent with the crisis of humanist
subjectivity which they ultimately represent. Finally, in the last part of this section, I
shall attempt to bring together Hilberseimer's formal research with his theorization of
the subject in the place from which both arise: the special context of Weimar Germany.
My argument will be that hovering, depleted architectural signs Hilberseimer puts forth
are contradictorily conceived. They are at once ciphers of an as-yet-unachieved utopia
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and historical productions of the special and especially anguished sensibility of Weimar
culture. They are a defense against the reality from which they emerge and an attempt
to construct another reality from the hidden (or repressed) signs of the first. In this, I
shall argue, they share the cognitive structure of paranoia, though I will have to go
some way in my analysis before I wil be able to substantiate this claim. Nevertheless,
the neutralization of subject and object on which this paranoia is predicated has already
been glimpsed in the total unification of architecture and the rationalized socioeconomic
structure of the city as analyzed in the previous section. Because the figures of
redemption can no longer be thought from within the concept of individual human
agency, Hilberseimer must posit their forms in external aesthetic objects generated by
supraindividual forces. These objects have the appearance of wholeness, but it is the
wholeness of a totally administered world. In this section of the thesis the corrosive
consequences of Hilberseimer's totalization will be charted.
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The Crisis of Humanism
and the Dissolution of the Object
The rather startling images of Mies van der Rohe's 1919-1922 skyscraper projects
(figs. 401, 403, 404, and 405) comprise two basic architectural strategies. One is a
building surface qualified no longer by patterns of shadow on an opaque material but
by the reflections and refractions of light by glass. The other is a building form
conceived not in terms of separate, articulated masses related to one another by some
measurable grid, but as a complex unitary volume that does not permit itself to be read
as emanating from a purely internal formal logic.2 With these two related propositions
Mies put into crisis the cognitive status of the humanist object and the corresponding
conception of the subject as an ideal, unified, centered monad contemplating the
abstract unity of that object.
Against the autonomous formal object of humanism - in which the viewer can
grasp in purely mental space an antecedent logic, decipering the relationships between
its parts and connecting every part to a coherent formal theme - the alternative posited
2Though the revelation of the steel structure of the skyscraper has often been emphasized, Mies himself
verifies the importance of viewing the shimmering glass wall and the registration of the contingencies
of the site over the demonstration of the building's skeleton. He writes, "My efforts with an actual
glass model helped me to recognize that the most important thing about using glass is not the effects
of light and shadow, but the rich play of reflection.... A superficial examination might suggest that
the curved outline of the plan is arbitrary. This was determined, however, by a concern for the
illumination of the interior, for the massing of the building as viewed from the street, and for the play
of reflections. The only fixed points of the plan are adjusted to the needs of the building and designed
to be carried out in glass." Mies van der Rohe, "Hochhaus Projekt fUr Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse in
Berlin," Froilicht 1 (Summer 1922): 122-24
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by Mies is an object intractable to decoding by an analysis of what is only immanent
and apparent. The glass curtain wall - alternately transparent, reflective, or refractive
depending on light conditions and viewing positions - absorbs, mirrors, or distorts
the immediate, constantly changing images of city life, and foregrounds the context as a
physical and conceptual frame for understanding the building. And if our reading of
Mies's project is thus far largely phenomenological, it is that very phenomenological
reality of the metropolis that throws humanist conceptions of the subject into question,
even as it is the vestiges of humanist thought that allow the reality to be gauged as
unsatisfactory.
An interpretation of the phenomenal context of the Friedrichstrasse is offered by
Georg Grosz in a drawing of 1918 (fig. 402). The drawing recalls Simmel's
description of the Nervenleben of the metropolis and the fetishization of its products as
"the intensification of nervous stimulation" resulting from the "rapid crowding of
changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance, and the
unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are the psychological conditions
which the metropolis creates." The typical consequence of this Nervenleben, according
to Simmel, is a blase attitude - a blunting of discrimination, an indifference to value, a
general languor.
In this phenomenon the nerves find in the refusal to react to their stimulation the
last possibility of accommodating to the contents and forms of metropolitan life.
The preservation of certain personalities is bought at the price of devaluating the
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whole objective world, a devaluation which in the end unavoidably drags one's
own personality down into a feeling of the same worthlessness. 3
This is the reality reflected in the surface of Mies's skyscraper, and the context it
focuses and disturbs. The convex, faceted surfaces are perceptually contorted by the
invasion of circumstantial images, while the reflection each concavity receives on its
surface is that of its own shadow, creating gaps which exacerbate the disarray. These
surface distortions accompany and accentuate the formal inscrutability of the volumetric
configuration. It is impossible, for example, to reduce the whole to a number of
constituent parts related by some internal armature or transformed through some formal
operation; indeed, no such compositional relationships exist. Neither is it possible to
explicate the object as a deflection from some formal type; Mies has rejected the
meanings that such mimetic design methods tend to promote. The very body of the
building contorts to assume the form demanded by the contingent configuration of the
site and to register the circumstantial images of the context. Mies thus invests meaning
in a sense of surface and volume that the building assumes in a particular time and
place, in a contextually qualified moment, continuous with and dependent upon the
world in which the viewer actually moves. This sense of surface, severed from the
knowledge of an internal order or a unifying logic characteristic of humanist
architecture, is enough to wrench the building from the atemporal, idealized realm of
3Georg Simmel, "Die Grossstidte und das Geistesleben" (Dresden, 1903); translated as "The Metropolis
and Mental Life," in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (New York:
The Free Press, 1950), 409-24.
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autonomous form and install it in a specific situation in the real world of experienced
time, open to all the chance and uncertainty of life in the metropolis.
Mies here exemplifies what we have already seen to be the central strategy of
antihumanist thought: against the a priori categories of rational understanding, in which
the mind is supposed to have a preformed and permanent structure that parcels out the
objects of experience, it is now the temporal, historically developed, and irrational
structure of society which is determinant. Adorno - rewriting Marx's dictum that
philosophy is not a "matter of logic" (Sache der Logik), but the "logic of the matter"
(Logik der Sache) - puts the point succinctly: "The fetish character of commodities
[the reality of the metropolis] is not a fact of consciousness, but dialectic in the eminent
sense that it produces consciousness." 4 For Adorno, as for Mies, the renunciation of
humanist subjectivity is consequent to an act of "immersion in particularity," 5 of the
subject giving itself over to the object (in Mies's case the city), which leads not to the
subject's self-discovery but to the discovery of a social structure in a particular
historical configuration. Yet Adorno further insists that the subject, though it yields to
the object, does not leave it unchanged. Rather the subject actively and interpretively
rearranges the elements of reality in an "exact fantasy,"6 as if to pin down and register
4Theodor Adorno, in a letter to Walter Benjamin of 1935, in Adorno, OJber Walter Benjamin (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 112
5Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973
[orig. German 1966]), 286Adorno called "an exact fantasy" of reality a "fantasy which abides within the material which the
sciences present to it, and reaches beyond them only in the smallest aspects of their arrangement:
aspects, granted, which fantasy itself must originally generate." Theodor Adorno, "Die Acktualitlt der
Philosophie" (1931), in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 341. An exact fantasy is "scientific" in its refusal to remove itself
from the technical logic of the medium of architecture, yet, as an active rearrangement of that logic, it
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the factuality that controls its thought, in a construction of cognitive as well as artistic
import.
It is in this sense of the artistic object as a cognitive mechanism that Mies's
skyscraper project can be identified with Kurt Schwitter's Merz Column in Hanover
begun the same year (fig. 407). Both projects share an antagonism toward a priori and
reasoned order. Both plunge into the chaos of the metropolis to seek another order
within it through a systematic use of the unexpected, the aleatory, the inexplicable.
Both are objects in crisis. They attest to the fact that the humanist conceptions of
formal rationality and self-creating subjectivity cannot cope with the irrationality of
actual experience. In the modern city, such constructs of rationality fail to function,
and the mind, the subject, is consequently unable to perceive a pattern in the chaos. At
such a moment, the subject has its one opportunity to escape reification: by thinking
through, with some critical distance, what it is that causes reality to appear to be only a
collection of fragmented images; by looking for structures and processes operating in
time behind what appears to be given and objectified; by constructing, in an aesthetic
modality, a cognitive mechanism understood "as a dialectically entwined and
explicatively undecipherable unity of concept and matter."7 Crisis, in short, is
converted into a critical mediation between various levels of form and its social
context.8 And the other aspect of Mies's "exact fantasy" - the thick, black, silent
is a controlled effort to split open the real by striking its elements against each other with the force of
the imagination.
7Theodor Adorno, "Thesen fiber die Sprache des Philosophen," in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 369
8Here I intend to invoke an Althusserian understanding that architecture is not simply a free-floating
object in its own right, nor does it mirror some base, context, or ground and simply replicate the latter
ideologically; but that the object possesses some "semi-autonomous" force with which it can also be
seen as negating that context. See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in
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elevational drawing (fig. 405) - attempts to negate the status quo, asserting itself as a
radically different, subversive object within an unsatisfactory social and physical
fabric. 9
The turn to the objective effects of modem industrial capitalism, to its structures
and processes understood as factors of form making, and to the construction of some
kind of causality among the levels of social experience, new modes and materials of
production, and architectural form: this is also the similarity between Mies's 1922
skycraper project and Ludwig Hilberseimer's Chicago Tribune project of the same year
(fig. 408). The distinction between them, however, is the different terms in which
these mutual relationships are graped - the difference between the displacement and
criticism of the social subtext by form, as is the case with Mies and Schwitters, and the
absorption or envelopment of this subtext into form, as is the case with Hilberseimer.
A definite epistemological shift separates the two, and it is this shift that will concern us
here. For I believe, and will try to argue, that the shift is nothing less than the
beginning of an era of postsignification. By this term I mean not only the abolition of
architecture as a communicative action or representational practice, not only the
evacuation of significations and subjectifications from the domain of architecture, but
Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London and New York: New Left Books,
1971). I must gloss over some problems with my use of the Althusserian term "mediation." For a
discussion see Jameson's introduction to The Political Unconscious Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1981), 23 ff.
9Mies's radical engagement with irrationality and chaos, his framing of circumstance, at once anguished
and exhilarated, perhaps begins and ends here in the skyscraper projects: his later work emphasizes
again and again its ambition to salvage the purity of high art from the encroachment of urbanization,
massification, technological modernization, in short, of modern mass culture. Mies's contact, at this
time in his career, with the a group, the expressionist, and the Berlin dadaists including Raoul
Hausmann, Hannah H6ch, and Kurt Schwitters may account for his momentary plunge into
particularity of postwar Berlin.
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also the negation of all dimensions of critique and conscious resistance available to
architectural practice (a condition of which, I would assert incidentally and polemically,
we are presently the heirs).
Mies's skyscraper is a sign still laden with meaning - projective, referential,
intrusive - in a negative dialogue with the context of its production, one that is
sustained at formal and cognitive levels. Hilberseimer's project, on the other hand,
begins not with some notion of context or situation to which it is a critical response, but
rather with a technical principle dissimulated as an architectural configuration. As we
have seen in the previous section, the technical principle is cellular reproduction. As
hypothesized by Hilberseimer, modem building construction requires that each building
unit - each structural and spatial cell - be identical to all others, not in a linear series,
but in a multi-dimensional matrix of repetitive cells; and the gap between the urban
order and the individual cell is thereby abolished.
In Hilberseimer's projects there seems at first to be a degree of transparency of
architectural form to the conditions of its making - building as an exhibition of
industrialized technology reduced to an elementary, reiterative structural and
constructional system. It is this which has been taken as Hilberseimer's Sachlichkeit or
functionalism. Hilberseimer's own writings sanction such interpretations. In a section
of Groszstadtarchitektur entitled "Hochhausbauten," for example, he argues:
Architecture is based fundamentally on an enabling construction
[ermdglichenden Konstruktion]. More recent architecture in particular, by
virute of the rationalism that inspires it, has almost completely identified itself
with pure structure and construction, whereas in the past cultural and sacral
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needs played a much more predominant role compared to the rational use that
the building was to be put to. 10
And commenting on Mies's project for a concrete office building in the last sentence of
a previous chapter, he asserts, "Form and construction have become the same thing
[sind unmittelbar eins geworden]."11
But it must be recognized that this architecture is not really a demonstration of
the technical, social, or economic conditions that produced it. On the contrary,
Hilberseimer's architecture effectively truncates the complex network of colliding
forces in which architecture originates to present us with a self-generating model that
obeys only its own logic. It conceals the real origins and stories of a building's
formation with an erased record, a kind of materiality that can communicate nothing
detached from itself. And yet, it can engender itself. For instance, where Mies renders
the context of his building antagonistically - the low, pitched roofed buildings in black
silhouette in the drawing; the slightly melting masses in the model - Hilberseimer, in
the Chicago Tribune project, reduces the context to two short lines across the page - a
horizon or an edge. His bulding does not measure itself against its context as a
negative instance, but rather absorbs the context into its own system; or better, the
context itself issues from the same system. And then there are two towers, less a
plastic manipulation of volume than a reduplication of the modular system indefinitely
repeated in ignorance of all circumstance. The signified and the referent are now
dissolved by a generalized code that no longer refers back to any real but rather to its
10Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur (Stuttgart: Verlag Julius Hoffmann, 1927)
11Ibid., 61
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own logic. Bluntly put, the signifier becomes its own referent. As Jean Baudrillard
has written, "For the sign to be pure, it has to duplicate itself: it is the duplication of the
sign which destroys meaning." 12
There is a lack of articulation here in Hilberseimer's project. The typology of
American skycrapers - repetitive towers on a high base as exemplified by McKim,
Mead, and White's Pennsylvania Hotel in New York, which Hilberseimer published in
Groszstadtarchitektur (fig. 409)13 - is reduced in the Chicago Tribune to its most
elementary structure. The street facade is distinquished from other sides only by the
recess of the door and the slightly lower sill of the windows. At the top of the
drawing, where the declarative edge of the building's top would meet the sky, the
technique becomes more linear; the two lines that form this edge meet precisely at the
border of the paper. This, along with the perspective distortion and tonal reversals
change the whole disposition of the form, dissolving the volume into two depthless
planes and converting the projecting exterior corner into what might be taken as a
receeding interior. The surface of the glass is gone; now we see only the blankness of
the page through the empty openings.
A comparison of Hilberseimer's language of drawing with that of Heinrich
Maria Dauringhausen, "The Profiteer," 1920-21 (fig. 410), or with Georg Grosz's
"Untitled," 1920 (fig. 411), is inescapable, and it is a language Hilberseimer was to
employ throughout his early career: the reduced surfaces, windows as opaque swaths
barely adhering to the exterior surface of the building, the absence of glass from the
12Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), 136
13The project was illustrated in Groszstadtarchitektur on page 65.
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window openings, the relentless repetition and starkness of the environment. But
Hilberseimer defused the critical mechanisms of such painting and drawing and sought
to demonstrate the availability of the language for use in constructing postive
information. His previously worked-out theory of pure form - which we will
consider in more detail later but may now polemically be staged - understands form as
that which reunites the creative process with the conditions of modem building in a
definitive figuration absolved from the need to register the heteronomy of preliminary
operations it claims to comprehend. This theory provided a readily available conceptual
framework to be fitted-out with the floating icons and atmospheres of the Grof3stadt as
enunciated by his Berlin colleagues.
These are the visual effects of Hilberseimer's cellular reproduction, the visible
signs of the closure of his system. But let it be stressed that what is at issue here is not
the exchange of one image of reality, one "exact fantasy," for another, as with Mies,
but of substituting signs of the realfor the real itself, a strategy that subsumes every
contingency and defers every connection with the historical, technical, or social
specificity to its simulated double. The very external ground against which figuration
may be understood is absorbed into the figure.
So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. The latter
starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this
equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation
starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence,from the radical negation
of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every
reference. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it
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as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation
itself as a simulacrum. 14
Moreover, it should be made clear that this architectural system of reduplicated
molecular elements without origin is viewed by Hilberseimer himself as an elementarist
substitute for any metaphysical fullness, or "cultural or sacral needs" of "community
religiousness" as sought by the expressionists. He writes,
The few projects made by Berlin architects for the Chicago Tribune competition
fall in [a] period of transition. The projects of Gropius and Max Taut reveal a
change from the fantastic to the rational, while that of Bruno Taut is still
extravagant in appearance. My own project, though not submitted to the
competition, was published in G and may be considered, in its extreme
puritanism, as a protest against the formal exuberance of the Expressionists....
As the trend of our time is toward the secular, so is the trend of contemporary
architecture. Its theme are all those building types which the Expressionists
considered inferior to become objects of architecture.... To develop adequate
types for them according to their purpose and function, the materials used and
the structures employed, constitute the real problems which the Elementarists
have to solve. This will lead to an architecture which is direct and free from all
romantic reminiscences, in agreement with present daily life, not subjective and
individualistic, but objective and universal. 15
The protest against expressionism is fundamental to the development of
Hilberseimer's theory of architecture. We must take up this topic, too, in more detail
14Baudrillard, Simulations, 11; emphasis in original.
15Hilberseimer, The Berlin School of Architecture of the Twenties MS (orig. German 1967), (Ludwig
Karl Hilberseimer Archives, Art Institute of Chicago, series 8/1, box 7/10), 49-51
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later. For now, what is important is the way in which the language of causality found
in Hilberseimer's theoretical writings ( for example, "architecture is based
fundamentally on an enabling construction") gives way to a different parallelism
between form and its constructional-material determinants in his design work,
permitting Hilberseimer to ellide the terminology of the first to the second: to speak of
the logic of simulation in terms of "the laws of matter." There are instances where
Hilberseimer's own language betrays the process of dissimulation:
The conformation of material content according to an idea means at the same
time conformation of the ideal content according to the laws of matter. In the
meeting of both of these moments in a single form architecture is born.... It
liberates material and ideal contents from their initial contexts. And it reunifies
them. It joins them according to precise laws.16
Indeed, the liberation and reunification of subject (idea) and object (matter) according to
the precise laws of the simulacrum. If the Chicago Tribune project is taken as an
instantiation of this "liberation" of subject and object, the degree of abstraction
necessary to permit such a sublation can readily be felt. Idea and matter are dissolved
into sheer formal relationality, into purely formal categories and sytems. In contrast to
Mies's skyscraper, it is now no longer a question of form providing a way of entering
into the real, no longer a strategy of displacement, but of absorption; no longer
resistance, but mask. It is when this transformation from causality to parallelism to
simulation is fully accomplished that architecture will contribute to the complete
16Hilberseimer, "Grossstadtarchitektur", in Der Sturm 15, n. 4 (1924): 177-189; quotation on 177-
178; my emphasis
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suppression of the human subject, of questions of actual experience, context, and
history; and, ultimately, an engendering without a subject - without individual human
agency or history - will become the posthumanist norm.
Now, this is all very close to what Jean Baudrillard chartacterizes as the passage
from representational objects to the "hyperreality" of our own late-twentieth-century
present.
The description of this whole intimate universe [of objects] - projective,
imaginary and symbolic - still corresponded to the object's status as mirror of
the subject, and that in turn to the imaginary depths of the mirror and "scene":
there is a domestice scene, a scene of interiorty, a private space-time
(correlative, moreover, to a public space). The oppositions subject/object and
public/private were still meaningful. This was the era of the discovery and
exploration of daily life, this other scene emerging in the shadow of the historic
scene, with the former receiving more and more symbolic investment as the
latter was politically disinvested.... But today the scene and mirror no longer
exist; instead, there is a screen and network. In place of the reflexive
transcendence of mirror and scene, there is a nonreflecting surface, an
immanent surface where operations unfold - the smooth operational surface of
communication. 17
Perhaps, then, a case could be made for reading Hilberseimer not as a paragon of
modernism, but rather as an anticipation of that later and quite different thing we have
come to call postmodernism. Certainly the self-generating sequence of forms for which
function and construction are mere pretexts, the realization of a formal mechanism,
17Jean Baudrillard, "The Ecstacy of Communication," in Hal Foster, The Anti-Aesthetic (Port
Townsend: Bay Press, 1983), 126-27
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depersonalized and virtually unauthored, in which the aleatory and seemingly
uncontrolable and unverifiable generation of new forms obeys a logic of its own - all
this is very close, as I have been trying to make it out, to recent work variously called
"simulationist," or postmodernist. But I want to argue, to the contrary, for its historical
specificity. For Hilberseimer's architecture, I will try to show, can be conceived only
as a production of, and a response to, the very particular conditions of the Weimar
Republic. I want to demonstrate that, having first recognized the determining
conditions for a certain historically specific type of subjectivity, which I have broached
in the analysis of Hannes Meyer as a radical and potentially critical kind of
antihumanism, Hilberseimer's modernism itself increasingly hollowed out such
subjectivity and rendered its articulation as a critical agency highly problematic.
Hilberseimer's art critical writings
I shall approach my topic through an analysis of the writings of Hilberseimer,
published for the most part in 1919 in Der Einzige, 18 a journal edited by admirers of the
nineteenth-century German anarcho-individualist Max Stirner, and his follower (in their
opinion) Friedrich Nietzsche; and between 1920-24, in the Sozialistische Monatshefte,
a paper which followed Eduard Bernstein in advocating an accomodating, evolutionary
18Hilberseimer's articles, all published in volume 1 (1919), were: "Schpfung und Entwicklung," Jan.
19, p. 46; "Umwertung in der Kunst," Jan. 26, pp. 24-25; "Form und Individuum," Feb. 2, pp. 30-3 1;
"Der Naturalismus und das Primitive in der Kunst," March 9, pp. 88-89; "Kunst und Wissen," March
30, pp. 127-28. I shall also frequently refer to a longer work, also entitled "Sch6pfung und
Entwicklung," MS, c. 1922 (Ludwig Karl Hiberseimer Archives, Art Institute of Chicago, series 8/3,
box 1/10). This 41 page manuscript is the synthesis of many of Hilberseimer's earlier articles and the
source for many later ones. The strategy of repetition extends to Hilberseimer's writings: yet another
version was published with the same title in Sozialistische Monatshefte 28, no. (1922): 993-997.
Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
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policy of socialism, and for which Hilberseimer was the art critic. 19 Hilberseimer's
articles, as we shall see, elaborate Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy - in terms of the
epistemological status of art, the notion of the artist as a prophetic leader, and the
concept of chaos as the constitutive condition of the eternal return - and assimilate
these ideas to Alois Riegl's assertion that the art of all cultures is measured by their
Kunstwollen. The conjunction of Nietzsche and Riegl will become key in
Hilberseimer's "total solution."
There are several stresses found throughout Hlberseimer's theoretical and
critical writings worth distinguishing by way of introduction. First is the resolutely
epistemological thrust of his concerns. A large part of what is at stake in his essays is
an assessment of the status of our knowledge and the characterization of the distinction
between scientific and artistic knowledge, or as Nietzsche put it, of "the raging discord
between art and truth." 20 Following Nietzsche, Hilberseimer asserts that art has no
less a claim to knowledge than science, for "all of science [Wissenschaft], in the final
end, depends on faith. Prerequisite [Voraussetzung] of all of science are believed
truths. Ultimate precisions are always affairs of belief and find their roots in religions,
which connect inseparably the finite with the infinite."21 Science delivers (liefert) the
material of thought; it is analytic, searching in the parts and pieces of the external world
for knowledge of the whole and tending, therefore, toward specialization and technical
19Hannes Meyer referred to Hilberseimer as a "socialist architect." See The Bauhaus, H. M. Wingler,
ed., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 164. Hilberseimer would teach at the workers' school, the
Kollektiv f~r sozialistisches Bauen, in 1931-32. Yet, there is no evidence in his writings that his
socialism is anything more than routine for the times.
2 0Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1886-88), Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, trans.
and eds. (New York: Random House, 1968), § 853
2 1Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," MS, 4
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proficiency. Scientific knowledge is a form of retrieval, with cool precision, of the
images and schema primordially superimposed on the world; and though it aims for
objectivity, it remains necessarily partial, subjective, and derivative. In contrast, art, as
positive creation, gives form to the very raw material of reality; it is comparably
primary, holistic, and synthetic, and, "despite its subjective issue reaches the highest
objectivity."22 Artistic knowledge enlarges the world, breaking down the narrow limits
of conceptual, rational identities which tend to foreclose on polysemy. Above all,
creation is intuitive, free from laws. Creative work goes spontaneously with a
legitimacy peculiar to it, derived from creativity. And all science and
knowledge, all research and recognition-detection [Erkennen (sic)] cannot
replace this naive security of creation. The new can therefore never be criticized
for not following the old obsolete laws. Still less can creation itself serve extant
laws. It does not know them at all. And if it should know them, it must first
have overcome them in order to have come to creation.23
22Ibid., 4
23Ibid., 11. Walter Benjamin criticized the emphasis on creativity over the properly destructive task of
the artist in a way that is provocative for a comparison of Hilberseimer and Meyer. "For too long the
accent was placed on creativity. People are creative to the extent that they avoid tasks and supervision.
Work as a supervised task - its model: political and technical work - is attended by dirt and detritus,
intrudes destructively into matter, is abrasive to what is already acheived, critical toward its conditions,
and is in all this opposite to that of the dilettante luxuriating in creation. His work is innocent and
pure, consuming and purifying masterliness. And therefore the monster stands among us as the
messenger of a more real humanism. He is the conqueror of the empty phrase. He feels solidarity not
with the slender pine but with the plane that devours it, not with the precious ore but with the blast
furnace that purifies it. The average European has not succeeded in uniting his life with technology,
because he has clung to the fetish of creative existence. One must have followed Loos in his struggle
with the dragon "ornament," heard the stellar Esperanto of Scheerbart's creations or seen Klee's New
Angel, who preferred to free men by taking from them, rather than make them happy by giving to
them, to understand a humanity that proves itself by destruction. Walter Benjamin, "Karl Kraus," in
Benjamin, Reflections (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 272-73
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It should be underscored that artistic creation is conceived here neither as
formative power - as a development from techni, craft and artisanry, or science -
nor as demiurgic production - as an imposition of form by an individual force - but
rather as intuition. Art is ascribed not so much to a talent or faculty, classically
conceived and destined to a signifying identification and function, as to compulsion,
desire, and will. This is important because it already opens the way to a challenge both
of the hubris of conventional bourgeois science and its positivist claim to knowledge
into which much of the neue Sachlichkeit fell, and of the humanist conception of artistic
creation as mimesis. But it also leaves open the question, to which we will return,
What propels or constrains the will?
Neither is there in Hilberseimer's theory a notion of art as respite from the
struggles and sufferings of reality, or as withdrawal from knowledge; art as a means of
escape was not his emphasis, even though he continued to use the words like
"banishment" and "magic" to describe art. The point, instead, is the Nietzschean one
that science and art are together illusory and their epistemological status must be
distinguished and judged on a basis altogether different from their descriptive powers.
Or better, science and art are both involved with the production of images of the world,
"appearances" as Nietzsche called them, and know-how (K~nnen) leads us into the
worse kind of self-blinded illusion, illusion that does not know itself to be one.
The opposition of science to art is figuratively realized in the antagonisms
narrated in The Birth of Tragedy. Apollo, without the consciousness forced upon him
by the "titanic and barbaric menace of Dionysius," gives birth to Socrates, or more
precisely the Socratic principle, which condemns us to the grand self-delusion that the
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rationality of classical mimesis has priority over intuition. Nietzsche's complaint
against Socrates is directed not against reason per se, but against Socratic narrowness
in regarding reason as the unique instrument of human knowledge and delivery.
Hilberseimer extends this Nietzschean complaint to his own classicizing, formalizing,
and functional-materialist opponents.
The art of recent times is still, in effect, only reproductive. The declining
culture displaces elementary creation. Under the misunderstanding of what is
essential, creativity is exhausted in schematized formalism. It is unspiritual
[ungeistig]. Perfection is ultimately purely technical, decaying into bare
imitation, going from the accidental to what we have already seen [geht vom
Zufdlligen, nur Gesehenen aus], leaving chaos in the chaotic. It is formless and
arbitrary, exhausted in the superficiality of the thing, remaining content in the
so-called beautiful appearance. Unbelievability, external appearance,
skepticism, and the analytic are typical for recent times, in which knowledge
and ability go over experience and will.24
The second point to be stressed is what is seemingly a contradictory formulation
of the structure of aesthetic totalization. Hilberseimer celebrates the Dionysian creative
subject - unschooled, unrestrained, naive, natural - as that which represents the
"original ground (Urgrund)"25 of reality - a primitive and non-contingent substratum
of being. The artistic subject reveals the contours of this reality, configures it in an art
of invariant meaning - spontaneously and subconsciously created, a "magical
banishment," "above time," "incapable of development," and antithetical to the art of
24Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," MS, 3225ibid., 9
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the Apollonian self-consciouness which distances us psychically from reality in the arid
compartments of beauty and proficiency (Kbnnen). "In creatively strong times art is
confirmation, banishment, magic. The work signifies this through belief, true ideas,
force and will, giving a total world picture [Weltbild]. "26 Thus, Hilberseimer's
aesthetic and epistemological formulations set forth, on the one hand, an ideal of
relatively unrestrained contact with genuine experience (Erlebnis) or total content, and
its passage through the creative subject into concrete form, presumably guaranteed by
an explicit bracketing of material conditions and causes. Whether what is in question in
an artwork is the symbol, the singularity, the intuitions, or the illusions, in every case
what is established is an ontological and formal purity which transcends such encircling
determinants as material, mode, technique, various historical contexts, rational
consciousness, and the discursiveness of ordinary practice. Recall: "The creator, then,
is intuitive, free from law.... And all science and knowledge, etc., cannot replace this
naive security of creation."
On the other hand, Hilberseimer calls into question both uncircumstanced reality
and, more significantly, the very notion of the antithesis between reality and its
representation. "Extant laws" may not make art, art may produce rather than repeat
reality, but art does not make itself alone. For while "the will to art [Kunstwollen], just
as any will [Wollen], is not determinantly subjugated to development," it is,
nevertheless, determined by the conditions of its epoch, and "another epoch disposes of
[verfigen iber] another will. The formal-becoming [Formgewordene] of this
26Ibid., 31
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expression [Ausdruck] just is the work of art."27 Hilberseimer understands Riegl's
concept of Kunstwollen as a complex and mediated relationship between subject and
object, a "creative struggle" between artistic will and material conditions that allows
itself to be understood historically as a special kind of vision, dominant in a particular
epoch.28 Hilberseimer summarized Riegl's analysis with an often repeated aphorism:
"An artwork is a condition of tension brought to harmony." 29
The form and the material conditions of the artwork will not be in any easy
balance; the will to form needs resistance to maintain itself. "[I]f the material opposes
no resistance to the will to form, decay enters, evolved through imitation and the ability
to play with form, because without resistance no tension can be maintained." 30 But
still less will the material conditions have determined the form. Hilberseimer is explicit
about this latter point: The problem of the "material functionality" of architecture is
finally, as in "primitive" architecture, "a problem of limited relevance." 3 1 If "the
architectural creation manifests the Kunstwollen of an epoch in its purest form," giving
a "faithful picture" of the "substrate of the respective collective wills of a time,"32 then
neither material nor technique is by itself capable of modifying this representation in its
27Ibid., 13
28Riegl emphasized artworks as "evidence not only of man's creative struggle with nature, but also of
his peculiar perception of shape and color." Alois Riegl, "The Modem Cult of Monuments: Its
Character and its Origins," trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo, Oppositions 25 (fall 1982 [orig.
German 1928]): 20-5 1; passage cited is from 47.
29Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," MS, 11
30Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," Sozialistische Monatshefte 28, no. 26 (1922): 996
3 1Hilberseimer, "Mexikanische Baukunst" in Das Kunstblatt 6, no. 4 (1922): 163-71; passage cited is
from 163.
32Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," MS, 14
348
The Crisis of Humanism and the Dissolution of the Object
essence. 33 On the contrary, the autonomy of the Kunstwollen assures that its
representational demands will be fulfilled even in contradiction of material conditions.
And more, the demands of the will of the present epoch, as with any period of
transition, are antithetical to the desire for traditional beauty.
The conventional refuses everything new on the grounds of dissonance.
Dissonance may exist in music, architecture, sculpture, and painting, but it is
because the true artwork presupposes it rather than installs it. It is always the
new stressful conditions that diverge from the habitual; therefore, it is the new
proportions and constructions that become dissonant perceptions....
Where beauty establishes itself, tradition is at hand. One wants to enjoy beauty
peacefully. The Kunstwollen, however, disturbs this rest. It is radical in its
manifestation [Auferung]. It is the constant threat to tradition.34
The Kunstwollen, for Hilberseimer at least, is at once a reaction against positivist
science, a disturbance of traditional beauty, and a profound totalization and
determinism. And as such, it is a refusal of idealism's celebration of free
consciousness, of artistic expression as an activity controlled by an individuated,
univocal subject in contact with material essences.
Art produces knowledge of the Kunstwollen. But ultimate knowledge is
neccesarily denied to us. "[Wills and] ideas are absolute. Their manifestation in works
of art, however, is only relative. Therefore, the concretization of the idea has
discordance as its consequence." 35 And then, these relationships in our own epoch are
33Hilberseimer, "Kirchenbauten in Eisenbeton" in Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung 67, no. 42 (1927):
533-542; passage cited is from 533.
34Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," MS, 11, 14
35Ibid., 12
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"necessarily problematic."36 There can be no unmediated knowledge of the real.
Reality can only be known through its representations and images (Abbild),
externalized in the space of signification as delimited by the will of a particular present.
In his affirmation of a wholly relational and differential view of artistic will that controls
that creative subject, Hilberseimer not only appropriates Riegl's Kunstwollen, but also
recollects Nietzsche's antihumanism.
But I must return to this later. For now it is enough to point to this second
stress, and to a third: that for Hilberseimer, the condition for artistic practice endemic
to modernism is nothing less than a crisis of cultural legitimation experienced primarily
as a loss or breakdown of figurability. Artistic technique has been threatened from the
inside by virtuosity and detached academicism, and from the outside by industrialized
technology and the specializations of science, with the results that the adequation
between form and content - and both to their essential "oneness" - is no longer
possible. "Our age is neccessarily problematic. Perfection would appear now as
hypocritical, just as comfortable methods neglect to admit of the abyss [Abgrunde]."37
The properties that distinguish artistic discourse as a primal compulsion no longer seem
to inhere in that discourse itself. And the human subject is constrainted by systems it
may have produced but in any case cannot seem to control. "The capitalist economic
system has also seized art, and made out of it a speciality production. Academic study
enables the effectuation of routine. One learns the metier and makes out of it a
distinguished high calling or a profession." 38 Meanwhile, "chaos surrounds us,
36Ibid., 41
37Ibid.
38Ibid, 34
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unformed, but certain to push into form," 39 "chaos, the attendant of civilization that
brings all manner of frustration to figural formation [Bildung]."40
What is important for us in this articulation of the inability of a culture to give
form to its world is the recognition that the loss of signification, experienced as crisis,
is the loss of the paternal fiction of humanist thought, of classical art's heritage and
guarantee. But even from this posthumanist vantageground, Hilberseimer remained
diligent, as we shall see, in his search for manifestations of that primitive movement
toward the future, and toward ultimate identity of subject and object in a formal utopia
whose presence, behind whatever distortion and beneath whatever layers of repression
or confusion, may always be detected by the apparatus of artistic intuition.
This is enough of a summary. In the following part of this section, I shall try to
situate Hilberseimer's essays in the discourse of the subject and to pitch the logic of his
argument toward some of the individual artistic practices with which he, in his writings
from 1919 to 1924, concerned himself. With a more specific understanding of his
writings we will then be able to return, in the last part of this section, to my argument
that the very ambiguities and contradictions embedded in the conditions of subjectivity
in modernism reproduce themselves in the forms of Hilberseimer's architecture.
39 Ibid, 39
4 0 Ibid, 2
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401. Mies van der Rohe, Friedrichstrasse
project, 1919, photomontage
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402. Georg Grosz, "Friedrichstrasse,"
lithograph, 1918
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403. Mies van der Rohe, skycraper project,
1922, model
404. Skyscraper project, plan
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NEUE ARCHITEKTUR I
LUDWIG HILBERSEIMER
GROSSTADTBAUTEN.
405. Mies van der Rohe, skycraper project,
elevation
406. Cover of Grosstadtbauten (Hanover,
1925) showing Ludwig Hilberseimer's
Chicago Tribune project of 1922
407. Kurt Schwitters, Merzsaule, c. 1923
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loigiscle Bildung. Root verzicltet auf mrctrische
Durclibilding, Aclisenhetoinng, Zusainienfassung
einzelner Teile zu Firiskalen hiiherer Ordnung.
Die Gestatiting dier Alase zu einem geforinten
Organisinus ist gelungen. Die .\rchitektur hat auf-
gehiart, eine secht sitzende Miaske zu sein. Root
gab nit disesemi Werk dier aicrikanischen Archi-
tektuir Gruindlage ind Ziel, willzog die Loilosutng
11 li ~;'vom Euripoiius, forutilierte das amierikanisclic
Sil1prinzip, das Frank loyMd Wright universal zu-
saninneniaUi. Das auf diese \\'eise entstandene Nei
alit nicIts lit bInaler ZweC kl.i11igkeit zu tuni, e
S kist hachste (Geb unideneid itind Kizentriertlict zu-
o A F gleich. Root hiat gezeigt, dali fur die Gegebenheiten
seiecs Landes und die Bedurfnisse der Gegenwart Die neuaartige
netuartige Aisdirickformen zu finden sind. Form
Es felit nicht an Versuchen, die durch die planlose
Erricitung von litlchtisern geschaffenen unhalt-
baren Zustande der anerikanischen ltlochhausstadt
zu indern. Duri ein neies Baugesetz, das ,Zoning Die Zonierung
-161). 153. Mcl. Kinm Mead und Whlites law", desen Grundgedanken Sullivan mit seinen Abb 155 u.l15
l'unniiyluania Illiiie leuyrk Mlochhliausbauten in Chicago berits virweggenom-
dLorativtn \'ehiiiaiiung mihr bedarf. GrundIlegend
Die Geslaitung fii die (es.i.ltung des I llchhauss sin d allein die
neuen led iirfnic eti id \nspriiilie in technischer und
rt nilii her Beziehung, sw vie die netien Materialien:
Eisen, Eisenbetin und Glas, the sich for das Iloch-
liauls a beond i 7w\kienliClih erin ieccn haben.
Der erste Als einziger von allen aierikanischen Architekten
Varsuch liar dies neben Sullivan John Root nicht nur er-
kannt und begrilfen, sindern auch durch seinen 1891
Abb.154 erbautei Monadnock llck in Chicago in die
Tat unigesetzi. 1 i6t erstatinlich, da dieses lhch-
haus, das eines der ersten Ilii llhauser iberhauipt
ist, noth von keittin zweiten in seiner ,Ricltigkeit"
uberctrifen wourde. Zwvai gehiirt es einer Zeit alt,
itt tier das Traghisterm noch niclt erfundCn wvar.
Aber was dies Gebatude auszeicihnet, ist die Tat-
sache, daU hier dis Priblet aller Architektur als cin
kubisel-rhys thmischies endlich siedererkannt und
neuartig tinter Beruck-ich tigung aller Gegebenheiten
verwirklicht wsurde. Der fuir die h1elirzalil der spite-
ren Ilochhuser so verderbliche Verlegenheitsaus-
tweg, schiipferisclies Unveri6gen durch bernihfige
Sttianhiaifing ersetzeten u wllei, ist lier instink-
tiv vermieden. Ein untraglicher Sinn lar Propor-
tionen gibE diseni Bauwerk innere Konsitenz und Abb. 154. Juhn loot: Monadnock Block, Chicago
Groauiaadt 5 65
409. Page from Groszstadtarchitektur
showing McKim, Mead, and White's
Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, and
Burnham and Root's Monadnock Building,
Chicago
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410. Georg Grosz, Untitled, 1920
411. Heinrich Maria Dauringhousen, The
Speculator, 1920-21
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Hope beyond Chaos:
on Expressionism and Dadaism
The chief conceptual framework within which all of Hilberseimer's examination of art
takes place is the familiar Hegelian opposition of the concrete and the abstract, and the
nature of artistic mediation between the two. The opposition is not a symmetrical one,
for the abstract denotes both the brute facticity of the empirical world - presumed to be
preexistent and already formed material with directly accessible content - and the
universal, transcendental, formal categories that have lost all material contact with that
empirical reality. Without mediation, the former falls into the illusions of a simple
positivism, mistaking its own conceptual categories for solid parts and pieces of the real
world itself, and the latter results inexorably in an empty formalism, what Hilberseimer
called the "point zero" of the abstract painting of suprematism and neoplasticism.
Hilberseimer summarized this dialectic necessity: "Stripped of rational elements [the
realm of the objective], architecture would be nothing but an empty play on forms;
without idealistic intentions [the realm of the subjective] it would be merely
engineering. "41
The Hegelian opposition overlaps the more contemporary notions of alienation
and subjectivity and allows a distinction between modernist and premodernist epochs.
In the artworks of preindustrialized, nonalientated, religious societies, the artist's raw
4 1Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," MS, c. 1922 (Ludwig Karl Hiberseimer Archives, Art
Institute of Chicago, series 8/3, box 1/10), passim.
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material had an immediate meaning; it presented itself as concrete in its elements from
the outset and required no mediation. In the words of Hegel,
What man requires for his external life, house and home, tent, chair, bed,
sword and spear, the ship with which he crosses the ocean, the chariot which
carries him into battle, boiling and roasting, slaughtering, eating and drinking
- nothing of all this must have become merely a dead means to an end for him;
he must still feel alive in all these with his whole sense and self in order that
what is in itself merely external be given a humanly inspired individual character
by such close connection with the human individual.42
In the words of Hilberseimer,
Art is always an expression of a philosophy of life, a symbol of spiritual
experience, a concentration of intuitive knowledge, a portrait of the entire
human connection with the cosmos. These conditions are plainly located in the
so-called primitive people. In them endures the unity of the attitude of will and
deed....
The essential aspect of art does not point to the development of so-called high
culture but to the primitive creations for which there was nothing other than idea
and material; the primitive creations still had no models and no restraints....
[Such creations] grow out of their respective materials, using their possibilities
completely.43
42Hegel, Aesthetik, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1955), 414; quoted in Georg Lukdcs, Studies in European
Realism, trans. Edith Bone (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 155.
43Hilberseimer, "Schdpfung und Entwicklung," Sozialistische Monatshefte 28, no. 26 (1922): 993,
995-996
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In primitive societies, there was nothing other than idea and material: subject and object
were one. With modernity, however, everything is changed. The elements of the
work are thrown from their human center and a dissolution of the human subject sets
in, a dispersion that leads out at every point into the contingent, into brute fact and
matter, into abstraction, into the not-human.44 The consequent loss of connection and
comprehensibility is the very mark of the modern experience, one in which the essential
meaning of life may no longer be immanent to it, but transcendent or otherworldy or,
indeed, wholly missing; one in which the individual and the outside world can never
find absolute identity or unity, in which the primacy of the individual subject and its
conceptual correlate, a unified and substantial center of experience, are both called into
question.
What seems essential to the so-called high cultures is, above all, their civilizing
consequence.... Form becomes the substitute for intuitive experiences, it
makes possible the appearance of an engagement with an object over which one
has control. One tries to replace quality with quantity, the productive with the
reproductive.... Skepticism still remains as the last outlet. 45
According to Hilberseimer, at the present, when individual intuition has been
riven from the collective reality now externalized and rationalized, artistic practice is left
to straddle the cleft. The modem artist must mediate between the objective world and
its subjectively comprehensible forms. If art holds to a purely individual,
ungeneralizable subjectivity, it risks falling into a falsely recreated primitivism.
4"Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 166
45Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," Sozialistische Monatshefte, 993
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The worst thing that we possess nowadays is recreated primitiveness.... In
painting this is the tendency represented by the groups around Pechstein,
Heckel and Schmitt-Rottluff, intoxicated by effects, attracted by the Ash
Wednesday of Lent. Study voyages to the South Seas are no substitute for
creative energies.... Wanting to be primitive in one's creating without really
being so: this is the most monstrous of mistakes. One can, of course, be
primitive in one's own means, but not in one's own objectives. The result is
the most vulgar of artistic workmanship. 46
If, on the other hand, art disengages itself completely from subjectivity and primitive
intuition, it tends to become absorbed by evermore complicated, self-regulating
mechanisms of the discipline, and by categories of abstract knowledge rather than
concrete experience. When an artistic practice maximizes stylistic development rather
than creation, when "know-how" (Kdnnen) and refinement, habit and reproduction,
triumph over primitive imagination and material, and the bonds with the subjective
realm are thus broken, then the necessary tension between form and matter is eased,
and the primitive "desire for form" is collapsed.
One suddenly understood the fundamental importance of primitiveness as
against that reproductiveness that turned into habituation and dominion over
materials, killed will-power, and saw good in the mere development of
knowledge and the work of art.47
46Hilberseimer, "Der Naturalismus und das Primitive in der Kunst," in Der Einzige 1, no. 10 (1919):
88-89; passage cited is from 89. Hilberseimer draws somewhat on Carl Einstein, Negerplastik
(Leipzig, 1915).
47Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," in Der Einzige 1, no. 1 (1919): 5-6
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Neoplasticism and suprematism, according to Hilberseimer, have thus guided abstract
art to the point of total annihilation of its material and to extreme formal concentration,
just as Renaissance painting had done in its epoch. Pictorial stereometries risk
becoming depleted planimetric elements, rhythmical games on the surface of the
canvas. This is the "zero point of art."48 Thus we see that, for Hilberseimer, the brute
facticity of simple empiricism and the formal universals of non-objective painting are
obverse conditions of equal abstractness, out of touch with concrete reality, whereas
the monadic subjectivity of expressionism is that abstraction's inverse, a false
primitivism. What is necessary, then, is a constantly articulated "state of tension"
between the subjective will to art and objective reality.
When considering in one of his last works (1972) the possibility of
transforming life into an organic work of art, Herbert Marcuse concluded that "no
matter in what form, art can never eliminate the tension between art and reality.
Elimination of this tension would be the impossible final unity of subject and object:
the materialist version of absolute idealism." 49 Tension may be construed as
nonantagonistic and nondestructive, but it can never be eliminated. Half a century
earlier, Hilberseimer could have agreed with Marcuse: according to Hilberseimer,
while art attempts to "humanize those unheimlich metaphysical experiences" in the
"vision engendered in the moment of ecstasy," "the true work of art is the result of a
48Hilberseimer, "Konstruktivismus," in Sozialistische Monatshefte 28, nos. 19-20 (1922): 831.
Hilberseimer, however, praises the work of the constructivists as properly elementary form.
49Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 108. Also see
Martin Jay's chapter on "Anamnestic Totalization: Memory in the Thought of Herbert Marcuse,"in
Marxism and Totality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 220 ff.
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state of tension" between that subjective vision, that primitive will, and objective
reality.50
We are led, then, to consider such a dialectical vision of artistic mediation in the
primary moments of art reviewed by Hilberseimer: expressionism and dadaism. I shall
attempt to articulate these two moments according to the various possible relationships
between subject and object entailed by each, and then to construct out of Hilberseimer's
often aphoristic and elliptical assertions the implied synthesis of an even more
"primitive" moment of completion against which all historical stages of art are
evaluated. We will come to see that this synthesis is necessarily contradictory in terms
of the subject it inscribes: a subject at once dispersed into present actuality - a product
of a present condition that Hilberseimer designates as chaos - and yet capable,
through the excercise of artistic will, of discovering within that very chaos of the
present ciphers of a future.
Expressionism and the uncoerced subject
The notion of the primitive is crucial in Hilberseimer's art theory. A
preliminary indication of his conceptualization of the primitive is afforded by a
consideration of his dissent from the "false primitivism" and romantic-expressionist
pronouncements of the Arbeitsrat fUr Kunst. Although an early supporter of the group,
which was led by Bruno Taut and later Walter Gropius, Hilberseimer withdrew his
participation by the summer of 1919, after submissions by him and Mies to the
50Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," MS, passim.
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Ausstellung unbekannter Architekten had been rejected. Hilberseimer was to recall
these events later:
In the spring of 1919 the "Arbeitsrat fUr Kunst" organized at Berlin an
exhibition entitled "Unknown architects." It is perhaps interesting to note that
neither Mies van der Rohe nor I myself were able to take part in this exhibition.
The jury refused to accept our designs, probably because their clarity and
soberness from an architectural point of view was at odds with the romantic
spirit that reigned over the exhibition. During the same period the "Arbeitsrat
fur Kunst" published a manifesto that carried some of Walter Gropius's and
Bruno Taut's declarations on architecture that were characteristic of the
dominant tendency in that period and that clearly illustrate the Expressionism in
architecture.... While Bruno Taut, under Paul Scheerbart's influence, busies
himself with the transformation of the surface of our planet, the other
expressionist architects, Hans Scharoun, Max Taut, Hans and Wassily
Luckhardt, and Hermann Finsterlin, content themselves with applying their
ideas and principles to single buildings or groups of buildings. Their studies
consisted of sketches, drawings, and models which generally concerned
religious buildings, theaters, and auditoria. Some of these projects were
nothing other than formal exercising of their imaginations. As we have already
said, they believed that this type of architecture, considered primitive and
primeval, had the faculty of either re-awakening religious feelings or of
deepening and consolidating them. These ideas were received with ever
increasing scepticism. 51
51Ludwig Hilberseimer, Berliner Architektur der 20er Jahre (Mainz: Florian Kupferberg Verlag, 1967),
30. The project Mies submitted was that for the Krller-Mfiller Museum in the Hague. The projects
by Hilberseimer are probably those later published in Max Wagenfihr, "Architektonische Entwirfe von
L. Hilberseimer," Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration 22 (July 1919). Wagenfihr confirmed that
Hilberseimer's projects should be understood as antidotes to expressionism.
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Hilberseimer articulated his skepticism of expressionism in a number of his art
critical essays of 1919.52 According to him, expressionist art is the necessarily false
attempt in modernity to recapture some of the quality of a lost primitive past, the
attempted reconciliation between matter and spirit, between daily life and life's essence.
Expressionism's promise of a future of reconciliation and happiness - a utopian
alternative to the present perception of a degraded social existence - is bound up with
its romantic retention of previous instances of joy and fulfillment recoverable through
some notion of anamnesis, "a conscious inclination toward the past," as Hilberseimer
put it. And yet, the formal activities of the expressionists project their desire for a
reconciled community of man into a psychic space not so different from the present
save for the eruption of particular desired objects or effects presently lacking - the
quasi-spiritual effects of gothic colored glass, curved lines, crafted details, and
continuous metamorphoses of light and colors. Such effects are "primitive and
infantile" in the sense that they amount to fetishes or magical incantations, a conjuring
up of the object in question just exactly as it is longed for, in all its plentitude, while at
the same time holding the actual material of the world in suspension, with no real
attempt to change it.
The fantasies of the freed individual psyche maintain faith in a moralized and
mythicized future where that most ungenuine attribute of the present - alienation -
has disappeared. Thus, the very concept of expressionism presupposes a painful split
within the monadic subject. As Fredric Jameson has written,
520n the expressionists and, in particular, Heckel, Pechstein, and Schmitt-Rottluff of Die Brucke, see
Hilberseimer, "Der Naturalismus und das primitive in der Kunst," in Der Einzige 1, no. 10 (1919): 88-
89; but key concepts and phrases recur throughout the 1919 articles.
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[E]xpressionism requires the category of the individual monad, but it also
shows us the heavy price to be paid for that precondition, dramatizing the
unhappy paradox that when you constitute your individual subjectivity as a self-
sufficient field and a closed realm in its own right, you thereby also shut
yourself off from everything else and condemn yourself to the windless solitude
of the monad, buried alive and condemned in a prison-cell without egress. 53
Furthermore, in expressionism that paradox now finds its analogue in the object itself
- in expressionist strategies such as the symbolism of the crystal, the empathetic
content of contorted surfaces, the projection of the Stadtkrone, or the withdrawal into
the cave.54 The anguish of the metropolitan experience is externalized in the work of
art as an outward projection and formalization of an inward desperation for freedom. A
typical statement of the period makes the point:
Freedom of the subject, as a corrective and confrontation to the conservative
social art practiced with the unstable ethic of commercial interests. Freedom
and authentic life for the individual.... It wants to transcend the commonplace,
which means freedom from it. It tends to recognize the forms of expression of
counter-art, that is to say, of the art of those regarded as infantile or sick,
according to its own laws, not as a rational product of consciousness, but rather
as an expression subjected to its own particular laws. 55
53Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," New Left Review
146 (July-August 1984): 53-92; passage cited is from 63-64.
54Wolgang Pehnt, Expressionist Architecture (London: Academy Editions, 1973) analyzes the
categories of tower and cave as tropes of expressionism.
55From the catalogue of the group Rih, Karlsruhe, in Helga Klieman, Die Novembergruppe (Berlin:
Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1969), 59; cited in Manfredo Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1987 [orig. Italian, 1980]), 122
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According to Hilberseimer, the nostalgia for past totalites, the welling up and
formal dramatization of subjective protest against the objective universe that threatens to
crush the individual, along with the provincialism of the present, what he called "the
unshakable belief in one's own face," these expressionist tendencies effectively block
the possibility of any genuine opening onto the future, of imagining a future that might
be constitutionally other than the present. Expressionism's eschatological vision of the
uncoerced self is generated by a thoroughly despairing understanding of the
possibilities of historical life. Its hope is placed rather in the myth of absolute presence
- the notion that being is a kind of plenum in which there exists a plentitude similar to
past social totalites, and that for this reason something like a substantial and meaningful
present is ontologically possible. The expressionist anxiety before the future ends up,
paradoxically, by glorifying the past and hypostasizing the present.
So it is that Hilberseimer here identifies expressionism's Platonic side, for the
most tenacious version of the myth of an absolute presence is the Platonic doctrine of
memory as a return to lost sources of plentitude before birth. "Thus primitivism,
exoticism, and infantilism arose within Expressionism.... All these intentions that link
themselves to the past are but attempts to substitute an intellectual rapport with the past
for the lost tradition." But more important, it is here that Hilberseimer rejects the
possibility of a return to plentitude and counters the Platonic doctrine of memory as a
return to significant objects with the Nietzschean imperative of chaos as the production
of significant appearances. It is this latter that is, by Hilberseimer's lights, truly
primitive. He continues,
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But [this return to the primitive] is far from a return to nature. Expressed in all
these aspirations is the search for the law that the art of the past manifests in
almost all of its works. But every link to the past is destined to lead to
eclecticism. The true [or truly primitive] work of art will always be born only
from the chaos of time. Only in this way can its image take on sense.56
Nietzschean chaos
Hilberseimer's notion of chaos as a constitutive condition for meaning cannot
be overemphasized, for it occurs again and again in his criticisms and is the hinge on
which his concepts of artistic mediation and subjectivity turn. It is worth a brief detour
from our main concern with Hilberseimer's texts to review this theme. Chaos is one of
the principle themes in Nietzschean thought. At once a relational condition organizing
phenomena, manifestations, and dissimulations, and the intolerable, depthless,
groundless reality of being, chaos is neither disorder waiting to be ordered nor
nonsense waiting to be imprinted with significance. Rather chaos is already interpreted
being: not so much a perversion of an original harmony as the constitutive condition
for any existence and the primitive determination of will to power. And it is nature that
determines being itself as the significant manifestation of chaos. 57
In Nietzschean thought chaos is related to epistemological as well as ontological
concerns, and it is through the realm of the former that we are afforded a route into
5 6Hilberseimer, "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst," Sammlung Gabrielson Gateburg 1922-23 (Art
Institute of Chicago, Series 1/1 Box 1/4); reprinted in the pamphlet Zehn Jahre Novembergruppe, 52-
57; English trans. in Manfredo Tafuri, "USSR-Berlin 1922: From Populism to the 'Constructivist
International,"' in Joan Ockman, et al., eds., Architecture Criticism Ideology (Princeton: Princeton
Architectural Press, 1985), 179-83; my emphasis.
57Jean Granier, "Nietzsche's Conception of Chaos," in David B. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 135-41
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Hilberseimer's art criticism. For Nietzsche, philosophical interrogation arrives not at
truths corresponding to things-in-themselves - solid essences of reality that issue
signs of themselves, that produce their own noumena - but at senses constructed by
interpreting subjects from a flux of "appearances." Knowledge is essentially active; it
is belief and conquest, and as such its particular structure, including the principles and
categories of logic, is not an adequation to objects, but rather to the will to power.
Appearance, as I understand it, is the true and unique reality of things; it is what
all existing predicates belong to, and what to some extent could best be
designated by the sum of these predicates, and this would even include contrary
predicates. But this work plainly signifies a reality that is inaccessible to the
operations and distinctions of logic, an "appearance," therefore, in relation to
"logical truth," which - it must be added - is only possible in an imaginary
world. I am not claiming that appearance is opposed to "reality;" on the
contrary, I maintain that appearance is reality, that it is opposed to whatever
transforms the actual into an imaginary "real world." If one were to give a
precise name to this reality, it could be called "will to power." Such a
designation, then, would be in accordance with its internal reality and not with
its proteiform, ungraspable, and fluid nature.58
To construct any system of value or any sort of logic from will to power is to
relate it to the desires and needs of a subject - desires for good and bad, for stability,
order, causality, finality, unity, identity. As Michel Haar has writtten,
58Friedrich Nietzsche, in Nietzsches Werke. Grossoktavausgabe, vol. 7 (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner
Verlag, 1901-1913), §121; cited in Granier, 136
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Logic rests upon a useful and necessary falsification, being born of the vital
need to lean upon identities despite that fact that nothing real is reducible either
to unity or to identity. Therefore, :truth is that kind of error without which a
certain kind of living being cannot live." [Nietzsche] But truth is, in addition,
falsification of the False, for the "in itself," namely "pure becoming," presents
itself to us as Chaos - i.e., as non-(logical)-truth, eternal and infinite. 59
All existence is interpretation; the subject constitutes sense by an interpretive
engagement.
Ultimately, the individual derives the values of his acts from himself; because
he has to interpret in a quite individual way even the words he has inherited.
His interpretation of a formula at least is personal, even if he does not create a
formula: as an interpreter he is still creative.60
It should not be thought, however, that this entails a conception either of unified subject
or of a limiting case of interpretation. "We are a pluality that has imagined itself a
unity." 61 "The world for us has become infinite, meaning that we cannot refuse it the
possibility to lend itself to an infinity of interpretations." 62
So, truth designates chaos. But chaos is too hostile to life, too terrible to be
apprehended. Chaos can only appear as masked in interpretation, veiled in
appearances. "It would be possible that the true constitution of things was so hostile to
59Michel Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," in David B. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 5-36; passage cited is on page 17.
60Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, (1886-88), Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, trans.
and eds. (New York: Random House, 1968), §767
6 1Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §333
62Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882), Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York: Random House,
1974)
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the presuppositions of life, so opposed to them, that we needed appearance in order to
be able to live."63 So every interpretation is always already a dissimulation, a
concealment, a deferral, a mask. "We no longer believe that truth remains truth when
the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to believe this."64 Every interpretation
is an'ontological dispersal - a necessary refusal of unity, essence, and identity - and
an epistemological "scrawl" (the word is Nietzsche's) - the production of sense that is
partial, contingent, superimposed, and shifting. "Insofar as the word 'knowledge' has
any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning
behind it, but countless meanings. - 'Perspectivism."' 65
Chaos, then, designates, on the one hand, the horizon of forces against which
various interpretive perspectives are drawn and, on the other, the instance when, all
values and logics having imploded, the will to power returns to itself. The incessant
passage of the eternal return - the reiterative power of appearance to affirm itself - is
inscribed in chaos and directed against the essential unity in things, against identity.
Neither is the will to power a substrate behind the constant issue of appearances;
appearances do not conceal something; there is no solid essence of will that accounts
for them. The will to power is just, in Nietzsche's words, "the last instance which we
could go back to," an instance rather than an essence. And the eternal return is not the
recurrence of the same essence in different guises, but the instantiation of ever
divergent appearances without an ultimate goal. "Universal chaos of the sort excluding
63Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §583
64Nietzsche, The Gav Science. Preface, 4
6 5Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §481
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all activity having a final purpose does not contradict the idea of circular movement: it's
just that this movement is an arational necessity...." 66 The inclusion of chaos in the
necessity of the circle of the return constitutes the perfection of circle as always already
a defect. The totality of the return is a fractured totality.
Dadaism and the dispersed subject
The emphasis on chaos distinguishes Hilberseimer's theory from the altogether
difrerent, anti-urban Nietzscheanism of Jugendstil and expressionism. Hilberseimer's
early contact with the disquietude of the radical art circles in Berlin, such as the G
group, 67 the Novembergruppe, the Ring, and for a brief period Die Kommune, 68 gives
further specificity to his understanding of possible new sensibilities springing not from
a false sense of the fullness of the past, but from the chaos of the present. Hilberseimer
was associated with the Berlin dadaists, such as Hans Richter, Hannah Hdch, and
Raoul Hausmann, as well as with Otto Dix, Kurt Schwitters, Theo van Doesburg, El
Lissitzky, and Viking Eggeling, throughout the 'teens and '20s. Richter published the
magazine G: Zeitschrift fMr elementare Gestaltung (figs. 412 and 413), to which
Hilberseimer contributed articles. "This circle," Richter wrote, "included Arp, Tzara,
Hilberseimer, Doesburg, but soon also Mies van der Rohe, Lissistzky, [Naum] Gabo,
66Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-84), in The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufman
trans. and ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1968), "The Seven Seals"6 7Hans Richter defined Q as being "born from the need to say what we could not tolerate and, at the
same time, from the need to create a forum for the ideas that, after the Dada period and with
Constructivism, were characterized as representing the cultural tendencies of the new era." Hans
Richter, Kopfe und Hinterkbpfe (Zorich: Velag der Arche, 1967), 75
68Die Kommune was a dissident faction of the avant-garde whose members overlapped with other
groups. See Klieman, Die Novembergruppe.
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[Anton] Pevszner [sic], Kiesler, Man Ray, Soupault, [Walter] Benjamin, Hausmann,
etc." 69 The first issue of _, in July 1923, announced its refusal of romantic
subjectivity in rather harsh terms.
The basic demand of creative figuration [Gestaltung] is economy. Pure
relationship of power and material. This depends on elementary means and a
total command of means. Elementary order. Regularity. We have no need for
the sort of beauty that attaches itself like tinsel to our very being; rather we need
[to realize] the internal order of our being.70
Richter described Hilberseimer as "one of my oldest friends, since 1912.... As a friend
he was in some ways an anti-friend, a man never satisfied and a bastian contrary by
profession; a just man who was quite convinced he was in the right."7 1 Hilberseimer's
work was of interest also to Schwitters. In 1925 he published Hilberseimer's
Grosstadtbauten as numbers 18-19 of Merz.72 In Kunst und Zeiten, 1926, he lists
Hilberseimer among those artists with whom he sympathized and notes that
Hilberseimer's "steps take him from the dry premises of rational thought to proper
figuration." 73 And in an article on the Weissenhof Siedlung in Stuttgart, Schwitters
criticizes the trendiness of Peter Behrens and Hans Poelzig, who produced "pretty
Italian villas" in the "new style," and identifies a "danger" in Le Corbusier because he is
69Hans Richter, letter to Raoul Hausmann, 16 February 1964, quoted in Hausmann's letter to the
editor, "More on Group G," At Journal 24 (Summer 1965): 350-52
70Hans Richter and Werner Graeff, _ 1 (July 1923): 171Hans Richter, Kfpfe und Hinterk6pfe (ZUrich: Velag der Arche, 1967), 75
72The essay also appears as Hilberseimer, Groszstadtbauten (Hannover: Aposverlag, 1925).
73Kurt Schwitters, Kunst und Zeiten (1926), now in Schwitters, Das literarische Werk vol. 5, ed.
Friedhelm Lach (Cologne: DuMont Buchverlag, 1981), 236-40. Other artists listed were Braque,
Boccioni, Mondrian, Van Doesburg, Malevich, Lissitzky, Moholy-Nagy, and Mies van der Rohe.
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a genius dedicated to romantic excess. In contrast, Schwitters praises the Weissenhof
projects of Hilberseimer as "basic, normal, and devoid of daydreams." 74 As a final
instance of the artworld's interest in Hilberseimer's work, we should note that in 1924
some of his drawings were exhibited in the Novembergruppe section of the Grosse
Berliner Kunstausstellung and in the gallery Der Sturm. Hilberseimer's explicit
identification of his work with the elementarists against the expressionists 75 is an
identification with this circle of post-dadaist artists.
Hilberseimer's estimations of dadaist and post-dadaist art movements were
recorded in his art critical writings. In his essay "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst" of
1923, he summarizes the dadaist experience simply: "Dadaism brought with it a
general activity that had a vivifying effect on art. Its effect in Germany has been
essentially political." 76 But in "Dadaismus" of 1920, his characterization is put more
precisely in terms of subjectivity and dadaism's adversarial relationship with bourgeois
culture: "[In dadaism] the ancient feelings of security are dissolved and replaced by an
animated world, by restlessness, by excitement. The I, now set free from meaningless
bonds, 'flows freely into the cosmos.' Dada destroys the idols of culture and scorns
the serious tedium of art."77
74 Kurt Schwitters, "Stuttgart die Wohnung Werkbundausstellung," Der Sturm 18, no. 10 (1928):
148-50; now in Schwitters, Das Literarische Werk vol. 5, 280-86
75See previous chapter. Various notions of elementarism were in the air among the members of the
Berlin-Moscow axis. Hilberseimer would later suggest that the "new spirit" in much of the art shown
in the gallery Der Sturm may have come from Nietzsche, who had written of the
"Elementarphilosophie" of the pre-Socratics in contrast to Plato. See Hilberseimer's address to the
Technische Universitit, Berlin, 1963 (Hilberseimer Archives, Art Institute of Chicago Series 1, Folder
5/7). I owe this reference to Richard Pommer.
76Hilberseimer, "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst," 180.
77Hilberseimer, "Dadaismus," Sozialistische Monatshefte 26, nos. 25-26 (1920): 1120-1122. The
internal quotation is Hilberseimer's.
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For Hilberseimer, dada fulfilled the contestatory obligation of art to resist the
security of habit and explode the nostalgias for a reconciliation between subject and
object no longer possible. Furthermore, there is no reason not to allow that
Hilberseimer fully understood the dadaist politically motivated destruction of aesthetic
autonomy and aesthetic pleasure in the service of a specific cultural critique of Weimar
circa 1920. It is precisely the critical negational aesthetic practices and forms of
expression adopted by the dadaists, their rejection of art's traditional role as the
"production of specialities," which indicts any attempt to fall back into a falsely
primitivist reproduction of a reconciled world. So it is that the "truly primitive" impulse
of Hausmann, Dix, or Grosz can measure up to the realism of "a pictorial practice that
will not be a mimetic reproduction of nature but, rather, criticism, parody, drama, and a
new order springing from chaos." 78
Berlin dada was, as Hilberseimer recognized, first and foremost a political
weapon, "bloody earnest" and aimed at well-defined targets, an instrument of derision
and ridicule dedicated to the destruction of bourgeois chauvinism and the autonomous
artistic practices that it fueled. The "wide range" of hybrid artforms produced by the
Berliners between 1919 and 1923 reveal more than an elaboration of cubist
compositional techniques; the dadaists were aware of their assemblages, cabaret
productions, and photomontages as forms for a new politicization of intellectual work,
one that would give audiences to understand what kinds of future social regeneration
might be available by reordering their perception of the historical present.
78Ibid.
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What distinquishes dada from most other modern movements in art, and what is
important for our consideration of Hilberseimer's conception of dadaist practice, is not
the reductive thesis that "it's all political" (or as Max Ernst dismissed dada, "C'est
vraiment allemand. Les intellectuels allemands nepeuventpasfaire ni caca nipipi sans
ideologies."); instead, it is the acute awareness that affiliations between art and cultural
authority obtain both in the case of art's direct dependence on the institutional
ideological apparatus and in the unlikely condition of art's total autonomy. Dada
understood art as belonging not to some free-floating Geist or to some self-governed,
coherently determined domain, but to a worldly intellectual endeavor - enmeshed in
circumstance, historical contingency, and currents of thought; connected in complex
ways to power, social class and economic production, to the dissemination of values
and world pictures. What must be made clear is the proposition that culture itself - or
thought or art - was for dada as for Hilberseimer a quasiautonomous extension of
politico-economic reality. To adopt the language of Edward Said, "One could go so far
to say that culture ... is what gives the State something to govern." 79 Through a
ferocious decomposition of the images of the dominant values, dada attempted to
oppose the self-affirming machinery of culture as well as to reject "art's traditional role
as the 'production of specialities"' that encode the culture's values.
The terms with which dada defined the political instrumentality of art are
important in coming to a characterization of "a pictorial practice that will not be an
imitative reproduction of nature but, rather, criticism, vital parody, drama, a new order
79Edward Said, commenting on the writings of Antonio Gramsci, in his The World. the Text. and the
Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 171
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springing from chaos." After 1920 the Berlin avant-garde was becoming progressively
disillusioned with the political revolution. Junker militarism and nationalism had
proved far stronger than radical intellectuals with international associations had
originally expected. The entire cultural establishment in which dada was enmeshed
quickly became suspect in a way Lunacharsky's Narkompros organization, on which
the proto-dadaist members of the Arbeitsrat flir Kunst seems to have modeled some of
their more positive notions of engagement, was not. Society and culture were viewed
as fundamentally nonorganic entities, products of a system, a ruling order that was
progressively replacing technologies and spaces controlled by and for man with ones
spontaneously elaborated - of both wonder and fear, of civilization and death, with
potentials for destruction as well as new forms of life - that began to overwhelm man.
Georg Grosz saw it as
complete insanity to believe that Spirit or people of spirit ruled the world....
Our only mistake was to have been seriously engaged at all with art. Dada was
the breakthrough, taking place with bawling and scornful laughter; it came out
of a narrow, overbearing and overrated milieu.... We saw then the insane end
products of the ruling order of society and burst into laughter. We had not yet
seen the system behind this insanity.... Then, there would be no more
laughing.80
The portraits of Grosz and Dix present, among other things, a preoccupation
with the horor and disgust of the destruction of the war (a war viewed as propagated by
80George Grosz and Wieland Herzfelde, "Die Kunst ist in Gefahr" (Berlin, 1925); English translation in
Lucy Lippard ed., Dadas on Art (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 81.
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an overwhelming technology and the lies of bourgeois rationalism) and "oppose with
irony and cynicism the constraints on difference [Varietihafte] of our profiteering
world,"81 as Hillberseimer wrote. The artist, according to Grosz's self portrait (fig.
413), is a "pedantic automaton," at once a product of a mechanized, commodified
culture and its most violent enemy. Similarly, Hausmann's "Tate mdcanique, L'Esprit
de notre temps" (fig. 414), or his portrait of the artist, "Tatlin" (fig. 415), with their
isomorphism between man and machine, are more ambilvalent, accidental, "oneiric,"
accumulations of ready-made images than they are organized affirmations of machine
art. By Hausmann's own account, he was interested in demonstrating that "everday
man has nothing but the capacities which chance has glued to his skull, on the exterior
[extirieurment], the brain was vacant;" 82 that is, in showing that the possibility for
private redemption had been foreclosed by the penetration of the mechanization and
massification of the market into the most remote regions of the self, in showing the
reduction of the individual, at once exalted and ridiculed, to a nullity.
Dada demonstrates that artistic production in society has an inescapable dialectic
relationship with those mass-cultural formations that govern collective perception. It
will not be possible, henceforth after dada, to presume that aesthetic perfection and
disinterested contemplation possess a transhistorical value which places them outside or
beyond the material determinations of history. But more, dadaist practice appropriates
the very terms provided by capitalist society to perceptually interpellate the viewer-
8 1Hilberseimer, "Dix," Sozialistische Monatshefte, January, 1923 (Art Institute of Chicago, Series
8/3, Box 5/35), 66
82Raoul Hausmann, "L'Esprit de notre temps 1919," in Michel Giroud, ed., Raoul Hausmann: "Je ne
suis pas un photographe" (Paris: Ch~ne, 1975), 30
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advertisements, journalism, commercial products - and uses them in an
insurrectionary form of affiliation with that society, adhering to the bourgeois artistic
conventions of presenting a unique, fabricated, rectangularly framed objects even as it
subversively folds into the sigularity of those objects the dispersed images of bourgeois
culture. In this way, dada can be said to repeat reality but not to duplicate it; or in
Nietzschean terminology to construct appearances of the real against the horizon of
chaos, and in so doing, to enunciate the desire to abolish idealist and humanist
ideologies by dismantling the increasingly entrenched notion of the viewing subject as
an ideal, unified, centered self, undivided by conflicting psychical enticements or
material appetites, unencumbered in its contemplation of the abstract unity of the
autonomous art object that was to be both an inducement to and a metaphor for a
position of transcendence and mastery. For dada the human subject, to put it now in
Althusserian language, is structured like a mode of production, and as such cannot be
the centered subject of bourgeois epistemology and aesthetics, but is instead precisely
decentered to the degree that it is the bearer of different and often contradictory
structures.
Hillberseimer undertood this, but it must be underscored here that the critical
dissonance, shock, and "Wahrheitsfanatismus"83 of dadaist activities, as well as the
concommitant assault on the human center as the origin of sense, are interpreted by
Hilberseimer as directed toward a possible future. In speaking of dadaism,
Hilberseimer evokes Nietzsche's lesson of a world "where we will be able to be
original, something like parodists of the history of the world and God's clowns; to the
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point where, perhaps, our laughter possesses a future, out of the so many things
belonging to the present time that are condemned to oblivion." 84 If one cannot refute
the experience of chaos, one can nevertheless mediate it, transforming it into that
positive anticipation which is its correlative. Indeed, artistic practice for Hilberseimer
just is such mediation: "the formal-becoming of this expression [of the will of the
epoch, which is chaos] just is the work of art." 85 Hilberseimer quotes Hausmann to
verify his own thesis:
Times of decay, of stagnation, are at the same time epochs of new stimulation
[Neubelebung] to becoming. One breaks open the old to enable the new to be
formed. [We are] suspended between two worlds. In these times the
productive energy is inclined toward the grotesque and satirical, toward [as
Hausmann says,] "the laughing or ironic elevation of men over their no-longer-
appropriate responsibilities. So, too, the tendency in art - the objectification
[Gegenstundlichkeit] will lose sense, so to speak, through the presentation of its
refusal to correspond with the sense of events. By emphasizing the ridiculous,
the senseless, the repulsive..., through the figuration [Gestaltung] of the
deficiencies of the world, we are allowed to anticipate a higher world. By way
of representations, the sculptor must support such consciousness." [...] From
this paradox it follows that the senseless, repulsive, and hideous will let the
genuine and real step forward. 86
84Ibid.
85Hilberseimer, "Schopfung und Entwicklung," MS, 13. Agnes Kohlmeyer, "Apollo e Dioniso:
Hilberseimer critico d'arte," Rassegna 8, 27 (September 1986): 30-3 1, asserts that Hilberseimer can be
seen as part of the "formal Dadaist" tendency. I can agree with her assertion but would note its
incomplete formulation.
86Hilberseimer, "Schbpfung und Entwicklung," MS, 29. Hilberseimer notes that the internal
quotation is from Raoul Hausmann. I have not been able to find its source.
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Out of the banality, the senselessness, and triviality of the present emerges the
hope for a future. Hilberseimer wishes to locate the positive within the negative itself:
to grasp that the negative may serve as a means of access to the positive that reveals
itself through it; that the negative is the very authentication of the positive; and that
chaos is the constitutive condition of a new order. The lacerating ambiguity of
Hilberseimer's position follows from his wish to preserve the chaos-negating power of
spiritual intuition at the level of the individual human agent without collapsing into
either mysticism or individualism; and this crossed by his equally intense insistence that
the content of that intuition is immanent in the very chaos of the world.
Hilberseimer's posthumanist subject
And so we can finally characterize with some precision the concept of the
subject that emerges in Hilberseimer's account of expressionism, dadaism, and other
artistic practices by which he was surrounded. It is a subject that can be fitted into both
a vision of effective human agency and some more radical notion of a subjectivity
dispersed into the realms of industrialization, standardization, mass reproduction, and
consumption. That is, Hilberseimer understands the subject of modernism as at once
the particular constitution of knowledge, history, and discourse in a historically specific
and individual human agent, and the no less circumstantially dense plurality of forces
that has passed from both an arrogant bourgeois humanism and the expressionist
sentimentalization of individual distress to a new, postindividualist, posthumanist
framework. The subject as seen by Hilberseimer is continually interpellated or called
upon to take multiple and contradictory subject-positions, yet it is capable of binding
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these positions together into "a new order springing from chaos." "The I, now set free
from meaningless bonds, 'flows freely into the cosmos."' As an individual human
agent the artistic subject preserves the potentiality of negativity and resistance in its
capacity to mediate between an unsatisfactory external world and the anticipation of
other experiences, an anticipation representable in an aesthetically immanent way;
whereas the dispersed subject is destined to resolve itself in a superior, if vaguely
articulated, Nietzschean consciousness.
Such paradoxical, primitive, liberated energies as those invoked by
Hilberseimer search for nothing less than new constitutions of reality. Chaos as the
constitutive condition of the present reality; the present as the only reality from which
art might emerge; art as the formation of a conciousness whose horizon is determined
not by a mystique of the past, but by forms that reveal the essential movement of
human reality toward the future: Hilberseimer corrects expressionist anamnesis
precisely along the lines Ernst Bloch's notion of anagnorisis:
The doctrine of anamnesis claims that we have knowledge only because we
formerly knew. But then there could be no fundamentally new knowledge, no
future knowledge. The soul merely meets in reality now what it always already
knew as idea. That is a circle within a circle and just as inaccurate as the other
theory (anagnorisis) is revealing: that the new is never completely new for us
because we bring something with us to measure by it.... Anamnesis provides
the reassuring evidence of complete similarity; anagnorisis, however, is linked
with reality by only a thin thread; it is therefore alarming. Anamnesis has an
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element of attenuation about it; it makes everthing a gigantic dijd vu, as if
everthing had already been, nil novi subanamnesi. But anagnorisis is shock.87
Hilberseimer could not have known of this formulation made by Bloch in 1968
or of his magnum opus Das Prinzip Hoffnung (1954-1959); nor have I found any
evidence that he read Bloch's earlier Geist der Utopie (1918 and 1923). Yet the
evocation of Bloch's thought is not arbitrary in the context of this examination of
Hilberseimer's critical writings. For Bloch provides a way of conceptualizing the
future and its relationship to the present and the primitive that is suggestive for an
interpretation of Hilberseimer's own epistemology of art.
Bloch spent most of his intellectual life developing what he came to call his
ontology of "not-yet-being" or philosophy of hope, and articulating a hermeneutics of
restoration for the alienating and antagonistic cultural experiences of the present. 88 For
Bloch, the present totality, the latitudinal whole, was not a homologous set of
relationships and functions with one genetic center, such as the marxist mode of
production. However homogeneous it may appear in reductive analyses of socio-
economic essentiality, present reality truly comprised distinct, eccentric, and irreducible
spheres such as religion, nature, and art, as well as production, which were not mere
alienations produced by capitalism, and hence sublatable after its demise, but were
rather a "consequence of the laboriousness of the founding of the Kingdom
87Ernst Bloch, in a interview given in 1968; Michael Landmann, "Talking with Ernst Bloch: Korcula,
1968," Telos 25 (Fall, 1975): 178
880n Bloch, see especially Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1984), 174 ff. and Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971), 116 ff.
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[Miihseligkeit der Reichsgrandung], which expresses itself in the temporal process, as
well as spatially in the creation of spheres." 89 Furthermore, even while apparently
complicitous with the unfulfilled present, these Ungleichzeitig (non-synchronous)
spheres also contained emergent and at times explosive intimations of the future -
Spuren, or figural traces, marks, and signs of the "not-yet" which undermine the
dominant trends of the present.
Suspicious of claims that the past contained some archaic heritage of plentitude,
and that some original meaning could be recovered from the memory of that past, Bloch
stressed the interpenetration of present actuality and utopia - the present gives us raw
material for a hope for plenitude in the future. "The real of the essence is that which
does not yet exist, which is in quest of itself in the core of things, and which is
awaiting its genesis in the tendency and latency [Tendenz-Latenz]of the process. "90
As Fredric Jameson has argued, Bloch's utopia is, above all, a formal one.9 1
And it is therefore of little surprise that he finds in the forms of artworks and artifacts of
daily life the most persuasive examples of attempts of the subject to rejoin in immediate
experience with the things of the world, and to anticipate other possiblities. "Every
great work of art, above and beyond its manifest content, is carried out according to a
latency of the page to come, or in other words, in the light of the content of a future
which has not yet come into being, and indeed of some ultimate resolution as yet
89Ernst Bloch, "Aktualitat und Utopie. Zu Lukics' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsin," reprinted in
Philosophische Aufsatze zur Objektiven Phantasie, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 10 (Frankfurt, 1969), 618;
cited in Jay, Marxism and Totality, 182
90Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt; Suhrkamp, 1959) 2 vols., 41; emphasis in original
9 1Jameson, Marxism and Form, 146.
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unknown." 92 The very form and structure of the work themselves "represent an
ontological anticipation [Vorschein] of the real which both transcends that limited and
temporally developing object of the work and intends it at the same time, an ontological
anticipation precisely representable in an aesthetically immanent way. Here is
illuminated what dull or habituated sense still scarcely sees, both in individual events,
as well as in social or natural ones...." 93
Occasioned by the same social milieu and historical moment as Bloch's Geist
der Utopie, Hilberseimer sought to redirect the historical trajectory of culture from the
disasters that had befallen Europe since the First World War, and to discover behind the
distortions of the present, through the apparatus of hope, hidden ciphers - basic,
primal figures (whose forms we will see shortly), manifestations of the primitive
moment of subject-object identity - for a transfigured world. "Our age is necessarily
problematic. Perfection now would be judged hypocricy, just as comfortable
techniques retreat from the admission of the abyss...." But, "precedent teaches that
every creative age follows from such a relaxation, loosening, and disintegration, like a
perpetual antagonist.... Every revolution that disentangles a dismantled tradtion is
nothing less than the anticipation of a new becoming.... We live for as yet unfulfilled,
unconcluded horizons, a future pregnant with hope."94
We must now return to an examination of the forms of this hope, to the ciphers
for future to arise out of the chaos of the present. It is when these ciphers are fully
conceptualized that Hilberseimer's architectural production can been fully understood.
92Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 110; emphasis in original
93Ibid., 150; emphasis in original
94Hilberseimer, "Sch6pfung und Entwicklung," MS, 41
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Groszstadtarchitektur and
Weimar-stimmung:
the Paranoid Subject
Subjectivity, like objectivity, is an effect of a system of differences and deferrals. The
subject is not a unified consciousness, but a variable and dispersed entity whose very
identity and status is constituted in social practice. "[This] confirms that the subject,
and first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of
presence, that the subject is not present, nor above all present to itself before diffirance,
that the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, in becoming space, in
temporising, in deferral."95 Even though I use the words of recent critical theory to
characterize subjectivity, there is no greater confirmation of this than the subject
perceived by Hilberseimer as split between intentional human agency and dispersion
across systems beyond the horizon of individual intention. The artistic will of the
individual, which would seem to be the most certain sign of self identity, is in fact the
obliteration of that identity, the disappearing of the self in the autonomy and
determinateness of the Kunstwollen that extends before and beyond the individual even
as the individual seems to emerge. "The I, now set free from meaningless bonds" is
the I that "flows freely" into - is dispersed into - the structure of will.
95Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone, 1981), 29
401
Ludwig Hilberseimer and the Inscription of the Paranoid Subject
The subject as Neutrum
The psychic split perceived by Hilberseimer is, as we now know, the very
condition of subjectivity under industrial capitalism. The lived experience of individual
consciousness as a fragmented, compartmentalized, subjugated, and reified condition,
coupled with the hope of some radical utopian agency of mediation and colligation is
not just a glitch in our conceptualization of subjectivity which can be resolved either by
reasserting a notion of individuality as a monadic and autonomous center of activity and
freedom, or by voiding the category of the subject altogether. Rather the articulation of
such an experience conjoined with such a hope conveys the precise historical moment at
which the whole range of problems and questions constituting Hilberseimer's
problematic is cut through, and the concrete cultural situation in which the emergence of
his incription of the posthumanist subject can be understood. For if Hilberseimer's
writings often attempt to sound timeless and universally valid, his theoretical position,
as I have attempted to locate it, can be conceived only as a production or a displacement
of the very particular Stimmung of the Weimar Republic. Hilberseimer's ambivalence
toward the metropolis - the sense of a disenchanted euphoria, the mood comprising
almost equal parts of anxiety and elation, which finds its object in Berlin, the principal
city of the early twentieth century and the focus of industry, production, consumption,
massification, and all manner of worldliness - is just the ambivalence and paradox of
Weimar culture, where modernity and negativity, higher consciousness and alienation,
sobriety and unhappiness, authenticity and depthlessness, become almost inseparable.
As Peter Sloterdijk writes,
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The Weimar Republic is one of those historical phenomena through which we
can best study how the modernization of a society has to be paid for.... In the
intellegentsia, which consciously went through and participated in the process,
there is no longer anywhere a "false consciousness" in the simple sense but
rather dissolute consciousness on all sides.... Weimar art cynics train
themselves to play masters of the situation, while the situation in fact is one in
which things have gotten out of control and sovereignty is no longer
possible.... They impudently place their poses against the equally
overwhelming and mediocre destiny of the period: cynically allowing
themselves to be swept along - Hey, we're alive. The modernization of
unhappy consciousness. 96
In his study of Weimar culture, Critique of Cynical Reason, Sloterdijk uses
Heidegger's concept of "Anyone" to characterize the Stimmung of Weimar in terms of
the condition of subjectivity. Without seeking to make Hilberseimer's work a
homologue of Heidegger's, it will be helpful here to draw a comparison between their
respective theories of subjectivity - both of which turn on the deliberate confrontation
with the objective conditions of the "everyday" metropolitan experience - in order to
further characterize Hilberseimer's search to find material for the construction of a new
consciousness which might replace a dysfunctional and discredited humanism. In the
chapter "Anyone, or: The Most Real Subject of Modern Diffuse Cynicism," Sloterdijk
elaborates Heidegger's turn toward the everyday, in a series of passages which are
suggestive enough for our analysis here to quote at some length:
96Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987
[originally published as Kritik der zynishcen Vernunft, 1983]), 385
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[Heidegger] eavesdrops on the "subject" in the banality of the everyday mode of
being. The existential ontology, which treats Anyone and its existence in
everydayness, attempts something that would not have occurred even in a
dream to earlier philosophy: to transform triviality into an object of "higher"
theory.... A philosophy thus appears that participates ambivalently in a
disillusioned, secularized, and technicized zeitgeist.... What is the rare being
that Heidegger introduces under the name of Anyone? At first glance, it
resembles modem sculptures that do not represent any definite object and
whose polished surfaces do not admit of any "particular" meaning. Still, they
are immediately real and firm to the touch. In this sense Heidegger emphasizes
that Anyone is no abstraction - roughly, a general concept that comprises "all
egos"; instead, he wants to relate, as ens realissimum, to something that is
present in every one of us. But it disappoints the expectation of personalness,
individual purport, and existentially decisive meaning. It exists but there is
"nothing behind" it. It is there like modem, nonfigurative sculptures: real,
everyday, concrete part of a world but not referring at any time to an actual
person, a "real" meaning. Anyone is the neutrum of our ego: everyday ego,
but not "I myself." It represents in a certain way my public side, my
mediocrity. I have Anyone in common with eveyone else; it is my public ego,
and in relation to it, averageness is always in the right. As inauthentic ego,
Anyone disposes of any highly personalized decisiveness (Entschiedenhiet) of
its own. By nature, it wants to make everything easy for itself, to take
everything from the outside and to abide by conventional appearances. In a
certain respect, it also behaves in this way toward itself, for what it is it"self" it
also accepts, just like something it finds among other things that are simply
givens. This Anyone can thus only be understood as something
nonautonomous, which has nothing of itself or solely for itself. What it is is
said and given by others; that explains its essential distractedness
(Zerstreutheit).97
9 7 Ibid., 195-7
404
Groszstadtarchitektur and Weimar-stimmung: the Paranoid Subject
With this, then, comes the intial set of points I should like to draw out in
relation to Hilberseimer's construction of the metropolitan subject: First, banality,
triviality, everydayness are now the proper material for a theory of art and architectural
production. This much Hilberseimer gathered from dada. A rarefied and autonomous
aesthetic is no longer possible in the modem city, whether for pleasurable aloofness or
for resistance; instead a practice enmeshed in the everyday lifeworld is demanded.
Second, the subject itself, to the extent of its relation with the structure of the everyday,
cannot be thought as autonomous. Objectively structured like a mode of production,
the subject is not so much an abstraction as a Neutrum. The character of the subject is
given from the outside, and contradictorily. And thus it is, precisely, distracted. It is,
at bottom, against this distraction which expressionism, unsuccessfully by
Hilberseimer's lights, attempted to militate. Finally, as Sloterdijk demonstrates, the
concept of distraction (Zerstreuung) is explicitly linked with postwar Wiemar culture.
No other word is so saturated with a specific taste of the mid-twenties - of the
first German modernity on a large scale. Everything we have heard about
Anyone would be, in the final analysis, inconvceivable without the precondition
of the Weimar Republic with its hectic postwar life feeling, its mass media, its
Americanism, its entertainment and culture industry, its advanced system of
distraction. Only in the cynical, demoralized, and demoralizing climate of a
postwar society, in which the dead are not allowed to die (because from their
downfall political capital is to be made), can an impulse be diverted out of the
"zeitgeist" into philosophy to observe existence "existentially" and to place
everydayness in opposition to "authentic," consciously decided existence as a
"being unto death." Only after the military G~tterddmmerung, after the
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"disintegration of values," after the coincidentia oppositorum on the fronts of
the material war, where "good and evil" dispatch each other into the "beyond"
did such a critical "reflection" on "authentic being" become possible. In this
period, for the first time attention is drawn in a radical way to the inner
socialization. This period senses that reality is dominated by spooks, imitators,
remote-controlled ego machines. Each person could be a double
(Wiedergdnger) instead of itself. But how can one recognize this? In whom
can one still see whether it is "it-self" or only Anyone? This question stimulates
in existentialists deep cares about the important but impossible distinction
between the genuine and the nongenuine, the authentic and the inauthentic, the
articulated and the inarticulated, the decided and the undecided (which is simply
"as it is"). [Heidegger put it this way:]
Everything looks as though it is genuinely understood, comprehended
and said, but basically it is not, or it does not look as though it is, but
basically it is. 98
Sloterdijk makes it clear that the ambivalence of Heidegger's language in this
last quotation, an ambivalence born of the acute recognition of distractedness, should
not be understood cognitively (in the terms of science or information or knowledge) but
rather existentially. It is the existential pathos of the ambivalence that must be grasped.
It is this sort of ambivalence that leads Heidegger (and I am arguing Hilberseimer as
well) to search for authenticity in the very inauthenticity of Weimar, to search for a
mode of existence other than the present in the very conditions of the present. "The
Other can initially be asserted only by simultaneously averring that it looks precisely
like the One; seen from the outside, the 'authentic' does not distinguish itself from the
98Ibid., 199. The quotation of Heidegger is from Sein und Zeit, 173.
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'inauthentic' in any way."99 What society gives us as an existential reality - a firmly
ensconced structure of reification - already binds us to inauthenticity. And yet a
difference can be made, though the difference must needs look much the same as the
condition it opposes: hence, the dimension of resistance, hope, and redemption found
within ambivalence.
As long as ambivalence is at least still asserted as a fundamental feature of
existence, the possibility of the "other dimension" remains formally salvaged.
With this, Heidegger's movement of thought (Denkbewegung) seems to
already exhaust itself: in a formal salvaging of the authentic, which of course,
can look exacly like the "inauthentic".... Alienation, we learn, does not mean
that existence had been wrenched from it"self', but rather that the inauthenticity
of this alienation is from the start the most powerful and the most primitive
mode of being of existence. In existence there is nothing that, in an evaluative
sense, could be called bad, negative, or false. Alienation is simply the mode of
being of Anyone. 100
This characterization of subjectivity in Sloterdijk's extraordinary explication of
Heidegger's philosophy merges with the conditions of subjectivity already described in
the distinct but related aesthetic practices of expressionism and dadaism as construed by
Hilberseimer. And Weimar is the primary locus of the development of these
conditions, which I have taken the terms reification, rationalization, and alienation to
denote. It is in this sense that we can reassert that Hilberseimer's theoretical production
is fundamentally a historical act.
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99Ibid., 199.
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But it is with the publication of his book Groszstadtarchitektur in 1927 (fig.
417) that what only begins to emerge in the consideration of dada and expressionism is
fully thematized in Hilberseimer's theory: namely, a specific consideration of the
external economic structures and modes of production of which the subject (and the
subject's distraction) is an effect. Furthermore, it is with the publication of the
Hochhausstadt project in Groszstadtarchitektur that we find more fully explicated the
relationship between structural causality101 and architectural form, along with the
proposal of the possible, if as yet only imperfectly realized and only vaguely
discernible, future architectural form. It is here, then, that Hilberseimer's theory of the
subject as we have constructed it from his writings can be rejoined with the
consideration of his architectural projects with which we began this section of the
present study. The theoretical and historical moment of Hilberseimer's production is
just this exigency to construct the new form, the new order, the utopian configuration
of grosstadtiche society, from the chaos of the present. Hilberseimer maintains an
ambivalent commitment; indeed, he "asserts" an ambivalence toward that hegemonic
mode of production of his own present, which, as he understands it, both intends and
anticipates the future to be diverted out of the waste products of bourgeois humanism.
10 1Here a contradiction may be sensed relative to my earlier suggestion that Hilberseimer's
architecture/reality is not so much one of causality but of parallelism. But I will try to show presently
that simple causality is not an adequate characterization, but only a preliminary one.
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Groszstadtarchitektur as effect of industrial capitalism
Hilberseimer begins his book with a concise characterization of the GroJ3stadt
which conjoins its identification as a multinational economic organism with a
description of its psychological effects.
The present type of large city owes its birth above all to the economic form of
capitalist imperialism which is in turn closely connected to the evolution of
science and of production techniques. Its possibilities surpass by far the sphere
of the national economy, and its influence is reflected ever more strongly on the
world economy. With the maximum concentration and an extensive and
complete organization it achieves a superabundance of intensity and energy: as
soon as production does not find a sufficient outlet for its own exigencies, there
is a move toward overproduction and toward antagonism with other countries,
and a tendency to the stimulation of needs rather than to their satisfaction. Thus
the large city appears primarily as the creation of omnipotent large capital and
therefore imprinted with anonymity. Furthermore, it is a type of city with its
own socio-economic and psycho-collective bases, in which is found at the same
time the maximum isolation and the densest crowding together of its
inhabitants. In it, an enormously intensified rhythm of life [verstdrkter
Lebensrhythmus] very rapidly represses every local and individual element. 102
One cannot but connect this characterization of metropolitan anonymity, intensity, and
leveling with Simmel's Nervenleben, conceived as a result of the bombardment of
undifferentiated, free-floating, and contradictory images all generated by the monetary
economy. According to Hilberseimer, though the advanced capitalism of the
102Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur (Stuttgart- Julius Hoffmann, 1927), 1-2
409
Ludwig Hilberseimer and the Inscription of the Paranoid Subject
bourgeoisie had brought this city into being, the bourgeoisie had not been able to
control it. Through parasitic, speculative enterprise, the city had fallen into
disorganization. Only in a "socially ordered society where production corresponds to
the needs of men, not the greed for profits of privileged individuals, will the metropolis
become a meaningful organism." 103
And so the Grofistadt is also, for Hilberseimer, a productive organism in its
own right.
The great cities... were stamped as parasitic with respect to the rest of the
country and considered as organisms capable only of consumption and not of
production. Their true nature has been completely misconstrued, and the fact
ignored that it is precisely the large cities that automatically increase the
productive process, taking over with ever-increasing rapidity and ability the
direction of the economy and contributing in a substantial way to the material
and spiritual productivity of the country. 104
Hilberseimer here reveals the result of the profound influence exercised on radical
culture by the intelligentsia of "democratic capitalism." Not by chance he cites Henry
Ford, whose autobiography of "enlightened" capitalism, Mein Leben und Werk. had
appeared in German in 1923, and who had become something of an apostle of
assembly-line techniques and scientific management but also of productive capital. But
it was Walter Rathenau who had already seen that, within the expanding cycle of
production and consumption, "mechanical production has elevated itself to an aim in
103Ibid., 2
104Ibid.
410
Groszstadtarchitektur and Weinar-stimmung: the Paranoid Subject
itself;" 105 and had already expressed an ironic distain for the person who would futily
try to hold to old beliefs and values:
Now he strives with cunning to regain what has been lost and plants little
shrines in his mechanized world, just as roof gardens are laid out on factory
buildings. From the inventory of the times, here a cult of nature is searched
out, there a superstition, a communal life, an artifical naivete, a false serenity,
an ideal of power, an art of the future, a purified Christiantiy, a nostalgic
preoccupation with the past, a stylization. Half believing, half dissembled,
devotion is given for a while, until fashion and boredom kill the idol.106
What is more, Rathenau's description of the large cities that "shoot their petrified street-
threads over the country side," and of massive contructions that directly and indirectly
serve production 107 are echoed in Hilberseimer's expansion of metropolitan laws such
105Walter Rathenau, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2 (1977), 52
10 61bid., 93. It is interesting to compare Rathenau's cynical irony with Ernst Jnger's aestheticization
of war technology and the Fronterlebnis, but also with the opposite reactions of recent liberal humanist
evaluations of Hilberseimer's architecture. Richard Pommer, for example, remarks that "it is of course
the total elimination of nature that is so shocking and deadening in Hilberseimer's city...," and that his
avantgardism "does not help to explain the equally depressing absence of any visual excitement or
pleasure in Hilberseimer's necropolis...." Richard Pommer, "'More a Necropolis than a Metropolis.'
Ludwig Hilberseimer's Highrise City and Modern City Planning," in In the Shadow of Mies (Chicago:
The Art Institute of Chicago, 1988), 34-35. The point of this mention of Pommer's lament is not, of
course, to choose the aesthetic preferences of Rathenau or Junger over Pommer, but rather to insist that
aesthetic preferences in se can no longer be the basis of an interpretation of Hillberseimer.
10 7Rathenau's striking description of the mechanization of the city is worth repeating: "Visible and
invisible networks of rolling traffic crisscross and undermine the vehicular ravines and twice daily
pump human bodies fom the limbs to the heart. A second, third, fourth network distributes water, heat
and power, an electrical bundle of nerves carries the resonances of the spirit.... Honeycomb cells, fitted
out with silky fabrics, paper, timber, leather, tapestries, are ordered into rows; outwardly supported by
iron, stone, glass, cement..... Only in the old centers of the cities... residues of physiognomical
peculiarities are still maintained as almost extinct showpieces, while in the surrounding districts... the
international world warehouse extends...." "What then is the purpose of these unheard-of
constructions? In large part, they directly serve production. In part, they serve transport and trade, and
thuse indirectly production. In part, they serve administration, domicile and health care, and thus
predominantly production. In part, they serve science, art, technology, education, recreation, and thus
indirectly... once again production." Rathenau, 22, 51, respectively
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that "from the building of the city one arrives at the building of the country." 108
According to Hilberseimer,
From the fusion of national or multinational states we will arrive at economic
unions: for us, above all, the fusion of the European continent, today politically
torn apart, into a single economic entity, will constitute the premise for an
avant-garde urban policy in a productive sense, which will finally lead to the
solution of the problem of the Grofistadt.109
But what must be underscored in the present context is Rathenau's cogent
description of the laboring subject as an epiphenomenon of the apparatus of production:
"Labor is no longer an activity of life, no longer an accomodation of the body and the
soul to the forces of nature, but a thoroughly alien activity for the purpose of life, an
accomodation of the body and the soul to the mechanism...."110 If the subject does not
wish to be merely a cog in the the city-machine, it must stretch itself out across the
machine in unresisting accomodation. Here, again, the assertion of capitalism and
mass reproduction - taken together as the sign of the determination to crush the
individual and to pass from the sentimentalization of individual distress to a new,
postindividualist framework - emerges as a primary constituent of Weimar modernity,
even as it calls into question, as thoroughly as Hilberseimer's art critical writings, any
expressive or reflective model of subject construction.
108Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur, 20
109Ibid., 21
110Rathenau, 67; my emphasis
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For Hilberseimer, as for Rathenau, advanced capitalism harbors contradictory
forces. It is, on the one hand, the structural precondition of modernity, whose force
blasts subject from object and recolonizes the fragments of each in terms of purely
instrumental and functional categories (thus promoting what Hilberseimer saw as the
overdevelopment of science, know-how, and technique). It is, at the same time, the
proleptic basis for, if not a direct experience, then at least the figural projection of a
future restructuring of experience. Capitalism is itself the only force capable of
organizing and harmonizing the dissonance of an otherwise random concatenation of
objects and events into a rationalized totality. The "evil" of the GroJ3stadt is in
capitalistic "abuse," not in capitalism's substance. For capitalism itself is but an
obscured form of reason, and its productive attributes - rationalization, Fordism,
Taylorism, planification - and the corresponding massified subjectivity are constitute
what we might call Hilberseimer's "concrete utopia."111
Here, too, the full ideological force of Hilberseimer's proposition of the
Hochhausstadt (figs. 418 and 419) can be felt - properly ideological just to the degree
that it produces an entire image and structure of subject/object relations in an irreducibly
aesthetic modality. Without ever leaving the terrain of the architectural project,
Hilberseimer's total solution for the city projects a vehicle for our understanding and
experience of an actual, concrete, historical situation of everyday social life that is
intolerable but inescapable. One might speculate (in order to make to point more vivid)
that the inhabitants of Hilberseimer's Hochhausstadt are the very metropolitan subjects
111Emst Bloch referred to the Fronterlebnis - with its community of males uncorrupted by capitalist
exchange - as Ernst Jnger's "concrete utopia."
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cynically portrayed in the drawings and paintings of Grosz, Dix, and Hausmann, or in
Heidegger's picture of "Anyone." The vocation of architectural theory is thereby
revealed as the exigency to produce the image, the referent, the Stimmung - the
matter-of-factness, the new "intensified rhythms of life,"112 the new ascetic,
desacralized, and disenchanted objects, as well as the marked and expectant absence at
the heart of the actual, perceptable spaces in this city - in short, that very life world of
intolerable ambiguity, contradiction, and abstraction of which theory can then claim to
be the opposition, resolution, and displacement. Hilberseimer confirms that any future
solution has its precondition in present fact.
The chaos of the city of today can be opposed only by attempts at theoretical
systematization, having the purpose of enucleating from actual situations - in a
totally abstract way - the fundamental principles of urban planning, thereby
arriving at the fomulation of general norms that then permit the solution of
determined concrete problems. Only the abstraction of the specific case
enables, us, in fact, to demonstrate how the disparate elements that make up a
large city can be placed, in an orderly way, in relationship with the whole. 113
While Hilberseimer in his art critical writings had argued against the abstraction of
pictorial representation,' 14 it is the architectural abstraction of metropolitan actuality that
is now staged as the path to concreteness. Though the Hochhausstadt has usually been
interpreted in purely technocratic, functional, and organizational terms, 115 it seems to
112Ludwig Hilberseimer, "Dadaismus," Sozialistische Monatshefte 26, nos. 25-26 (1920): 1120-1122113Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur, 13; my emphasis
114See previous part of this section of the thesis.115For example, Gustav Stotz, the organizer of the Werkbund Weissenhof exhibition in Stuttgart in
1927, in a review of Groszstadtarchitektur, declared that Hilberseimer "proceeds in his observations
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be more correct in the larger context of Hilberseimer's theory of art - which in general
tends toward an ever greater degree of formalization if not abstraction - to construe it
as a logical and necessary progression of his thought toward a more purely and
completely formal incarnation. In the conjunction of Hilberseimer's theory with his
projects for metropolitan architecture we will see that his "enucleations" from actual
situations are nothing less, and nothing more, than elementary signs for an architectural
"not-yet," to use again Bloch's sense of the term.
Groszstadtarchitektur as production of Spuren
As early as 1919,116 in one of the few preserved examples of his early work,
Hilberseimer had organized his ideas for a Kleinstadt in a delicate but austere drawing
in one-point perspective (fig. 421), in a technique that followed Heinrich Tessenow's
drawing style used for representing his Heimatstil rural buildings (fig. 420), and
Friedrich Ostendorf's theoretical insistence on reduced, symmetrical building forms
determined by functional program and the spatial implications of concommitant streets,
plazas, and gardens. 117 The enfilade of repetitive single-family houses converge
from the decisive formative factors - economic, social and technical - without historical restrictions,
and leaves the formal and aesthetic side of the problem as a secondary concern." Gustav Stotz,
"Werkbund Gedanken," in Stuttgarter Neues Tageblatt. Beiblatt, 25 August 1928 (Hilberseimer
Archives, Art Institute of Chicago, Series 9/5, Folder 5). Manfredo Tafuri is one of the few recent
critics to find more than summary importance to Hilberseimer and the Hochhausstadt project. See
especially the chapter "Sozialpolitik and the City in Weimar Germany," in his The Sphere and the
Labyrinth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987 [orig. Italian, 1980]).
116The date is not certain. Hilberseimer's drawing of a Palace design, published in Deutsche Bauhttte
10 (1906), is his first published design. The drawing for a village mentioned here may be from the
same period, though it is most likely from a later group of drawings submitted to the Ausstellung
unbekannter Architekten in April 1919.
117See Heinrich Tessenow, Die Wohnhausbau (Munich, 1909); Paul Mebes, Um 1800. Architektur
und Handwerk im letzten Jarhundert ihrer traditionellen Entwicklung (Munich, 1908); and Friedrich
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toward a public building differentiated from the residences only by the organization of
its windows. The scheme is striking in its reduction and indifference, and it was to
serve as the formal armature from which Hilberseimer was to develop all of his later
urban proposals.
But it was his personal contact with, and his analyses and absorption of the
most advanced experiments of the elementarist avantgardes that provided Hilberseimer
with the conceptual mechanisms necessary for a decisive shift away from the
classicizing tendencies and stylistic influences of Tessenow and Ostendorf, and toward
his ultimate solution. 118 For Hilberseimer, it was C6zanne who had initiated the shift
toward "elementare Gestaltung" in his revelation of "the sphere, the cone, and the
cylinder, using these starting points nature can be moulded into new figures. His
pictures enable one to perceive once again what an organism is, what figuration is....
For the first time his work rises above the chaos of the confused world." 119 Cezanne
"opened the way to cubism," which continued this development:
Cubism is essentially a structure of planes mediating contrasting subdivisions.
It has recognized the particular ordinance of the work of art, like an
extraordianry organism with iron-clad laws of structure. It has consciously
touched on the elements of all formations, returning to geometric-cubic form. It
has recognized the identity between matter and form. In cubist works, in fact,
Ostendorf, Sechs Bflcher vom Bauen (Berlin, 1913-22). Ostendorf was Hilberseimer's teacher at the
Grand Ducal Technical University Fredericiana in Karlsruhe.118For example, see Hilberseimer, "Konstruktivismus," Sozialistische Monatshefte 28 (1922): 831-
34; and "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst," Sammiung Gabrielson G6teburg 1922-23 (Art Institute of
Chicago, Series 1/1, Folder 1/4), trans. in Manfredo Tafuri, "USSR-Berlin 1922: From Populism to
the 'Constructivist International,"' in Joan Ockman, et al., eds., Architecture Criticism Ideology
(Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985), 179-83.
119Hilberseimer, "Cdzanne," Sozialistische Monatshefte 28, nos. 1-2 (1922): 64
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one sees the contrasts of manufacture and varied materials forced into unity by
compositional points of view. An artistic principle, which [Schwitter's]
Merzkunst has systematically elaborated. 120
I should underscore here the mediational role - understood in the sense I have
discussed earlier - between art and reality ascribed by Hilberseimer to cubism and the
Merz work. As well as Schwitters, it was Archipenko (fig. 422) who for Hilberseimer
recapitulated this overall scheme of development, beginning as an expressionist
sculptor, then developing his "dynamic-constructivist fantasies" through analogies with
and syntheses of the forms of "New York skycrapers, glass constructions, of the
machine and the airplane.... Through the reduction to the fundamental he came to his
synthesis of form." 121 And finally, whereas "Suprematism carried non-objective art to
its ultimate possibilities," and "seeks the point of nothingness in art," it was the
constructivists who "have traveled a new path. That of reality."
From construction in painting the constructivists have moved on to the
construction of objects. To architecture in the broadest sense of the word.
Constructivism is the logical consequence of methods of work that are based on
the collectivity of our time. Thus it has a base that is of a general rather than a
subjective nature. It perceives the subordination of art to society without
reserve, as of all of life. It seeks its elements in the expressions of our
mechanized and industrialized time. Mathematical clarity, geometrical rigor,
functional organization, extreme economy, and the most exact possible
120Hilberseimer, "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst"
121Hilberseimer, "Archipenko," Sozialistische Monatshefte, May 1921 (Hilberseimer Archives, Art
Institute of Chicago, Series 8/3, Box 5/43): 465-66. Compare Hilberseimer's analysis of
Archipenko's sythesis of New York skyscrapers, etc. to his own appropriation of the same in his
architecture.
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constructiveness are problems that are not only technical but also eminently
artistic. They determine what is properly essential in our epoch. The
constructivist method brings any object into the gamit of formation. Not
suppressing liveliness, but forming a reality. The works of the Constructivists
are, when all is said and done, nothing but experiments with materials. They
consciously work toward a solution to the new problems posed by material and
by form. Theirs are merely works of a transition toward functional architectural
constructions. The ultimate goal is a well-disciplined preparation for
architecture. 122
It was Hilberseimer's introjection of the formal experiments of the avantgarde
that sponsored this movement toward elementary form and enabled his subsequent
architectural designs. "To develop adequate types for [the buildings of which our cities
consists] according to their purpose and function, the materials used and the structures
employed, constitute the real problems which the Elementarists have to solve."123 In
Groszstadtarchitektur, Hilberseimer projected his evolutionary schema toward its
ultimate destiny in elementarist architecture.
Like every discipline, architecture, too, is confronted with the pressing need to
define its fundamental principles and the means at its disposition. In this
regard, painting has carried out a valuable preliminary task, by focusing
attention for the first time on the fundamental forms of every art: geometric and
cubic elements, which represent a maximum of objectification. The simple
122Hilberseimer, "Anmerkungen zur neuen Kunst"
123The passage continues, "This will lead to an architecture which is direct and free from all romantic
reminescences, in agreement with present daily life, not subjective and individualistic, but objective and
universal.... Clarity, logic, thoughtfullnesss will lead to a unification. All architectural work, as
different as it may be, is the result of the same spirit, an unfolding of it." Hilberseimer, "Berlin
School of Architecture of the Twenties," unpublished translation of Berliner Architektur der 20er Jahre
(1967) (Hilberseimer Archives, Art Institute of Chicago Series 8/1, Folder 7/10), 51-52.
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solid bodies - the cube, the sphere, the prism, the cylinder, the pyramid, the
cone - pure compositional elements - are fundamentals of all architecture.
The exactness of their definition requires formal clarity and imposes order on
chaos, in the most concrete ways.124
Late in 1923 Hilberseimer designed his second scheme for dwellings, the
Wohnstadt for 125,000 people (fig. 424), first published in 1925 by Kurt Schwitters as
Merz 18/19125 and later in Groszstadtarchitektur. It is stylistically altogether different
from his earlier Kleinstadt project. A related drawing (fig. 425) published as an
illustration of Hilberseimer's "Der Wille zur Architektur," 126 provides what can be
taken as a model for the public building shown at the center of the Wohnstadt
perspective, and is itself the "same" building as the Chicago Tribune save some
volumetric redisposition (compare fig. 408). But Hilberseimer's repetition works at a
structural level as well as an imagistic one. The Wohnstadt project comprises walk-up
apartments organized on a Zeilenbau system, with thin slabs oriented north-south, and
commercial spaces housed in lower blocks along the wider east-west streets (fig.
424a). Rapid transit lines are sunken along the axis of the plan, connecting the
residential satellite town to the main city, which was to be for work and business only.
The apartments are minimal, modeled on American hotels (fig. 424d). But what is
remarkable is how the definitive perspective of the project (fig. 424b) repeats that of the
Kleinstadt project of 1919 - in the construction of the perspective, in the functional
124Hilberseimer, Groszstadtarchitektur, 99-100
125Ludwig Hilberseimer, Grossstadtbauten (Hanover- Aposs-Verlag, 1925)
126Hilberseimer, "Der Wille zur Architektur," Das Kunstblatt 5 (May 1923): 133-140; illustration is
on p. 140, captioned "Entwurf zu einem Fabrikbau." The project was further developed and published
in Hilberseimer, "Grosstadtische Kleinwohnungen," Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung 32 (1929): 1-6.
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disposition of the public building and the residences, in the street space defined by the
buildings (compare fig. 421). Here we return to the radical repetition and denunciation
of invention with which, as we have seen, Hilberseimer was involved, but now we see
it within the very gestation and formation of the project.
Here, too, we witness Hilberseimer's version of what Bloch called Spuren, or
figural traces and signs of the latent "not-yet" which arise out of, but seek to
undermine, the dominant trends of the present. Recall Bloch's suggestion that these
"represent an ontological anticipation of the real which both transcends that limited and
temporally developing object of the work and intends it at the same time, an ontological
anticipation precisely representable in an aesthetically immanent way."127
Hilberseimer's Spuren are "the cube, the sphere, the prism, the cylinder, the pyramid,
the cone - pure compositional elements" whose exactness of definition and formal
clarity "imposes order on chaos, in the most concrete ways." In the Wohnstadt the
"valuable preliminary" elementarist studies analyzed by Hilberseimer find their
architectural analogue in the reiterative cell and converge with the distracted subjectivity
given by Weimar culture. All of which produces architectural Spuren structured on
radical repetition, seriality, and asserted ambivalence toward the actual situations from
which they emerge.
In architecturalizing the elementary forms of the pictorial avant-garde,
Hilberseimer also reconnects his research with the most advanced urban planning
projects of the time. It is the Wohnstadt and Le Corbusier's Contemporary City of
127Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt; Suhrkamp, 1959) 2 vols., 150; emphasis in
original
420
Groszstadtarchitektur and Weimar-stimmung: the Paranoid Subject
Three Million of 1922 that stands between Hilberseimer's Kleinstadt project of 1905
and the Hochhausstadt of 1924 (figs. 418, 419).128 According to Hilberseimer, the
failure of Le Corbusier's project was in its faulty calculation of possible densities of the
residential area and its inablity to solve the traffic problems; it was these shortcomings
which prompted Hilberseimer's critique of Le Corbusier's effort. Hilberseimer's
project relates the residential and commercial functions by superimposing fifteen-story
apartment slabs onto five-story commercial volumes in 600 meter by 100 meter city
blocks and coordinating the pedestrian and vehicular traffic specific to each in separate
levels. Hannes Meyer's conceptualization of nomadic space is here made fully
concrete. For the elevators and rapid transit systems and the coordinated places of
dwelling and work eliminate the need (and the possibility) of bourgeois domestic
entourage. But what is most striking is, again, the repetition of the Kleinstadt and the
Wohnstadt project(s), now with almost no modification of the latter other than an
increase in size, the separation of traffic, and the addition in the perspective of
metropolitan people walking the streets of the city, evenly dispersed by the flow of the
city's forces (figs. 418, 419). This last addition is a pictorial adjustment which
thematizes what was already implicit in the earlier projects: that the constitution of the
metropolitan subject is fundamental to this architecture. The differential play of subject
and object now finds literal representation.
128Hilberseimer pointed out that the Hochhausstadt was at once a critique and an homage to Le
Corbusier's project, what he called the only other fundamental, theoretical demonstration of the
problem of giving form to the chaos of the metropolis. Hilberseimer, Groszstadctarchitektur, 13. "Le
Corbusier does not concentrate [the density of the population], as it seems at first glance, but only
orders and improves. Without any change in principle. Without rethinking the problem anew." Ibid.,
15
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In Hilberseimer's constant repetition of his own project we find confirmation
that, in the long run, the content of the new architecture stands judged by its form,
which is the most certain index to the actual, vital possibilities of that social moment
from which it springs. Hilberseimer's evolutionary schema involves a constant
movement away from the gritty and complicated factuality of society and toward the
various determinate, elementary traces to which society's content can be reduced, and
whose conceptual limits and inadequacies stand as immediate figures of the limits of the
concrete social situation itself. I have been describing the force of this movement as
reification, but we must find another interpretive language with which to comprehend
the now superattenuated link between architectural form - understood as a system of
signs which is "semi-autonomous" (in an Althusserian sense) - and the cultural sphere
or "structural totality" which is its ultimate referent. And if over-eager assertions of "a
free-play of signifiers" or "the discourse of the simulacral" (a la Baudrillard) seem
premature, we must nevertheless find some way to explicate a signifying practice like
Hilberseimer's, which generates formal patterns and subjectivities but, freed from the
ballast of interiority and plentitude, seems nevertheless to hover above the everyday
lifeworld in mid-air.
Groszstadtarchitektur as mass ornament
Siegfried Kracauer once defined the intention of his critical analyses of the
"surface manifestations of an epoch" which resemble "the aerial photographs of
landscapes and cities for [they do] not emerge from the interior of a given reality, but
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rather appear above it."129 Kracauer writes, "Spatial images [Raumbilder] are the
dreams of society. Wherever the hieroglyphics of these images can be deciphered, one
finds the basis of social reality." 130 For Kracauer, the aesthetic topography of mass
culture is the surface that reveals the movement of society within a historical context,
and what he called "the mass ornament" was, in the Taylorized culture of Weimar, "the
aesthetic reflex of the rationality aspired to by the prevailing economic system." 13 1 It is
Kracauer's notion of the mass ornament that I would propose as the concept with
which to frame my conclusions about Hilberseimer's work.
Kracauer's predominant example of mass ornament is the Tiller Girls, an
American dance troupe who began performing in Berlin during the period of inflation.
Not only were they American products; at the same time they demonstrated the
greatness of American production. I distinctly recall to appearance of such
troupes in the season of their glory. When they formed an undulating snake,
they radiantly illustrated the virutes of the conveyor belt; when they tapped their
feet in fast tempo, it sounded like business, business; when they kicked their
legs high with mathematical precision, they joyously affirmed the progress of
rationalization; and when they kept repeating the same movements witout ever
interrupting their routine, one envisioned an uninterrupted chain of autos gliding
from the factories into the world, and believed that the blessings of prosperity
had no end. 132
129Siegfried Kracauer, "The Mass Ornament," New German Critique 5 (Spring 1975): 69; emphasis
in original
130Siegfried Kracauer, "Uber Arbeitsnachweise," Frankfurter Zeitung, 17 June 1930; reprinted in
Kracauer, Strassen in Berlin und anderswo (Frankfurt, 1964), 70.
131Kracauer, "The Mass Ornament," 70
132Siegfried Kracauer, "Girls und Krise," Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 May 1931; quoted in Karsten Witte,
"Introduction to Siegfried Kracauer's 'The Mass Ornament'," New German Critique 5 (Spring 1975):
63-64.
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Like the constellations of Tiller Girls, Hilberseimer's mass ornament generates
a correspondingly massified subject: "Only as parts of a mass, not as individuals who
believe themselves to be formed form within, are human beings components of a
pattern."133 And like the Tiller Girls, Hilberseimer's mass ornament is an end in itself.
According to Kracauer, the mass ornament - unlike military demonstrations, say,
whose aesthetic order is a means to an end, or in any case, tied to feelings of
patriotism, loyality, and morality, or gymnastic configurations which have a functional
and hygenic dimension - has neither aesthetic nor functional meaning. "In the end
there is the closed ornament, whose life components have been drained of their
substance." 134 Nevertheless, in a series of passages remarkable for their relation to
what we have seen in Hilberseimer's work, Kracauer takes a position against cultural
pessimism and attempts to redeem the mass ornament, precisely because of its
structural relationship to the cultural totality. I shall therefore quote from the essay at
length.
The ornament, detached from its bearers, must be understood rationally. It
consists of degrees and circles like those found in textbooks of euclidean
geometry. Waves and spirals, the elementary structures of physics, are also
included: discarded are the proliferations of organic forms and the radiations of
spiritual life. Hereafter, the Tiller Girls can no longer be reassembled as human
beings. Their mass gymnastics are never performed by whole, autonomous
bodies whose contortions would deny rational understanding. Arms, thighs
and other segments are the smallest components of the composition.
133Kracauer, "The Mass Ornament," 68
1341bid., 68
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The structure of the mass ornament reflects that of the general contemporary
situation. Since the principle of the capitalist production process does not stem
purely from nature, it must destroy the natural organisms which it regards either
as a means or as a force of resistance. Personality and national community
(Volksgemeinschaft) perish when calculability is demanded; only as a tiny
particle of the mass can the individual human being effortlessly clamber up
charts and service machines. A system which is indifferent to variations of
forms leads necessarily to the obliteration of national characteristics and to the
fabrication of masses of workers who can be employed and used uniformly
throughout the world.
Like the mass ornament, the capitalist production process is an end in itself....
It is conceived according to rational principles which the Taylor system only
takes to its final conclusion. The hands in the factory correspond to the legs of
the Tiller Girls.... The mass ornament is the aesthetic reflex of the rationality
aspired to by the prevailing economic system.
... I would argue that the aesthetic pleasure gained from the ornamental mass
movements is legitimate. They belong in fact to the isolated configurations of
the time, configurations, which imbue a given material with form. The masses
which are arranged in them are taken from offices and factories. The structural
principle upon which they are modeled determines them in reality as well.
When great amounts of reality-content are no longer visible in our world, art
must make do with what is left, for an aesthetic presentation is all the more real
the less it dispenses with the reality outside the aesthetic sphere. No matter how
low one rates the value of the mass ornament, its level of reality is still above
that of artistic productions which cultivate obsolete noble sentiments in withered
forms - even when they have no further significance.135
425
135Ibid., 69-70; emphasis in original.
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For Kracauer, as for Hilberseimer, capitalism is a stage in the process of
demystification (Entzauberung) by which history, through reason, continually
dismantles those superstructural and naturalizing myths whose regressive effect is to
prolong the notion of some unchanging and proprietary human essence.
However, the rationale of the capitalist economic system is not reason itself but
obscured reason.... It does not encompass human beings. The operation of the
production process is not set up to take them into consideration, nor is the
formation of the socio-economic organization based on them. There is not one
single instance where the system is based on human essences.... Capitalism
does not rationalize too much but too little.136
For Kracauer, as for Hilberseimer, the sign of capitalist thought is abstraction,
but the present state of abstractness is ambivalent; its alternative poles are the growth of
abstract thought or the decline into false concreteness. 137 All of which means that the
process of demystification and demythologizing is incomplete. In this context,
Hilberseimer's constant reassertion of the cube, the sphere, the prism, the cylinder, the
pyramid, the cone, the cell - all depleated, austere, abstract pictorial and architectural
forms - should not seem surprising, and neither should his ambivalence be
understood as a legitimate mode of architectural thought. The mass ornament just is
this abstraction and this ambivalence, and the recognition of the ornament is the
recognition that the possibility for a more concrete, articulate, private figure of
redemption for the present has been foreclosed by modernity itself.
136Ibid., 72
137Recall the analysis of Hilberseimer's art theory at the beginning of the second part of this section.
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Groszstadtarchitektur as paranoid totalization
But to dwell only on ambivalence, abstraction, and distraction is to miss the
other, dialectically related side of the Weimar-stimmung. Initially, this could be
characterized as a kind of euphoria orjouissance. The concept unites the experiences of
orgasmic pleasure, death, and the moment of self-obliteration. Roland Barthes
describes the texte de jouissance as a text that takes an quasi-erotic pleasure in
accomplishing the death of its subject in two senses: the dissolution of its topic (subject
matter) and its person (the author or reader). The texte de jouissance is a text in which
"language is in pieces, and culture is in pieces" and where nothing can be recovered
from the social vacuum through conformity to the "canonical languages" of society.
Such a text produces a "fading" of the subject by destroying all possible meanings; it
creates a "hole" which "swallows the subject of the game - the subject of the text" by
"rocking the reader's historical, cultural, and psychological foundations and the
consistency of his tastes, values, and memories." But if the text is nihilisitc, it also, at
the same time, contains "the trace of an affirmation." 138 This is the same contradiction
of negation and affirmation that we find in Hilberseimer. For as his work of
dissolution is continued - penetrating not only the abstract and ambivalent ornamental
sign, and threatening not only the human body, but now the very interior of that other
entity (whose construction on the model of the body we have already analyzed), the
distracted subject itself- we witness, first, the vision of the humanist subject seared
138Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975 [orig. French 1973]),
23, 25-26, 36-36, respectively
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hard, brittle, and transparent to the exterior forces of which it is an effect, and then, the
final break-up of the subject in mid-air. This is the ephoria of self liquidation through
mechanization once again perhaps, but now, unlike with dadaism or Meyer, with no
resistant materiality left as residue.
The human figure used in this mass ornament has begun its exodus from the
organic splendor and individual constituency [Gestalthaftigkeit] and entered the
realm of anonymity into which it exteriorizes itself when it stands in truth and
when the knowledge radiating from its human source dissolves the contours of
the visible natural form. 139
Hilberseimer projects his analyses of present culture toward a utopian future.
But here we must recall that, to the extent that the mass ornament, including
Hilberseimer's architectural version of it, presents itself as a fetishization of existing
psycho-physical culture, and to the extent that the consumption of the ornamental
figures distracts from concrete, material action toward changing the current social
system, it becomes comprehensible how fascism, a short time later, would be able to
reinvest those mass ornaments that lay devoid of substance with an altogether
unintended and horrifyingly different meaning; so that the masses would ultimately
come to claim to see their own triumph of the will in the megalomania of the ciphers
and spectacles of Naziism. And here we can recollect my earlier claim that the
139Kracauer, "The Mass Ornament," 73
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disintegrating ambiguity of Hilberseimer's work stands in uneasy parallel to the
disintegration of Weimar Germany and its passage into fascism. 140
Hilberseimer's utopian neutralization of capitalism ends up making a
contribution, above and beyond its value as an instrument of urban analysis, to the
production of a version of the mass ornament, and projects a form, more properly
ideologically determined than most architectural critics have allowed, according to
which it is proposed that society be organized. Understood in this way, the
Hochhausstadt comes to constitute something like an impossible third term which
attempts to resolve the objective demands of the social with subjective existence: the
project registers the subjective oscillation between massification, critical individual
agency, dispersion into a postindividual collective framework, and the reactionary
capitulation of individuality to the suprahistorical forces of technology, blood, and
nation. 141 In this sense, the Hochhausstadt itself can still be described as a mediation
140The idea of a dialectic of progress, of advances in society taking place through repression of
individuals, is a central theme in modem social theory evident in writers from Hegel to Weber, Freud,
and Marx. But Weimer's right-wing intellectuals contributed to an irrationalist and nihilist embrace of
technology and the eclipse of the bourgeois individual through a reactionary reading of Nietzsche,
elevating the idea of the Fronterlebnis over effeminate normative standards, linking the concept of
eroticized technological beauty to an elitist notion of the will, and finally interpreting war technology
and the metropolis as the embodiment of that beauty and that will. Perhaps Ernst Jnger is the most
vivid example of the fetishization of technological that begins sounding very close to the language of
Hilberseimer, but culminates in Naziism. For example, Ringer wrote, "The country and the nation...
must come to terms with the following necessity: We must penetrate and enter into the power of the
metropolis, into the forces of our time - the machine, the masses, and the worker. For it is in these
that the potential energy so crucial for tomorrow's national spectacle resides.... [Ilt is precisely these
masses who will produce a decisive and unrestricted leader, one who will have far fewer restrictions on
his actions than even the sovereign of the absolute monarchy did." Ernst Ringer, "Grosstadt und Land,"
Deutsches Volkstum 8 (1926): 579-80. What separates Hilberseimer from such thought, I believe, is
precisely the de-aestheticization and de-eroticization of mass technology.
14 1The latter was described by Ernst Ringer as an "anonymous slavery," saying, "it is certainly our
innermost will to sacrifice our freedom, to give up our existence as individuals and to melt into a large
life circle, in which the individual has as little self-sufficiency as a cell which must die when separated
from the body." Ernst Ringer, "Fortschritt, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit," Arminius 8 (1926): 8.
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on the order of Simmel's concept of style or Meyer's Co-op form, as an architectural
production standing between subject and object.
And yet, another structure, which can now be specified, overlaps that of
Groszstadtarchitektur as an effect of metropolitan actuality, as production of Spuren,
and as mass ornament. Hilberseimer's conflictual model of subjectivity - the
recognized loss of an authentic relation with the external world coupled with the hope to
recapture a relation by building a world up again - shares the structure of paranoia, in
which conflictual anxieties become projected forms. Of course, the passage from (or
even coincidence of) the radical desire for resistance and change to (or with) the
increasingly cynical self-resignation is not unfamiliar, especially, perhaps, on the
political left.142 And given our analysis in this section, Hilberseimer's affirmational
internalization of the schizophrenic dissolutions of capitalism - his Nietzschean choice
- may correctly, I think, be interpreted as a point of contact with thefear of that
suprapersonal system of modernity.
For Hilberseimer, the artistic subject must still be the principal agency of
mediation between the realm of production and the realm of form. Though he
recognizes that the individual subject in modernism is ineluctably dispersed, his
Nietzchean conception of the heroic artist still requires a unifying principle of the
subject. Hilberseimer's solution, however, is not to reassert individual unity, but to
totalize the disunifying components of the real: Riegl's supraindividual Kunstwollen
replaces the individual subject in a construction that can totalize capitalism as the
142See, for example, Walter Benjamin, "Left-Wing Melancholy. (On Erich K~stner's New Book of
Poems)," Screen 15, no. 2 (Summer 1974 [orig. 1931]): 28-32.
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socioeconomic force of modem society, Fordism or Taylorism as its mode of
production, cellular repetition and seriality as its architectural form, and dispersal as the
subjective condition of everyday life. The fundamental category under which
Hilberseimer's thought operates is that of the whole: we oscillate back and forth
between cellular and structural, molecular and molar, local and global, euphoria and
distraction, until a totality of "will" is reached. As the Kunstwollen becomes a kind of
field phenomenon, it appears to operate as a virtual subject, accountable to no one while
seeming to account for everything, and thus resolving the tension between the objective
reality and some future utopia arising from it. But the form of that utopia is, as we
have seen, already presignified as a possiblilty, as a possible category, by the objective
reality of the present. Hilberseimer's totality is an affirmational tautology - an ecstatic
surrender of the subject to the very force that assures its dissolution.
I would like to suggest that this particular inscription of the subject I have been
trying to articulate - a postindividual subject at once subjected to material forces and
systems of signification beyond its control, and at the same time, capable of mediating
or totalizing those external forces and systems with the internal economy of
architectural form - this doubled subject is not constructed for nothing. It is an
"enunciative" attempt to compensate for the loss of figurability that I have already
mentioned - the loss of signification, the loss of the paternal fiction of humanist
thought - to the inauthenticity of mass culture. It is an attempt to insert into an
imposed order an alternative space of action, itself an "effect produced by the
operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent
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unity of conflictural programs." 143 It is an attempt to salvage, within the modality of
architecture, some vestige of artistic agency that might replace a dysfunctional and
discredited humanism.
The duplicity of humanism lies in its implacable claim to individual rights on a
reality that does not permit alternative constructions - indeed, a reality that does not
even know itself as a construction - as well as the insistence on the subject's
innocence of reality's formation: the confident, controlling apparatus of self-
affirmation. In contrast, what seems to be to be at the root of Hilberseimer's urge to
totalize is, as I have said, a kind of paranoia: a paranoia that is all too cognizant of
distraction as the fundamental condition of everyday life, all too aware of a world out of
control, and consequent of this awareness, tries to fend off the threatening and
destructive identification between the discursive formations of architecture and social
reality in favor of some more affirmational construction of the same. This paranoia
takes its directive from Hilberseimer's ideological and epistemological imperative to
maintain that a correspondence continues to exist between architectural discourse and
the social world, and that there is a supraindividual artistic-heroic subject,
reenfranchized and aggrandized, that resides in and mediates that correspondence.
And so the maintenance of that correspondence between subject and object must
obtain through the production and affirmation of some object as well as a subject. This
much we have already seen. But how can Hilberseimer's simultaneous production of
object and subject be called paranoid? According to Freudian psychoanalysis, there are
143Michel de Certeau, "Walking in the City," in The Practive of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984), 117
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two primary factors involved in paranoia. First is the withdrawal of the cathetic
relationship of the subject with the outside world, a divestment of the subject's mental
and emotional energy in the object. Withdrawal of cathexis is the precondition of the
perceptual registration (via hallucination) of the image of the desired object. "With a
reversal to unpleasure [the libido] clings to the perceptions into which the object has
been transformed.... The libidinal cathexis heightens the images that have become
perceptions, transforming them into hallucinations."144 Second, the withdrawn libido
returns to and aggrandizes the ego, becoming auto-erotic and narcissistic; this is a
regression to an earlier functional mode of the ego. At this point the world is perceived
as hostile to the subject and the subject becomes agressive toward the previously
desired object. Paranoia, then, emerges as the delusional reconstruction of a world, the
attempt to recapture a relation with the world. The paranoiac analysand constructs,
from the start as it were, "in a distorted form precisely those things which neurotics
keep hidden." 145 The paranoiac projects onto external objects anything perceived as
threatening and destructive within the ego. The perception of external reality is entirely
produced by an internal psyhcic economy but is imagined as outside the body.
Paranoia itself, then, is already an interpretation. Unlike in neurosis, in paranoia there
is no internal tension between subject and object to be overcome through a process of
analysis, all disturbances in the subject/object relationship having been expelled into a
set of images, signs, and identifications which already guarantee a resolution in totality.
The paranoiac's delusional conceptions of reality "make demands on the thought-
144Sigmund Freud to Carl Gustav Jung, in Letters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 40
145Sigmund Freud, "Psychoanalytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia,"
1958 [1911], in Freud, Standard Edition, vol. 12 (London: Hogarth Press), 9
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activity of the ego until they can be accepted without contradiction.... [These are]
interpretive delusions."146 Such interpretive strategies constitute the real lifeworld of
the paranoiac.
The return to libidinal attachment to the ego in paranoia parallels the return of
artistic energies to an aggrandized Kunstwollen in Hilberseimer's theory. And the
production of external signs by a wholly internal psychic economy in paranoia parallels
the projection of architectural Spuren by a purely formal mechanism (what I earlier
called Hilberseimer's system of simulacra). What is important about these paranoid
symptoms here is that they are the consequence of the effort to maintain the fiction,
exactly, of a wholeness in the self-engendering economy of the subject-object
producing mechanism in the face of a perceived loss of boundaries and significations.
This projective, interpretive mechanism is thus both a production of and a defense
against reality, an objectifying apparatus that produces coherence but entails closure.
And its structure can be found in the architecture of Hilberseimer, in his search for a
total system operative in the gap above the subject and its experience of everyday
reality. Through the hypostatization of Wahrheitsfanatismus, paranoia and distraction
replace humanism and mimesis in the ambiguous space of Weimar culture.
Perhaps what I have been describing is the transition from a failed idea or
possibiltiy of sustaining a critical enterprise to an order of an altogether different kind-
a totalizing set of realtionships among an institution of artistic production, an emergent
economic and political authority, and their constituencies and audiences. Perhaps it is
146Sigmund Freud, "Further Remarks on the Neuropsychology of Defence," 1962 [1896], in Freud,
Standard Edition, vol. 3, 185; my emphasis
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simply an example of how an architecture, produced by the accidents of a certain
history, can be dislodged and pressed into the service of a quite different one,
reinvested with new and unexpected content, and adapted to unsuspected ideological
functions. Perhaps. But more important, what I have been describing illustrates, I
believe, the way authority is revalidated, however unwittingly, by intellectuals
operating by rational consent to articulate, maintain, or elaborate some prior idea or
world view. Authority is maintained by the consensus of cultural agents - by
affirmation of what exists - as well as by repression: in the final evaluation of
Hilberseimer's work, this is what must be constantly confronted.
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418. Ludwig Hilberseimer, Hochhausstadt,
1924, east-west street
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422. Alexander Archipendo, Painting-
Sculpture, 1917
423. Viking Eggeling, Studies for Diagonal
Symphony I, c. 1915-17, three stages
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424. Hilberseimer, Wohnstadt, 1923: (a)
plan, (b) perspective of street, (c) residential
blocks, (d) perspectives of cell interiors
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425. Hilberseimer, industrial building,
1922
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